NOT TO BE ISSUED
OUT OF THE LIBRARY.

BOMBAY BRANCH
OF THE
ROYAL ASIATIC SOCIETY.
TOWN HALL, BOMBAY.

Digitized with financial assistance from the
Government of Maharashtra
on 15 June, 2016

AN ESSAY ON THE NATURE *and* CONDUCT OF THE *Passions* and *Affections.* WITH ILLUSTRATIONS On the MORAL SENSE.

59703

By the Author of the Inquiry into the Original of our Ideas of *Beauty* and *Virtue.*

Hoc opus, hoc ſtudium, parvi properemus, & ampli,
Si Patriæ volumus, ſi Nobis vivere chari. Hor.

LONDON:

Printed by *J. Darby* and *T. Browne*, for *John Smith* and *William Bruce*, Bookſellers in *Dublin*; and ſold by *J. Osborn* and *T. Longman* in *Pater-Noſter-Row*, and *S. Chandler* in the *Poultrey*. M.DCC.XXVIII.

00059703

THE PREFACE.

ALTHO the main *practical Principles*, which are inculcated in this Treatiſe, have this Prejudice in their Favour, that they have been taught and propagated by the beſt of Men in all Ages, yet there is reaſon to fear that renewed Treatiſes upon Subjects ſo often well manag'd, may be look'd upon as *ſuperfluous*; eſpecially ſince little is offer'd upon them which has not often been well ſaid before. But

beſide that general Conſideration, that old Arguments may ſometimes be ſet in ſuch a Light by one, as will convince thoſe who were not moved by them, even when better expreſs'd by another; ſince, for every Claſs of *Writers*, there are Claſſes of *Readers* adapted, who cannot reliſh any thing higher: Beſides this, I ſay, the very *Novelty* of a Book may procure a little Attention, from thoſe who over-look the Writings which the World has long enjoy'd. And if by *Curioſity*, or any other means, ſome few can be engag'd to turn their Thoughts to theſe important Subjects, about which a little *Reflection* will diſcover the Truth, and a thorow *Conſideration* of it may occaſion a great Increaſe of real Happineſs; no Perſon need be aſham'd of his Labours as uſeleſs, which do ſuch Service to any of his Fellow-Creatures.

IF any ſhould look upon ſome Things in this *Inquiry into the Paſſions*, as too ſubtile for common Apprehenſion, and conſequently not neceſſary for the Inſtruction of Men in *Morals*, which are the common buſineſs of Mankind: Let them conſider, that the Difficulty on theſe Subjects ariſes chiefly from ſome *previous Notions*, equally difficult at leaſt, which have been already receiv'd, to the great Detriment of many a *Natural Temper*; ſince many have been diſcourag'd from all Attempts of cultivating *kind generous Affections* in themſelves, by a previous Notion that there are no ſuch Affections in Nature, and that all Pretence to them was only *Diſſimulation*, *Affectation*, or at beſt ſome *unnatural Enthuſiaſm*. And farther, that to diſcover Truth on theſe Subjects, nothing more is neceſſary than a little *Attention to what paſſes in our own Hearts*,

and conſequently every Man may come to Certainty in theſe Points, without much Art or Knowledge of other Matters.

WHATEVER Confuſion the *Schoolmen* introduced into Philoſophy, ſome of their keeneſt *Adverſaries* ſeem to threaten it with a worſe kind of Confuſion, by attempting to take away ſome of the moſt *immediate ſimple Perceptions*, and to explain all *Approbation*, *Condemnation*, *Pleaſure* and *Pain*, by ſome intricate Relations to the Perceptions of the *External Senſes*. In like manner they have treated our *Deſires* or *Affections*, making the moſt generous, kind and diſintereſted of them, to proceed from *Self-Love*, by ſome ſubtle Trains of Reaſoning, to which honeſt Hearts are often wholly Strangers.

LET

LET this alſo ſtill be remembred that the *natural Diſpoſitions* of Mankind will operate regularly in thoſe who never reflected upon them, nor form'd juſt Notions about them. Many are really *virtuous* who cannot explain what *Virtue* is. Some act a moſt generous diſintereſted Part in Life, who have been taught to account for all their Actions by *Self-Love*, as their ſole Spring. There have been very different and oppoſite Opinions in *Opticks*, contrary Accounts have been given of *Hearing*, *voluntary Motion*, *Digeſtion*, and other *natural Actions*. But the Powers themſelves in reality perform their ſeveral Operations with ſufficient Conſtancy and Uniformity, in Perſons of good Health, whatever their Opinions be about them. In the ſame manner our *moral Actions* and *Affections* may be in good order, when our Opini-

ons are quite wrong about them. *True Opinions* however, about both, may enable us to *improve* our natural Powers, and to *rectify* accidental Diſorders incident unto them. And true Speculations on theſe Subjects muſt certainly be attended with as much *Pleaſure* as any other Parts of Human Knowledge.

IT may perhaps ſeem ſtrange, that when in this *Treatiſe* Virtue is ſuppos'd *diſintereſted*; yet ſo much Pains is taken, by a *Compariſon* of our ſeveral *Pleaſures*, to prove the *Pleaſures* of *Virtue* to be the greateſt we are capable of, and that conſequently it is our trueſt *Intereſt* to be *virtuous*. But let it be remember'd here, that tho there can be no *Motives* or *Arguments* ſuggeſted which can directly raiſe any *ultimate Deſire*, ſuch as that of our *own Happineſs*, or *publick Affections* (as we attempt to prove in *Treatiſe* IV;) yet

yet if both are *natural Diſpoſitions* of our Minds, and nothing can ſtop the Operation of *publick Affections* but ſome *ſelfiſh Intereſt*, the only way to give publick Affections their full Force, and to make them prevalent in our Lives, muſt be to remove theſe *Opinions of oppoſite Intereſts*, and to ſhew a ſuperior Intereſt on their ſide. If theſe Conſiderations be juſt and ſufficiently attended to, a *natural Diſpoſition* can ſcarce fail to exert it ſelf to the full.

IN this *Eſſay on the Paſſions*, the Proofs and Illuſtrations of a *moral Senſe*, and *Senſe of Honour* are not mention'd; becauſe they are ſo, in the *Inquiry into Moral Good and Evil*, in the firſt and fifth *Sections*. Would Men reflect upon what they feel in themſelves, all *Proofs* in ſuch Matters would be needleſs.

SOME

SOME ſtrange Love of *Simplicity* in the Structure of human Nature, or Attachment to ſome favourite *Hypotheſis*, has engag'd many *Writers* to paſs over a great many *ſimple Perceptions*, which we may find in our ſelves. We have got the Number *Five* fixed for our *external Senſes*, tho *Seven* or *Ten* might as eaſily be defended. We have Multitudes of Perceptions which have no relation to any *external Senſation*; if by it we mean *Perceptions, occaſion'd by Motions or Impreſſions made on our Bodies*; ſuch as the Ideas of *Number, Duration, Proportion, Virtue, Vice, Pleaſures of Honour, of Congratulation*; *the Pains of Remorſe, Shame, Sympathy*, and many others. It were to be wiſh'd, that thoſe who are at ſuch Pains to prove a beloved Maxim, that "all Ideas ariſe from *Senſation* and *Reflection*," had ſo explain'd

plain'd themſelves, that none ſhould take their Meaning to be, that all our Ideas are either *external Senſations*, or *reflex Acts* upon *external Senſations*: Or if by *Reflection* they mean an *inward Power of Perception*, as I fancy they do, they had as carefully examin'd into the ſeveral kinds of *internal Perceptions*, as they have done into the *external Senſations*: that we might have ſeen whether the former be not as *natural* and *neceſſary* as the latter. Had they in like manner conſider'd our *Affections* without a previous Notion, that they were all from *Self-Love*, they might have felt an *ultimate Deſire* of the Happineſs of others as eaſily conceivable, and as certainly implanted in the human Breaſt, tho perhaps not ſo ſtrong as *Self-Love*.

THE Author hopes this imperfect *Eſſay* will be favourably receiv'd,

ceiv'd, till ſome Perſon of greater Abilities and Leiſure apply himſelf to a more ſtrict Philoſophical Inquiry into the various *natural Principles* or *natural Diſpoſitions* of Mankind; from which perhaps a more exact Theory of Morals may be form'd, than any which has yet appear'd: and hopes that this Attempt, to ſhew the fair ſide of the human Temper, may be of ſome little uſe towards this great End.

THE principal Objections offer'd by Mr. *Clarke* of *Hull*, againſt the ſecond Section of the ſecond *Treatiſe*, occurr'd to the Author in Converſation, and had appriz'd him of the neceſſity of a farther illuſtration of *diſintereſted Affections*, in anſwer to his Scheme of deducing them from *Self-Love*, which ſeem'd more ingenious than any which the Author of the *Inquiry* ever yet ſaw in print. He takes better from Mr. *Clarke*, all other

other Parts of his Treatment, than the raiſing ſuch an Outcry againſt him as *injurious to Chriſtianity*, for Principles which ſome of the moſt *zealous Chriſtians* have publickly maintain'd: He hopes Mr. *Clarke* will be ſatisfy'd upon this Point, as well as about the Scheme of *diſintereſted Affections*, by what is offer'd in the Treatiſe on the *Paſſions*, Sect. I. and deſignedly placed here, rather than in any diſtinct *Rep'y*, both to avoid the diſagreeable Work of *Anſwering* or *Remarking* upon Books, wherein it is hard to keep off too keen and offenſive Expreſſions; and alſo, that thoſe who have had any of the former Editions of the Inquiry, might not be at a loſs about any *Illuſtrations* or additional *Proofs* neceſſary to complete the Scheme.

THE laſt Treatiſe had never ſeen the Light, had not ſome worthy *Gen-*

Gentlemen miſtaken ſome things about the moral Senſe alledg'd to be in Mankind: Their Objections gave Opportunity of farther Inquiry into the ſeveral *Schemes* of accounting for our *moral Ideas*, which ſome apprehend to be wholly different from, and independent on, that *Senſe* which the Author attempts to eſtabliſh. The following Papers attempt to ſhew, that all theſe *Schemes* muſt neceſſarily preſuppoſe this *moral Senſe*, and be reſolv'd into it: Nor does the Author endeavour to over-turn them, or repreſent them as unneceſſary Superſtructures upon the Foundation of a moral Senſe; tho what he has ſuggeſted will probably ſhew a conſiderable Confuſion in ſome of the Terms much uſed on theſe Subjects. One may eaſily ſee from the great *variety of Terms*, and diverſity of *Schemes* invented, that all Men *feel* ſomething in their own Hearts recommending Virtue, which

yet

yet it is difficult to explain. This Difficulty probably ariſes from our previous Notions of a ſmall Number of *Senſes*, ſo that we are unwilling to have recourſe in our Theories to any more; and rather ſtrain out ſome Explication of moral Ideas, with relation to ſome other natural Powers of Perception univerſally acknowledg'd. The like difficulty attends ſeveral other *Perceptions*, to the Reception of which Philoſophers have not generally aſſigned their *diſtinct Senſes*; ſuch as *natural Beauty*, *Harmony*, the Perfection of *Poetry*, *Architecture*, *Deſigning*, and ſuch like Affairs of Genius, Taſte, or Fancy: The Explications or Theories on theſe Subjects are in like manner full of Confuſion and Metaphor.

To define *Virtue* by *agreeableneſs to this moral Senſe*, or deſcribing it to be *kind Affection*, may appear

appear perhaps too uncertain; conſidering that the Senſe of particular Perſons is often depraved by *Cuſtom*, *Habits*, falſe Opinions, Company: and that ſome *particular kind Paſſions* toward ſome Perſons are really pernicious, and attended with very unkind Affections toward others, or at leaſt with a Neglect of their Intereſts. We muſt therefore only aſſert in general, that "every "one calls that Temper, or thoſe "Actions *virtuous*, which are ap-"prov'd by his *own Senſe*;" and withal, that "abſtracting from par-"ticular Habits or Prejudices, every "one is ſo conſtituted as to approve "every *particular kind Affection* "toward any one, which argues no "*want of Affection* toward others. "And conſtantly to approve that "Temper which deſires, and thoſe "Actions which tend to procure "the greateſt Moment of Good in "the Power of the Agent toward

"the

" the moſt extenſive Syſtem to " which it can reach;" and conſequently, that the Perfection of Virtue conſiſts in " having the *uni-* " *verſal calm Benevolence*, the pre- " valent Affection of the Mind, ſo " as to limit and counteract not on- " ly the *ſelfiſh Paſſions*, but even " the *particular kind Affections*."

OUR *moral Senſe* ſhews this to be the higheſt Perfection of our Nature; what we may ſee to be the *End* or *Deſign* of ſuch a Structure, and conſequently what is requir'd of us by the Author of our Nature: and therefore if any one like theſe Deſcriptions better, he may call Virtue, with many of the Antients, " *Vita ſecundum naturam*;" or " acting according to what we " may ſee from the Conſtitution " of our Nature, we were in- " tended for by our Creator."

IF this *Moral Senſe* were once ſet in a convincing Light, thoſe vain Shadows of Objections againſt a virtuous Life, in which ſome are wonderfully delighted, would ſoon vaniſh: alledging, that, whatever we admire or honour in a *moral Species*, is the effect of *Art*, *Education*, *Cuſtom*, *Policy*, or ſubtle Views of Intereſt; we ſhould then acknowledge

Quid ſumus, & quidnam victuri gignimur. Perſ.

'TIS true, a *Power of Reaſoning* is natural to us; and we muſt own, that all Arts and Sciences which are well founded, and tend to direct our Actions, are, if not to be called *Natural*, an *Improvement upon our Nature*: yet if Virtue be look'd upon as wholly Artificial, there are I know not what Suſpicions againſt it; as if indeed it

it might tend to the greater Intereſt of *large Bodies* or *Societies* of Men, or to that of their *Governors*; whereas a private Perſon may better find his *Intereſt*, or enjoy greater Pleaſures in the Practices counted *vicious*, eſpecially if he has any Probability of *Secrecy* in them. Theſe Suſpicions muſt be entirely remov'd, if we have a *moral Senſe* and *publick Affections*, whoſe Gratifications are conſtituted by Nature, our moſt intenſe and durable *Pleaſures*.

I HOPE it is a good Omen of ſomething ſtill better on this Subject to be expected in the learned World, that Mr. *Butler*, in his Sermons at the *Rolls Chapel*, has done ſo much Juſtice to the wiſe and good Order of our Nature; that the Gentlemen, who have oppos'd ſome other Sentiments of the Author of the *Inquiry*, ſeem convinc'd of a *moral*

ral Senſe. Some of them have by a Miſtake made a Compliment to the Author, which does not belong to him; as if the World were any way indebted to him for this Diſcovery. He has too often met with the *Senſus Decori & Honeſti*, and with the Δύναμις ἀγαθοειδὴς, to aſſume any ſuch thing to himſelf.

SOME Letters in the *London* Journals, ſubſcribed *Philaretus*, gave the firſt Occaſion to the *Fourth Treatiſe*; the Anſwers given to them bore too viſible Marks of the Hurry in which they were wrote, and therefore the *Author* declined to continue the Debate that way; chuſing to ſend a private Letter to *Philaretus*, to deſire a more private Correſpondence on the Subject of our Debate. I, have been ſince informed, that his Death diſappointed my great Expectations from

ſo

ſo ingenious a Correſpondent. The *Objections* propoſed in the firſt *Section* of *Treatiſe* IV, are not always thoſe of *Philaretus*, tho I have endeavour'd to leave no Objections of his unanſwer'd; but I alſo interſperſed whatever Objections occurr'd to me in Converſation on theſe Subjects. I hope I have not uſed any Expreſſions inconſiſtent with the high Regard I have for the Memory of ſo ingenious a Gentleman, and of ſuch Diſtinction in the World.

THE laſt *Section* of the *Fourth Treatiſe*, was occaſion'd by a private Letter from a Perſon of the moſt real Merit, in *Glaſgow*; repreſenting to me ſome Sentiments not uncommon among good Men, which might prejudice them againſt any Scheme of *Morals*, not wholly founded upon *Piety*. This Point is, I hope, ſo treated, as to remove the Difficulty.

THE

THE Deference due to a Perſon, who has appear'd ſo much in the learned World, as M. *Le Clerc*, would ſeem to require, that I ſhould make ſome Defenſe againſt, or Submiſſion to, the Remarks he makes in his *Bibliotheque Ancienne & Moderne*. But I cannot but conclude from his Abſtract, eſpecially from that of the *laſt Section* of the *Inquiry*, either that I don't underſtand his *French*, or he my *Engliſh*, or that he has never read more than the Titles of ſome of the *Sections*: and if any one of the three be the Caſe, we are not fit for a Controverſy.

IN the References, at bottom of Pages, the Inquiry into *Beauty* is called *Treatiſe* I. That into the Ideas of moral Good and Evil, is *Treatiſe* II. The Eſſay on the Paſſions, *Treatiſe* III. And the Illuſtrations on the moral Senſe, *Treatiſe* IV.

THE

THE

CONTENTS.

TREATISE I.

An Eſſay on the Nature and Conduct of the Paſſions.

SECT. I. *A General Account of our ſeveral* Senſes *and* Deſires, *Selfiſh or Publick.* Page 1.

SECT. II. *Of the* Affections *and* Paſſions: *The natural* Laws of pure Affection: *The* confuſed Senſations *of the Paſſions, with their* final Cauſes. 27.

SECT. III. *Particular Diviſions of the* Affections and Paſſions. 58.

SECT. IV. *How far our ſeveral* Affections *and* Paſſions *are under our* Power, *either to govern them when raiſed, or to prevent their ariſing: with ſome general Obſervations about their* Objects. 88.

SECT. V. *A Compariſon of the Pleaſures and Pains of the ſeveral Senſes, as to Intenſeneſs and Duration.* 126.

SECT.

CONTENTS.

SECT. VI. *Some general* Concluſions *concerning the beſt* Management *of our Deſires. With ſome Principles neceſſary to* Happineſs. Page 165.

TREATISE II.

ILLUSTRATIONS upon the Moral Senſe. Page 205.

SECT. I. *Concerning the Character of Virtue,* agreable to Truth or Reaſon. 213.

SECT. II. *Concerning that Character of* Virtue *and* Vice; *the* Fitneſs *or* Unfitneſs of Actions. 245.

SECT. III. *Mr.* Woolaſton's Significancy *of* Truth, *as the Idea of* Virtue *conſider'd.* 253.

SECT. IV. *Shewing the Uſe of* Reaſon *concerning* Virtue *and* Vice, *upon Suppoſition that we receive theſe Ideas by a* Moral Senſe. 275.

SECT. V. *Shewing that* Virtue *may have whatever is meant by* Merit; *and be rewardable upon the Suppoſition that it is perceived by a* Senſe, *and elected from* Affection *or* Inſtinct. 288.

SECT. VI. *How far a Regard to the Deity is neceſſary to make an Action virtuous.* 301.

AN

AN ESSAY ON THE NATURE and CONDUCT OF THE PASSIONS

SECT. I.

A general Account of our ſeveral SENSES *and* DESIRES, Selfiſh *or* Publick.

THE Nature of human Actions cannot be ſufficiently underſtood without conſidering the *Affections* and *Paſſions*; or thoſe *Modifications, or Actions of the Mind conſequent upon the Apprehenſion of certain Objects or Events, in which the Mind generally conceives Good or Evil.*

Sect. 1. In this Inquiry we need little *Reaſoning*, or *Argument*, ſince Certainty is only attainable by diſtinct *Attention* to what we are *conſcious* happens in our Minds.

Art. I. "OBJECTS, Actions or Events "obtain the Name of *Good*, or *Evil*, ac- "cording as they are the Cauſes, or Occa- "ſions, mediately, or immediately, of "a grateful, or ungrateful *Perception* "to ſome ſenſitive Nature." To underſtand therefore the ſeveral Kinds of *Good*, or *Evil*, we muſt apprehend the ſeveral *Senſes* natural to us.

THERE ſeems to be ſome *Senſe* or other ſuited to every ſort of Objects which occurs to us, by which we receive either *Pleaſure*, or *Pain* from a great part of them, as well as ſome *Image*, or *Apprehenſion* of them: Nay, ſometimes our only *Idea* is a *Perception of Pleaſure*, or *Pain*. The Pleaſures or Pains perceived, are ſometimes *ſimple*, without any other previous Idea, or any Image, or other concomitant Ideas, ſave thoſe of *Extenſion*, or of *Duration*; one of which accompanies every Perception, whether of *Senſe*, or *inward Conſciouſneſs*. Other Pleaſures ariſe only upon ſome *previous Idea*, or *Aſſemblage*, or *Compariſon of Ideas*. Theſe Pleaſures, preſuppoſing previous Ideas, were called *Perceptions* of an *internal Senſe*, in a former

men Treatiſe *. Thus *Regularity* and *Uni-* Sect. 1.
formity in Figures, are no leſs grateful than *Taſtes*; or *Smells*; the *Harmony* of Notes, is more grateful than ſimple Sounds †. In like

* INQUIRY into BEAUTY.

† It is not eaſy to divide diſtinctly our ſeveral *Senſations* into Claſſes. The Diviſion of our *External Senſes* into the five common Claſſes, is ridiculouſly imperfect. Some *Senſations*, received without any previous Idea, can either be reduced to none of them, ſuch as the Senſations of *Hunger*, *Thirſt*, *Wearineſs*, *Sickneſs*; or if we reduce them to the Senſe of *Feeling*, they are Perceptions as different from the other *Ideas* of Touch, ſuch as *Cold*, *Heat*, *Hardneſs*, *Softneſs*, as the *Ideas* of *Taſte* or *Smell*. Others have hinted at an External Senſe different from all of theſe. The following general Account may poſſibly be uſeful. (1.) That certain Motions raiſed in our Bodies are by a *general Law* conſtituted the Occaſion of *Perceptions* in the Mind. (2.) Theſe Perceptions never come entirely alone, but have ſome other *Perception* joined with them. Thus every Senſation is accompanied with the *Idea* of *Duration*, and yet *Duration* is not a ſenſible *Idea*, ſince it alſo accompanies *Ideas* of *Internal Conſciouſneſs* or Reflection: So the *Idea* of *Number* may accompany any ſenſible Ideas, and yet may alſo accompany any other Ideas, as well as external Senſations. (3.) Some *Ideas* are found accompanying the moſt different Senſations, which yet are not to be perceived ſeparately from ſome *ſenſible Quality*; ſuch are *Extenſion*, *Figure*, *Motion*, and *Reſt*, which accompany the *Ideas* of Sight, or Colours, and yet may be perceived without them, as in the *Ideas* of *Touch*, at leaſt if we move our Organs along the Parts of the Body touched. *Extenſion*, *Figure*, *Motion*, or *Reſt* ſeem therefore to be more properly called *Ideas accompanying* the Senſations of *Sight* and *Touch*, than the Senſations of either of theſe Senſes. The *Perceptions* which are purely ſenſible, received each by its proper Senſe, are *Taſtes*, *Smells*, *colours*, *Sound*, *Cold*, *Heat*, &c. The univerſal Concomitant *Ideas* which may attend any *Idea* whatſoever, are *Duration*, and *Number*. The *Ideas* which accompany the moſt different Senſations, are *Extenſion*, *Figure*, *Motion*, *Reſt*. Theſe all ariſe without any previous *Ideas* aſſembled, or compared:

Sect. 1. like manner, *Affections*, *Tempers*, *Sentiments*, or *Actions*, reflected upon in our ſelves, or obſerved in others, are the conſtant *Occaſions* of agreeable or diſagreeable Perceptions, which we call *Approbation*, or *Diſlike*. Theſe *Moral Perceptions* ariſe in us as neceſſarily as any other Senſations; nor can we alter, or ſtop them, while our *previous Opinion* or *Apprehenſion* of the *Affection*, *Temper*, or *Intention* of the Agent continues the ſame; any more than we can make the Taſte of Wormwood ſweet, or that of Honey bitter.

If we may call *every Determination of our Minds to receive Ideas independently on our Will, and to have Perceptions of Pleaſure and Pain*, A Sense, we ſhall find many other *Senſes* beſide thoſe commonly explained. Tho it is not eaſy to aſſign accurate Diviſions on ſuch Subjects, yet we may reduce them to the following Claſſes, leaving it to others to arrange them as they think convenient. A little Reflection will ſhew that there are ſuch *Natural*

---

the Concomitant *Ideas* are reputed Images of ſomething External.

From all theſe we may juſtly diſtinguiſh "the Pleaſures "perceived upon the previous Reception and Compariſon of "various ſenſible Perceptions, with their concomitant Ideas, "or intellectual Ideas, when we find Uniformity, or Re-"ſemblance among them." Theſe are meant by *the Perceptions of the internal Senſe*.

Powers

Powers in the human Mind, in whatever Order we place them. In the 1ſt Claſs are the *External Senſes*, univerſally known. In the 2d, the *Pleaſant Perceptions* ariſing from *regular, harmonious, uniform* Objects; as alſo from *Grandeur* and *Novelty*. Thoſe we may call, after Mr. ADDISON, the Pleaſures of the *Imagination*; or we may call the Power of receiving them, an *Interior Senſe*. Whoever diſlikes this Name may ſubſtitute another. 3. The next Claſs of Perceptions we may call a *Publick Senſe*, *viz.* "our Determination "to be pleaſed with the *Happineſs* of o-"thers, and to be uneaſy at their *Miſery*." This is found in ſome degree in all Men, and was ſometimes called Κοινονοημοσύνη, or *Senſus Communis* by ſome of the Antients. 4. The fourth Claſs we may call the *Moral Senſe*, by which "we perceive *Virtue*, or *Vice* in our ſelves, or others." This is plainly diſtinct from the former Claſs of Perceptions, ſince many are ſtrongly affected with the Fortunes of others, who ſeldom reflect upon *Virtue, or Vice* in themſelves, or others, as an Object: as we may find in *Natural Affection, Compaſſion, Friendſhip*, or even *general Benevolence* to Mankind, which connect our Happineſs or Pleaſure with that of others, even when we are not reflecting upon our own Temper, nor delighted with the Perception of our own Virtue. 5. The fifth

Sect. 1.

Sect. 1. Claſs is a *Senſe of Honour*, "which makes "the *Approbation*, or *Gratitude* of others, "for any good Actions we have done, the "neceſſary occaſion of Pleaſure; and their "*Diſlike*, *Condemnation*, or *Reſentment* "of Injuries done by us, the occaſion of "that uneaſy Senſation called *Shame*, even "when we fear no further evil from them."

THERE are perhaps other *Perceptions* diſtinct from all theſe Claſſes, ſuch as ſome Ideas "of *Decency*, *Dignity*, *Suitableneſs to* "*human Nature* in certain Actions and Cir- "cumſtances; and of an *Indecency*, *Mean-* "*neſs*, and *Unworthineſs*, in the contrary "Actions or Circumſtances, even without "any conception of *Moral* Good, or E- "vil." Thus the Pleaſures of *Sight*, and *Hearing*, are more eſteemed than thoſe of Taſte or Touch: The Purſuits of the Pleaſures of the *Imagination*, are more approved than thoſe of ſimple external Senſations. *Plato* * accounts for this difference from a conſtant Opinion of *Innocence* in this ſort of Pleaſures, which would reduce this Perception to the Moral Senſe. Others may imagine that the difference is not owing to any ſuch Reflection upon their *Innocence*, but that there is a different ſort of Perceptions in theſe caſes, to be reckoned another *Claſs of Senſations*.

* Hippias Major. See alſo *Treat.* 2. *Sect.* 5. *Art.* 7.

II.

Sect. 1.

A like Division of our Desires.

I. DESIRES arise in our Mind, from the Frame of our Nature, upon Apprehension of Good or Evil in Objects, Actions, or Events, to obtain for our *selves* or *others* the *agreeable Sensation*, when the Object or Event is good; or to prevent the *uneasy Sensation*, when it is evil. Our original Desires and Aversions may therefore be divided into five Classes, answering to the Classes of our Senses. 1. The Desire of *sensual Pleasure*, (by which we mean that of the external Senses); and Aversion to the opposite Pains. 2. The Desires of the *Pleasures of Imagination* or Internal Sense *, and Aversion to what is disagreeable to it. 3. Desires of the Pleasures arising from *Publick Happiness*, and Aversion to the Pains arising from the *Misery of others*. 4. Desires of *Virtue*, and Aversion to *Vice*, according to the Notions we have of the Tendency of Actions to the Publick Advantage or Detriment. 5. Desires of *Honour*, and *Aversion* to Shame †.

THE third Class of *Publick Desires* contains many very different sorts of Affections, all those which tend toward the *Happiness of others*, or the removal of Misery; such as those of *Gratitude*, *Com-*

* See *Treat.* 1. † See *Treat.* 2. *Sect.* 5. *Art* 3——8.

Sect. 1. *paſſion, Natural Affection, Friendſhip*, or the more extenſive calm *Deſire of the Univerſal Good* of all ſenſitive Natures, which our moral Senſe approves as the Perfection of Virtue, even when it limits, and counteracts the narrower Attachments of Love.

Secondary Deſires of Wealth & Power.

Now ſince we are capable of *Reflection, Memory, Obſervation*, and *Reaſoning* about the diſtant Tendencies of Objects and Actions, and not confined to things preſent, there muſt ariſe, in conſequence of our *original Deſires*, "*ſecondary Deſires* "of every thing imagined uſeful to gratify "any of the primary Deſires, with ſtrength "proportioned to the ſeveral original De- "ſires, and the imagined Uſefulneſs, or "Neceſſity, of the advantageous Object." Hence it is that as ſoon as we come to apprehend the Uſe of *Wealth* or *Power* to gratify any of our original Deſires, we muſt alſo deſire them. Hence ariſes the *Univerſality* of theſe Deſires of Wealth and Power, ſince they are the Means of gratifying all other Deſires. "How fooliſh then is the "Inference, ſome would make, from the "univerſal Prevalence of theſe Deſires, that "human Nature is wholly ſelfiſh, or that "each one is only ſtudious of his *own* "*Advantage*; ſince Wealth or Power are "as naturally fit to gratify our *Publick* "*Deſires*, or to ſerve *virtuous Purpoſes*, "as the *ſelfiſh* ones?"

"How

Sect. 1

"How weak alſo are the Reaſonings "of ſome recluſe Moraliſts, who condemn "in general all Purſuits of Wealth or Power, "as below a perfectly virtuous Character: "ſince Wealth and Power are the moſt ef- "fectual *Means*, and the moſt powerful "*Inſtruments*, even of the greateſt Vir- "tues, and moſt generous Actions?" The Purſuit of them is laudable, when the *Intention* is virtuous; and the neglect of them, when honourable Opportunities offer, is really a Weakneſs. This juſtifies the Poet's Sentiment:

——Hic onus horret,
Ut parvis animis & parvo Corpore majus:
Hic ſubit & perfert: aut virtus nomen inane eſt,
Aut Decus & Pretium recte petit experiens Vir.
HOR. *Epiſt.* 17.

"FURTHER, the *Laws* or *Cuſtoms* of "a Country, the *Humour* of our Company "may have made ſtrange *Aſſociations* of "*Ideas*, ſo that ſome Objects, which of "themſelves are indifferent to any Senſe, "by reaſon of ſome *additional* grateful "*Idea*, may become very deſirable; or by "like *Addition* of an ungrateful *Idea* may "raiſe the ſtrongeſt Averſion." Thus many a Trifle, when once it is made a *Badge* of *Honour*, an Evidence of ſome *generous Diſpoſition*, a Monument of ſome *great Action*, may be impatiently purſued,

from

Sect. 1. from our Deſire of Honour. When any *Circumſtance*, *Dreſs*, *State*, *Poſture* is conſtituted as a Mark of *Infamy*, it may become in like manner the Object of Averſion, tho in it ſelf moſt inoffenſive to our Senſes. If a certain way of *Living*, of *receiving Company*, of *ſhewing Courteſy*, is once received among thoſe who are honoured; they who cannot bear the Expence of this may be made uneaſy at their Condition, tho much freer from Trouble than that of higher Stations. Thus *Dreſs*, *Retinue*, *Equipage*, *Furniture*, *Behaviour*, and *Diverſions* are made Matters of conſiderable Importance by additional *Ideas* *. Nor is it in vain that the wiſeſt and greateſt Men regard theſe things; for however it may concern them to break ſuch Aſſociations in their own Minds, yet, ſince the bulk of Mankind will retain them, they muſt comply with their Sentiments and Humours in things innocent, as they expect the *publick Eſteem*, which is generally neceſſary to enable Men to ſerve the Publick.

The Uſes of theſe Aſſociations.

SHOULD any one be ſurprized at this *Diſpoſition* in our Nature to aſſociate any *Ideas* together for the future, which once preſented themſelves jointly, conſidering what great *Evils*, and how much *Corrup-*

* See 1 *Treat. Sect.* 1. *Art.* 7. and 2 *Treat. Sect.* 6. *Art.* 2.

tion

tion of Affections is owing to it, it may help to account for this Part of our Constitution, to conſider "that all our *Lan-* "*guage* and much of our *Memory* depends "upon it:" So that were there no ſuch *Aſſociations* made, we muſt loſe the uſe of *Words*, and a great part of our Power of *recollecting paſt Events*; beſide many other valuable *Powers* and *Arts* which depend upon them. Let it alſo be conſidered that it is much in our power by a vigorous *Attention* either to prevent *theſe Aſſociations*, or by *Abſtraction* to ſeparate Ideas when it may be uſeful for us to do ſo. Sect. 1.

CONCERNING our Purſuit of *Honour*, 'tis to be obſerv'd, that "ſince our Minds "are incapable of retaining a great Diver- "ſity of Objects, the *Novelty*, or *Singu-* "*larity* of any Object is enough to raiſe a "particular Attention to it among many "of equal Merit:" And therefore were Virtue *univerſal* among Men, yet, 'tis probable, the *Attention* of Obſervers would be turned chiefly toward thoſe who diſtinguiſhed themſelves by ſome *ſingular Ability*, or by ſome Circumſtance, which, however trifling in its own Nature, yet had ſome honourable Ideas commonly joined to it, ſuch as *Magnificence*, *Generoſity*, or the like. We ſhould perhaps, when we conſidered ſedately the common Virtues of others,

Sect. 1. thers, equally love and esteem them *. And yet probably our *Attention* would be generally fixed to those who thus were *distinguished* from the Multitude. Hence our natural Love of Honour, raises in us a Desire of *Distinction*, either by higher Degrees of Virtue; or, if we cannot easily or probably obtain it this way, we attempt it in an easier manner, by any Circumstance, which, thro' a *Confusion of Ideas*, is reputed honourable.

THIS Desire of *Distinction* has great Influence on the Pleasures and Pains of Mankind, and makes them chuse things for their very *Rarity*, *Difficulty*, or *Expence*; by a confused Imagination that they evidence *Generosity*, *Ability*, or a *finer Taste* than ordinary; nay, often the merest Trifles are by these means ardently pursued. A *Form of Dress*, a *foreign Dish*, a *Title*, a *Place*, a *Jewel*; an *useless Problem*, a *Criticism on an obsolete Word*, the *Origin of a Poetic Fable*, the *Situation of a razed Town*, may employ many an Hour in tedious Labour:

Sic leve, sic parvum est, animum quod laudis avarum
Subruit aut reficit: —— HOR.

* See 2 *Treat. Sect.* 3. last Parag.

Art.

Sect. I.

Art. III. THERE is another Diviſion of our Deſires taken from the Perſons for whoſe Advantage we purſue or ſhun any Object. *Deſires, ſelfiſh and publick.*

The Deſires in which one intends or "purſues what he apprehends advantageous "to himſelf, we may call SELFISH; and "thoſe in which we purſue what we appre- "hend advantageous to others, and do "not apprehend advantageous to *our ſelves*, "or do not purſue with this view, we "may call *Publick* or BENEVOLENT "Deſires." If there be a juſt Foundation for this Diviſion, it is more extenſive than the former Diviſion, ſince each of the former Claſſes may come under either Member of this Diviſion, according as we are deſiring any of the five ſorts of Pleaſures *for our ſelves*, or deſiring them *for others*. The former Diviſion may therefore be conceived as a Subdiviſion of the latter.

THIS Diviſion has been diſputed ſince *Epicurus*; who with his old Followers, and ſome of late, who deteſt other parts of his Scheme, maintain, "that all our De- "ſires are *ſelfiſh*: or, that what every "one intends or deſigns ultimately, in "each Action, is the obtaining Pleaſure "to *himſelf*, or the avoiding his own *pri- "vate Pain*."*

* See *Cicero de finib. lib.* 1.

IT

Sect. 1.

IT requires a good deal of Subtilty to defend this Scheme, ſo ſeemingly oppoſite to *Natural Affection*, *Friendſhip*, *Love of a Country*, *or Community*, which many find very ſtrong in their Breaſts. The Defenſes and Schemes commonly offered, can ſcarce free the Sustainers of this Cauſe from manifeſt Abſurdity and *Affectation*. But ſome do * acknowledge a *publick Senſe* in many Inſtances; eſpecially in *natural Affection*, and *Compaſſion*; by which "the "Obſervation of the Happineſs of others "is made the neceſſary Occaſion of Plea"ſure, and their Miſery the Occaſion of "Pain to the Obſerver". That this *Sympathy* with others is the Effect of the Conſtitution of our Nature, and not brought upon ourſelves by any Choice, with view to any *ſelfiſh Advantage*, they muſt own: whatever Advantage there may be in Sympathy with the *Fortunate*, none can be alledged in Sympathy with the *Diſtreſſed*: And every one feels that this *publick Senſe* will not leave his Heart, upon a change of the Fortunes of his Child or Friend; nor does it depend upon a Man's *Choice*, whether he will be affected with their Fortunes or not. But ſuppoſing this publick Senſe, they inſiſt, "That by means of it "there is a *Conjunction of Intereſt*: the

* See Mr. *Clark* of *Hull*, his *Remarks on Treat.* 2.

"Hap-

" Happineſs of others becomes the Means Sect. 1.
" of private Pleaſure to the Obſerver;
" and for this Reaſon, or with a View to
" this private Pleaſure, he deſires the Hap-
" pineſs of another." Others deduce our Deſire of the Happineſs of others from Self-love, in a leſs ſpecious manner.

IF a *publick Senſe* be acknowledged in Men, by which the Happineſs of one is made to depend upon that of others, independently of his Choice, this is indeed a ſtrong Evidence of the Goodneſs of the AUTHOR of our Nature. But whether this Scheme does truly account for our *Love of others*, or for *generous Offices*, may be determined from the following Conſiderations; which being matters of *internal Conſciouſneſs*, every one can beſt ſatisfy himſelf by Attention, concerning their Truth and Certainty.

LET it be premiſed, that *Deſire is generally uneaſy, or attended with an uneaſy Senſation*, which is ſomething diſtinct from that uneaſy Senſation ariſing from ſome *Event* or *Object*, the Prevention or Removal of which Senſation we are intending when the Object is apprehended as Evil; as this *uneaſy Senſation of Deſire* is obviouſly different from the *pleaſant Senſation*, expected from the Object or Event which

Sect. 1. which we apprehend as Good. Then it is plain,

1. "THAT no Desire of any Event is "excited by any view of removing the "*uneasy Sensation attending this Desire* "*itself*". Sensations which are *previous* to a *Desire*, or not connected with it, may excite Desire of any Event, apprehended necessary to procure or continue the Sensation if it be pleasant, or to remove it if it be uneasy: But the *uneasy Sensation, accompanying and connected with the Desire itself*, cannot be a Motive to that *Desire* which it presupposes. The *Sensation* accompanying Desire is generally *uneasy*, and consequently our Desire is never raised with a view to obtain or continue it; nor is the Desire raised with a view to *remove* this uneasy *Sensation*, for the Desire is raised previously to it. This holds concerning all *Desire* publick or private.

THERE is also a *pleasant Sensation of Joy*, attending the *Gratification* of any Desire, beside the *Sensation* received from the *Object itself*, which we directly intended. "But Desire does never arise from a View "of obtaining that *Sensation of Joy*, con- "nected with the Success or Gratifica- "tion of Desire; otherwise the strongest "Desires might arise toward any Trifle, "or an Event in all respects indifferent: "Since,

" Since, if Deſire aroſe from *this View*, Sect. 1.
" the ſtronger the Deſire were, the higher
" would be the *Pleaſure of Gratification*;
" and therefore we might deſire the turn-
" ing of a Straw as violently as we do
" *Wealth* or *Power*." This Expectation of the *Pleaſure of gratified Deſire*, would equally excite us to deſire the *Miſery* of others as their Happineſs; ſince the *Pleaſure* of *Gratification* might be obtained from both Events alike.

2. It is certain that, " *that Deſire* of
" the Happineſs of others which we ac-
" count virtuous, is not *directly* excited
" by proſpects of any *ſecular Advantage*,
" *Wealth*, *Power*, *Pleaſure of the ex-*
" *ternal Senſes*, *Reward from the Deity*,
" *or future Pleaſures of Self-Approba-*
" *tion*." To prove this let us conſider,
" That no Deſire of any Event can ariſe
" immediately or directly from an *Opinion*
" in the Agent, that his *having ſuch a*
" *Deſire* will be the Means of private
" Good." This *Opinion* would make us *wiſh* or *deſire* to have that *advantageous Deſire* or *Affection*; and would incline us *to uſe any means* in our power to raiſe that Affection: but no Affection or Deſire is raiſed in us, directly by our *volition* or *deſiring* it. That alone which raiſes in us from *Self-Love* the Deſire of any Event, is an *Opinion* that *that Event* is the *Means*

Sect. 1. of private Good. As ſoon as we form this Opinion, a Deſire of the Event immediately ariſes: But if *having the Deſire or Affection* be imagined the *Means* of private Good, and not the *Exiſtence of the Event deſired*, then from *Self-Love* we ſhould only deſire or wiſh to have the *Deſire* of that Event, and ſhould not deſire the *Event* itſelf, ſince the *Event* is not conceived as the *Means* of Good.

For inſtance, ſuppoſe God revealed to us that he would confer Happineſs on us, if our *Country were happy*; then from Self-Love we ſhould have immediately *the ſubordinate Deſire* of our Country's Happineſs, as the Means of our own. But were we aſſured that, whether our Country were happy or not, it ſhould not affect our future Happineſs, but that we ſhould be rewarded, provided we *deſired the Happineſs of our Country*; our Self-Love could never make us now deſire the *Happineſs of our Country*, ſince it is not now conceived as the *Means* of our Happineſs, but is perfectly indifferent to it. The Means of our Happineſs is *the having a Deſire of our Country's Happineſs*; we ſhould therefore from Self-Love only *wiſh* to have *this Deſire*.

'Tis true indeed in fact, that, becauſe *Benevolence* is natural to us, a little Attention

tention to other Natures will raiſe in us good-will towards them, whenever by any Opinions we are perſuaded that there is no real *Oppoſition of Intereſt*. But had we no Affection diſtinct from *Self-Love*, nothing could raiſe our *Deſire of the Happineſs of others*, but conceiving their Happineſs as the Means of ours. An Opinion that our having *kind Affections* would be the Means of our private Happineſs, would only make us deſire to have thoſe Affections. Now that Affections do not ariſe upon our *wiſhing* to have them, or our volition of raiſing them; as conceiving the *Affections themſelves* to be the *Means* of private Good; is plain from this, that if they did thus ariſe, then a *Bribe* might raiſe any Deſire toward any Event, or any *Affection* toward the moſt improper Object. We might be hired to *love* or *hate* any ſort of Perſons, to be *angry*, *jealous*, or *compaſſionate*, as we can be engaged into external Actions; which we all ſee to be abſurd. Now thoſe who alledg, that our Benevolence may ariſe from proſpect of *ſecular Advantage*, *Honour*, *Self-Approbation*, *or future Rewards*, muſt own, that theſe are either *Motives only to external Actions*, or *Conſiderations*, ſhewing, that *having the Deſire* of the Happineſs of others, would be the *Means* of private Good; while the *Event* ſuppoſed to be deſired, *viz.* the Happineſs of others, is not Sect. 1.

Sect. 1. ſuppoſed the *Means* of any private Good. But the beſt Defenders of this part of the Scheme of *Epicurus*, acknowledge that "Deſires are not raiſed by *Volition*."

This Diſtinction defended.

3. "THERE are in Men *Deſires of the* "*Happineſs of others*, when they do not "conceive this *Happineſs* as the *Means* "of obtaining any ſort of Happineſs to "themſelves." *Self-Approbation*, or *Rewards* from the Deity, might be the *Ends*, for obtaining which we might poſſibly *deſire* or *will* from Self-Love, to raiſe in our ſelves *kind Affections*; but we could not from *Self-Love* deſire the *Happineſs of others*, but as conceiving it the Means of our own. Now 'tis certain that ſometimes we may have this *ſubordinate Deſire* of the Happineſs of others, conceived as the *Means* of our own; as ſuppoſe one had laid a *Wager* upon the Happineſs of a Perſon of ſuch Veracity, that he would own ſincerely whether he were happy or not; when Men are *Partners in Stock*, and ſhare in Profit or Loſs; when one hopes to *ſucceed to*, or ſome way to *ſhare in* the Proſperity of another; or if the DEITY had given ſuch Threatnings, as they tell us *Telamon* gave his Sons when they went to War, that he would reward or puniſh one according as others were happy or miſerable: In ſuch caſes one might have this *ſubordinate Deſire*

ſire of another's Happineſs from Self-Love. Sect. 1.
But as we are ſure the DEITY has not given ſuch Commanations, ſo we often are conſcious of the *Deſire of the Happineſs of others*, without any ſuch Conception of it as the *Means* of our own; and are ſenſible that this *ſubordinate Deſire* is not that virtuous Affection which we approve. The virtuous Benevolence muſt be an *ultimate Deſire*, which would ſubſiſt without view to private Good. Such *ultimate publick Deſires* we often feel, without any *ſubordinate Deſire* of the ſame Event, as the *Means* of private Good. The *ſubordinate* may ſometimes, nay often does concur with the *ultimate*; and then indeed the *whole Moment* of theſe conſpiring Deſires may be greater than that of either alone: But the *ſubordinate alone* is not that Affection which we approve as virtuous.

Art. IV. THIS will clear our way to anſwer the chief Difficulty: "May not "our Benevolence be at leaſt a *Deſire of* "*the Happineſs of others, as the Means* "*of obtaining the Pleaſures of the publick* "*Senſe, from the Contemplation of their* "*Happineſs?*" If it were ſo, it is very unaccountable that we ſhould approve this *ſubordinate Deſire* as virtuous, and yet not approve the like Deſire upon a *Wager*, or other Conſiderations of Intereſt. Both Deſires proceed from *Self-Love* in the ſame

Benevolence is not the Deſire of the Pleaſures of the publick Senſe.

Sect. 1. manner: In the latter caſe the Deſires might be extended to multitudes, if any one would wager ſo capriciouſly; and, by increaſing the Sum wagered, the *Motive of Intereſt* might, with many Tempers, be made ſtronger than that from the Pleaſures of the publick Senſe.

DON'T we find that we often deſire the Happineſs of others without any ſuch ſelfiſh Intention? How few have thought upon this part of our Conſtitution which we call a *Publick Senſe?* Were it our only View, in *Compaſſion* to free our ſelves from the *Pain of the publick Senſe*; ſhould the DEITY propoſe it to our Choice, either to obliterate all Ideas of the Perſon in Diſtreſs, but to continue him in Miſery, or on the other hand to relieve him from it; ſhould we not upon this Scheme be perfectly indifferent, and chuſe the former as ſoon as the latter? Should the DEITY aſſure us that we ſhould be immediately annihilated, ſo that we ſhould be incapable of either Pleaſure or Pain, but that it ſhould depend upon our Choice at our very Exit, whether our Children, our Friends, or our Country ſhould be happy or miſerable; ſhould we not upon this Scheme be intirely indifferent? Or, if we ſhould even deſire the *pleaſant Thought* of their Happineſs, in our laſt Moment, would not this Deſire be the faineſt imaginable?

'TIS

Sect. 1.

'TIS true, our *Publick Senſe* might be as acute at our Exit as ever; as a Man's Taſte of Meat or Drink might be as lively the inſtant before his Diſſolution as in any part of his Life. But would any Man have as ſtrong *Deſires* of the Means of obtaining theſe Pleaſures, only with a View to himſelf, when he was to periſh the next Moment? Is it ſuppoſable that any *Deſire* of the *Means of private Pleaſure* can be as ſtrong when we only expect to enjoy it a Minute, as when we expect the Continuance of it for many Years? And yet, 'tis certain, any good Man would as ſtrongly deſire at his Exit the *Happineſs of others*, as in any part of his Life. We do not therefore deſire it as the *Means of private Pleaſure*.

SHOULD any alledge, that this Deſire of the Happineſs of others, after our Exit, is from ſome *confuſed Aſſociation of Ideas*; as a Miſer, who loves no body, might deſire an Increaſe of Wealth at his Death; or as any one may have an Averſion to have his Body diſſected, or made a Prey to Dogs after Death: let any honeſt Heart try if the deepeſt Reflection will break this *Aſſociation* (if there be any) which is ſuppoſed to raiſe the Deſire. The cloſeſt Reflection would be found rather to ſtrengthen it.

Sect. 1. How would any *Spectator* like the Temper of one thus rendered indifferent to all others at his own Exit, so that he would not even open his Mouth to procure Happineſs to Poſterity? Would we eſteem it *refined Wiſdom*, or a *Perfection* of Mind, and not rather the vileſt Perverſeneſs? 'Tis plain then we feel this *ultimate Deſire* of the Happineſs of others to be a moſt *natural Inſtinct*, which we alſo expect in others, and not the Effect of any confuſed Ideas.

THE Occaſion of the imagined Difficulty in conceiving *diſintereſted Deſires*, has probably been from the attempting to define this ſimple Idea, *Deſire*. It is called *an uneaſy Senſation in the abſence of Good*. Whereas *Deſire* is as diſtinct from any *Senſation*, as the *Will* is from the *Underſtanding* or *Senſes*. This every one muſt acknowledge, who ſpeaks of *deſiring to remove Uneaſineſs or Pain*.

WE may perhaps find, that our Deſires are ſo far from tending always toward *private Good*, that they are often employ'd about *the State of others*. Nay further, we may have a Propenſity toward an Event, which we neither apprehend as the *Means of private Good, or publick*. Thus an *Epicurean* who denies a future State; or, one to whom

whom God revealed that he ſhould be annihilated, might at his very Exit deſire a *future Fame*, from which he expected no Pleaſure to himſelf, nor intended any to others. Such Deſires indeed no *ſelfiſh Being*, who had the modelling of his own Nature, would chuſe to implant in itſelf. But ſince we have not this power, we muſt be content to be thus "befooled into a "publick Intereſt againſt our Will;" as an ingenious Author expreſſes it. Sect. 1.

THE Proſpect of any *Intereſt* may be a Motive to us, to deſire whatever we apprehend as the *Means* of obtaining it. Particularly, "if *Rewards* of any kind are pro-"poſed to thoſe who have virtuous Affec-"tions, this would raiſe in us the Deſire "of having theſe *Affections*, and would "incline us to uſe all means to raiſe them "in our ſelves; particularly to *turn our* "*Attention* to all thoſe Qualities in the "DEITY, or our Fellows, which are na-"turally apt to raiſe the virtuous Affecti-"ons." Thus it is, that Intereſt of any kind may influence us indirectly to Virtue, and Rewards particularly may over-ballance all Motives to Vice.

THIS may let us ſee, that "the Sancti-"ons of *Rewards* and *Puniſhments*, as "propoſed in the *Goſpel*, are not rendered "uſeleſs

Sect. 1. " uſeleſs or unneceſſary, by ſuppoſing the " virtuous Affection to be *diſintereſted*;" ſince ſuch *Motives of Intereſt*, propoſed and attended to, muſt incline every Perſon to *deſire* to have virtuous Affections, and to *turn his Attention* to every thing which is naturally apt to raiſe them; and muſt *overballance* every other *Motive of Intereſt*, oppoſite to theſe Affections, which could incline Men to ſuppreſs or counteract them.

SECT.

SECT. II.

Of the Affections *and* Paſſions: *The natural* Laws of pure Affection: *The* confuſed Senſations *of the Paſſions, with their* final Cauſes.

AFTER the general account of *Senſations*, we may conſider other *Modifications* of our Minds, conſequent upon theſe Perceptions, whether grateful, or uneaſy. The firſt which occur to any one are *Deſire* of the grateful Perceptions, and *Averſion* to the uneaſy, either for our ſelves or others. If we would confine the word *Affection* to theſe two, which are entirely diſtinct from all *Senſation*, and directly incline the Mind to *Action* or *Volition of Motion*, we ſhould have no Debate about the Number or Diviſion of *Affections*. But ſince, by univerſal Cuſtom, this Name is applied to other Modifications of the Mind, ſuch as *Joy*, *Sorrow*, *Deſpair*, we may conſider what univerſal *Diſtinction* can be aſſigned between theſe *Modifications*, and the ſeveral *Senſations* above-mentioned; and we ſhall ſcarce find any other than this, that we call "the *direct immediate Per-* "*ception* of Pleaſure or Pain from the pre-

Proper Affections are Deſire *and* Averſion.

Sect. 2. "ſent Object or Event, the *Senſation*:" But we denote by the *Affection* or *Paſſion* ſome other "*Perception* of Pleaſure or "Pain, not directly raiſed by the *Preſence* "or *Operation* of the Event or Object, "but by our *Reflection* upon, or *Appre-* "*henſion* of their preſent or certainly fu- "ture Exiſtence; ſo that we are ſure that "the Object or Event will raiſe the *direct* "*Senſations* in us." In beholding a regular Building we have the *Senſation* of Beauty; but upon our *apprehending* our ſelves poſſeſſed of it, or that we can procure this pleaſant Senſation when we pleaſe, we feel the *Affection* of *Joy*. When a Man has a Fit of the Gout, he has the *painful Senſation*; when he is not at preſent pained, yet apprehends a ſudden return of it, he has the *Affection of Sorrow*, which might in ſome ſenſe alſo be called a Senſation.

Other Affections, wherein different from Senſation.

Affection diſtinct from Paſſion.

WHEN the word *Paſſion* is imagined to denote any thing different from the *Affections*, it includes, beſide the *Deſire* or *Averſion*, beſide the *calm Joy* upon apprehended Poſſeſſion of Good, or *Sorrow* from the Loſs of it, or from impending Evil, "a * *confuſed Senſation* either of Pleaſure

* Whoever would ſee ſubtile Diviſions of thoſe Senſations, let him read *Malebranche's Recherche de la Verite*, *B.* v. *c.* 3. Together with theſe Senſations there are alſo ſome ſtrong *Propenſities* diſtinct from any rational Deſire: About which ſee *Sect.* 3. *Art.* 2. of this Treatiſe.

"or

" or Pain, occaſioned or attended by ſome Sect. 24
" violent bodily Motions, which keeps
" the Mind much employed upon the
" preſent Affair, to the excluſion of every
" thing elſe, and prolongs or ſtrengthens
" the Affection ſometimes to ſuch a de-
" gree, as to prevent all *deliberate Reaſo-*
" *ning* about our Conduct. ".

II. We have little reaſon to imagine, that all other Agents have ſuch *confuſed Senſations* accompanying their Deſires as we often have. Let us abſtract from them, and conſider in what manner we ſhould act upon the ſeveral Occaſions which now excite our Paſſions, if we had none of theſe *Senſations* whence our Deſires become *paſſionate*. *General Deſires, and particular Affections or Paſſions.*

There is a Diſtinction to be obſerved on this Subject, between " the *calm Deſire*
" of Good, and Averſion to Evil, either
" ſelfiſh or publick, as it appears to our
" *Reaſon* or *Reflection*; and the *particu-*
" *lar Paſſions* towards Objects immedi-
" ately preſented to ſome Senſe. " Thus nothing can be more diſtinct than the *general calm Deſire* of private Good of any kind, which alone would incline us to purſue whatever Objects were apprehended as the Means of Good, and the particular *ſelfiſh Paſſions*, ſuch as *Ambition*, *Covetouſneſs*, *Hunger*, *Luſt*, *Revenge*, *Anger*,

as

Sect 2. as they ariſe upon particular Occaſions. In like manner, our public Deſires may be diſtinguiſhed into the *general calm Deſire of the Happineſs of others*, or *Averſion to their Miſery* upon Reflection; and the *particular Affections* or *Paſſions* of *Love*, *Congratulation*, *Compaſſion*, *natural Affection*. Theſe *particular Affections* are found in many Tempers, where, thro' want of Reflection, the *general calm Deſires* are not found: Nay, the former may be oppoſite to the latter, where they are found in the ſame Temper. We obtain *Command* over the *particular Paſſions*, principally by ſtrengthning the *general Deſires* thro' frequent Reflection, and making them *habitual*, ſo as to obtain Strength ſuperior to the *particular Paſſions*.

AGAIN, the *calm public Deſires* may be conſidered as "they either regard the "Good of *particular Perſons* or *Societies* "preſented to our Senſes; or that of ſome "more abſtracted or general Community, "ſuch as a *Species* or Syſtem." This latter ſort we may call *univerſal calm Benevolence*. Now 'tis plain, that not only *particular kind Paſſions*, but even *calm particular Benevolence* do not always ariſe from, or neceſſarily preſuppoſe, the *univerſal Benevolence*; both the former may be found in Perſons of little Reflection, where the latter is wanting: And the former two may be

be oppoſite to the other, where they meet together in one Temper. So the *univerſal Benevolence* might be where there was neither of the former; as in any ſuperior Nature or Angel who had no particular Intercourſe with any part of Mankind. Sect. 2.

OUR *moral Senſe*, tho it approves all particular *kind Affection* or *Paſſion*, as well as *calm particular Benevolence* abſtractly conſidered; yet it alſo approves the *Reſtraint* or *Limitation* of all particular Affections or Paſſions, by the *calm univerſal Benevolence*. To make this Deſire prevalent above all *particular Affections*, is the only ſure way to obtain conſtant *Self-Approbation*.

THE *calm ſelfiſh Deſires* would determine any Agent to purſue every Object or Event, known either by Reaſon or prior Experience to be good to itſelf. We need not imagine any innate Idea of *Good in general*, of *infinite Good*, or of the *greateſt Aggregate*: Much leſs need we ſuppoſe any *actual Inclination* toward any of theſe, as the *Cauſe* or *Spring* of all particular Deſires. 'Tis enough to allow, "that we "are capable by *enlarging*, or by *Abſtra-* "*ction*, of coming to theſe Ideas: That "we muſt, by the Conſtitution of our "Nature, deſire any apprehended Good "which occurs a-part from any Evil:

"That

Sect. 2. " That of two Objects inconſiſtent with " each other, we ſhall deſire that which " ſeems to contain the greateſt *Moment of* " *Good.*" So that it cannot be pronounced concerning any *finite Good*, that it ſhall neceſſarily engage our Purſuit; ſince the Agent may poſſibly have the Idea of a *Greater*, or ſee this to be inconſiſtent with ſome *more valuable Object*, or that it may bring upon him ſome *prepollent Evil.* The certain Knowledge of any of theſe Things, or probable *Preſumption* of them, may ſtop the Purſuit of any finite Good. If this be any ſort of *Liberty*, it muſt be allowed to be in Men, even by thoſe who maintain " the *Deſire* or *Will* to be ne- " ceſſarily determined by the *prepollent* " *Motive*;" ſince this very *Preſumption* may be a prepollent Motive, eſpecially to thoſe, who by frequent *Attention* make the Idea of the *greateſt Good* always preſent to themſelves on all important Occaſions.

THE ſame may eaſily be applied to our Averſion to finite Evils.

THERE ſeems to be this Degree of Liberty about the Underſtanding, that tho the *higheſt Certainty* or *Demonſtration* does neceſſarily engage our Aſſent, yet we can ſuſpend any *abſolute Concluſion* from *probable* Arguments, until we examine whether

ther this apparent *Probability* be not oppoſite to *Demonſtration*, or *ſuperior Probability* on the other ſide. Sect. 2.

THIS may let us ſee, that tho it were acknowledged that "Men are *neceſſarily* "determined to purſue their own Happi- "neſs, and to be influenced by whatever "Motive appears to be *prepollent*;" yet they might be proper *Subjects of a Law*; ſince the very *Sanctions* of the Law, if they attend to them, may ſuggeſt a Motive *prepollent* to all others. In like manner, "Errors may be criminal, * where there "are ſufficient *Data* or *Objective Evi-* "*dence* for the Truth;" ſince no Demonſtration can lead to Error, and we can ſuſpend our Aſſent to probable Arguments, till we have examined both Sides. Yet *human Penalties* concerning Opinions muſt be of little conſequence, ſince no Penalty can ſupply the place of *Argument*, or *Probability* to engage our *Aſſent*, however they may as *Motives* determine our *Election*.

IN the *calm publick Deſires*, in like manner, where there are no oppoſite Deſires, the greater Good of another is always preferred to the leſs: And in the calm

* See *Treat.* 4. *Sect.* 6. *Art.* 6. laſt Paragraph.

Sect. 2. univerſal Benevolence, the Choice is determined by the *Moment* of the Good, and the *Number* of thoſe who ſhall enjoy it.

WHEN the *publick Deſires* are oppoſite to the *private*, or ſeem to be ſo, that kind prevails which is *ſtronger* or more intenſe.

Definitions. III. THE following *Definitions* of certain Words uſed on this Subject, may ſhorten our Expreſſions; and the *Axioms* ſubjoined may ſhew the manner of acting from *calm Deſire*, with Analogy to the *Laws of Motion*.

Natural Good and Evil. 1. NATURAL *Good* is Pleaſure: *Natural Evil* is Pain.

2. NATURAL *good Objects* are thoſe which are apt, either mediately or immediately to give Pleaſure; the former are called *Advantageous*. Natural *Evil Objects* are ſuch as, in like manner, give Pain.

Abſolute. 3. ABSOLUTE *Good* is that which, conſidered with all its Concomitants and Conſequences, contains more Good than what compenſates all its Evils.

4. ABSOLUTE *Evil*, on the contrary, contains Evil which outweighs all its Good.

5. RE-

Sect. 2.

5. RELATIVE *Good or Evil*, is any particular Good or Evil, which does not thus compenſate its contrary Concomitants or Conſequences. This Diſtinction would have been more exactly expreſſed by the *Bonum ſimpliciter*, and *ſecundum quid* of the Schoolmen. *Relative.*

Cor. RELATIVE *Good* may be *Abſolute Evil*; thus often ſenſual Pleaſures are in the whole pernicious: And *Abſolute Good* may be *Relative Evil*; thus an *unpleaſant Potion* may recover Health.

GOOD and *Evil*, according to the *Perſons* whom they affect, may be divided into *Univerſal*, *Particular* and *Private*.

6. UNIVERSAL *Good*, is what tends to the Happineſs of the whole *Syſtem of ſenſitive Beings*; and *Univerſal Evil* is the contrary. *Univerſal.*

7. PARTICULAR *Good* is what tends to the Happineſs of a Part of this Syſtem: *Particular Evil* is the contrary. *Particular.*

8. PRIVATE *Good or Evil* is that of the Perſon acting. Each of theſe three Members may be either *Abſolute* or *Relative*. *Private.*

Sect. 2.

Cor. 1. PARTICULAR *or private Good* may poſſibly be *univerſal Evil:* And *univerſal Good* may be *particular* or *private Evil.* The Puniſhment of a Criminal is an Inſtance of the latter. Of the former, perhaps, there are no real Inſtances in the whole Adminiſtration of Nature: but there are ſome apparent Inſtances; ſuch as the *Succeſs of an unjuſt War*; or the *Eſcape of an unrelenting Criminal.*

Cor. 2. WHEN *particular* or *private Goods* are entirely innocent toward others, they are *univerſal Good.*

Compound. 9. COMPOUND *good Objects* or *Events*, are ſuch as contain the Powers of ſeveral Goods at once. Thus, Meat may be both pleaſant and healthful; an Action may give its Author at once the Pleaſures of the *Moral Senſe* and of *Honour.* The ſame is eaſily applicable to *compound Evil.*

Mixed. 10. A MIXED *Object* is what contains at once the Powers of Good and Evil: Thus a virtuous Action may give the Agent the *Pleaſures* of the *Moral Senſe*, and *Pains of the external Senſes.* Execution of Juſtice may give the Pleaſures of the *publick Senſe*, and the Pains of *Compaſſion* toward the Sufferer.

11. THE

Sect. 2.

11. THE *greateſt* or *moſt perfect Good* is that whole Series, or Scheme of Events, which contains a greater Aggregate of Happineſs in the whole, or more abſolute univerſal Good, than any other poſſible Scheme, after ſubtracting all the Evils connected with each of them. *Greateſt Good.*

12. AN Action is *good, in a moral Senſe,* when it flows from benevolent Affection, or Intention of abſolute Good to others. Men of much Reflection may actually intend *univerſal abſolute Good*; but with the common rate of Men their Virtue conſiſts in intending and purſuing *particular abſolute Good*, not inconſiſtent with univerſal Good. *Moral Good.*

13. AN Action is *morally evil*, either from Intention of *abſolute Evil*, univerſal, or particular, (* which is ſeldom the caſe with Men, except in ſudden Paſſions;) or from purſuit of *private* or *particular relative Good*, which they might have known did tend to *univerſal abſolute Evil.* For even the *want* of a † juſt Degree of Benevolence renders an Action evil. *Moral Evil.*

---

* See 2 Treatiſe, *Sect.* 2. *Art.* 4. *p.* 143.

† Treatiſe 4. *Sect.* 6. *Art.* 4.

Sect. 2.

Compound.

14. COMPOUND *moral Goodneſs* is that to which different *moral Species* concur: Thus the ſame Action may evidence Love to our Fellows, and Gratitude to GOD. We may in like manner underſtand *compound moral Evil.* We cannot ſuppoſe *mixed moral Actions* ‡.

15. AGENTS are denominated *morally good or evil,* from their Affections and Actions, or Attempts of Action.

Axioms, or general Laws.

IV. AXIOMS, or natural Laws of *calm Deſire.*

1. SELFISH *Deſires* purſue ultimately only the private Good of the Agent.

2. BENEVOLENT or *publick Deſires* purſue the Good of others, according to the ſeveral *Syſtems* to which we extend our Attention, but with different Degrees of Strength.

3. THE *Strength* either of the *private* or *publick* Deſire of any Event, is proportioned to the imagined *Quantity of Good,* which will ariſe from it to the Agent, or the Perſon beloved.

‡ See 2 Treatiſe, *Sect.* 7. *Art.* 9. laſt Parag.

4. MIXED

4. MIXED *Objects* are purſued or ſhunned with Deſire or Averſion, proportioned to the apprehended *Exceſs* of Good or Evil.

5. EQUAL *Mixtures* of Good and Evil ſtop all Deſire or Averſion.

6. A COMPOUND *good or evil Object*, is proſecuted or ſhunned with a *Degree* of Deſire or Averſion, proportioned to the *Sum* of Good, or of Evil.

7. IN computing the *Quantities* of Good or Evil, which we purſue or ſhun, either for our ſelves or others, when the *Durations* are equal, the Moment is as the *Intenſeneſs*: and when the *Intenſeneſs* of Pleaſure is the ſame, or equal, the Moment is as the *Duration*.

8. HENCE the *Moment* of Good in any Object, is in a compound Proportion of the *Duration* and *Intenſeneſs*.

9. THE *Trouble*, *Pain*, or *Danger*, incurred by the Agent, in acquiring or retaining any Good, is to be ſubtracted from the *Sum* of the Good. So the *Pleaſures* which attend or flow from the means of *prepollent Evil*, are to be ſubtracted, to find the *abſolute Quantity*.

Sect. 2.

10. THE Ratio of the *Hazard* of acquiring or retaining any Good muſt be multiplied into the Moment of the Good; ſo alſo the *Hazard* of avoiding any Evil is to be multiplied into the Moment of it, to find its comparative value.

Cor. HENCE it is, that the ſmalleſt certain Good may raiſe ſtronger Deſire than the greateſt Good, if the *Uncertainty* of the latter ſurpaſs *that* of the former, in a greater Ratio than that of the greater to the leſs. Thus Men content themſelves in all Affairs with *ſmaller*, but more *probably ſucceſsful* Purſuits, quitting thoſe of greater Moment but *leſs Probability*.

11. TO an *immortal* Nature it is indifferent in what part of its Duration it enjoys a Good limited in Duration, if its Senſe be equally *acute* in all parts of its Exiſtence; and the Enjoyment of this Good excludes not the Enjoyment of other Goods, at one time more than another. The ſame may be applied to the Suffering of Evil, limited in Duration.

12. BUT if the Duration of the Good be *infinite*, the Earlineſs of Commencement increaſes the Moment, as *finite* added to *infinite*, ſurpaſſes *infinite* alone.

13. TO

13. To Beings of *limited certain Duration*, Axiom 12. may be applied, when the *Duration* of the Good would not ſurpaſs the Exiſtence of the Poſſeſſor, after the Time of its Commencement.

14. To Beings of *limited uncertain Duration*, the Earlineſs of Commencement increaſes the Moment of any Good, according to the Hazard of the *Poſſeſſor's Duration*. This may, perhaps, account for what ſome alledg to be a *natural Diſpoſition* of our Minds, even previous to any Reflection on the Uncertainty of Life, *viz.* that we are ſo conſtituted, as to deſire more ardently the *nearer* Enjoyments than the more diſtant, tho of equal Moment in themſelves, and as certainly to be obtained by us.

15. The *Removal of Pain* has always the Notion of Good, and ſollicits us more importunately: Its Moment is the ſame way computed by *Intenſeneſs* and *Duration*, and affected by the *Hazard* and by the *Uncertainty* of our Exiſtence.

These are the general Ways of computing the Quantities of Good in any Object or Event, whether we are purſuing our own private Good from ſelfiſh Deſires, or the

Sect. 2. the Good of others from publick Affections. Concerning theſe latter we may obſerve,

16. THAT our Deſires toward *publick Good* are, when other Circumſtances are equal, proportioned to the Moment of the Goods themſelves.

17. OUR publick Deſires of any Events, are proportioned to the *Number* of Perſons to whom the good Event ſhall extend, when the *Moments* and other Circumſtances are equal.

18. WHEN the *Moments* themſelves, and *Numbers* of Enjoyers are equal, our Deſire is proportioned to the *Strength* or *Nearneſs* of the *Ties* or *Attachments* to the Perſons.

19. WHEN all other Circumſtances are equal, our Deſires are proportional to the apprehended *Moral Excellence* of the Perſons.

20. IN general, the Strength of publick Deſire is in a Compound Ratio of the *Quantity of the Good itſelf, and the Number, Attachment, and Dignity* of the Perſons.

THESE ſeem to be the general Laws, according to which our Deſires ariſe. Our

Senſes

Senſes conſtitute Objects, Events or Actions *good*; and ſ" we have Power to " *reaſon*, reflect and compare the ſeveral " Goods, and to find out the proper and " effectual Means of obtaining the greateſt " for our ſelves or others, ſo as not to be " led aſide by every Appearance of *rela-* " *tive* or *particular* Good." Sect. 2.

Action from pure Deſire or Affection.

V. If it be granted, that we have implanted in our Nature the ſeveral *Deſires* above-mentioned, let us next inquire " in- " to what *State* we would incline to bring " our ſelves, upon the ſeveral Accidents " which now raiſe our *Paſſions*; ſuppoſing " that we had the Choice of our own State " entirely, and were not, by the Frame of " our Nature, ſubjected to certain *Senſa-* " *tions*, independently of our Volition."

If it ſeems too raſh to aſſert a Diſtinction between *Affections* and *Paſſions*, or that *Deſire* may ſubſiſt without any *uneaſineſs*, ſince perhaps we are never conſcious of any Deſire abſolutely free from all uneaſineſs; " let it be conſidered, that the " ſimple Idea of *Deſire* is different from " that of Pain of any kind, or from any " *Senſation* whatſoever: Nor is there any " other Argument for their Identity than " this, that they occur to us at once: " But this Argument is inconcluſive, other- " wiſe

Sect. 2. " wiſe it would prove *Colour* and *Figure* " to be the ſame, or *Inciſion* and *Pain*."

THERE is a *middle State* of our Minds, when we are not in the purſuit of any *important Good*, nor know of any great *Indigence* of thoſe we love. In this State, when any ſmaller poſitive Good to our ſelves or our friend is apprehended to be in our power, we may reſolutely *deſire* and *purſue* it, without any conſiderable *Senſation of Pain* or Uneaſineſs. Some Tempers ſeem to have as ſtrong *Deſires* as any, by the Conſtancy and Vigor of their Purſuits, either of publick or private Good; and yet give ſmall Evidence of any *uneaſy Senſation*. This is obſervable in ſome ſedate Men, who ſeem no way inferior in Strength of Deſire to others: Nay, if we conſult our ſelves, and not the common Syſtems, we ſhall perhaps find, that " the " nobleſt Deſire in our Nature, that of " *univerſal Happineſs*, is generally calm, " and wholly free from any confuſed unea- " ſy Senſation:" except in ſome warm Tempers, who, by a lively *Imagination*, and frequent Attention to general Ideas, raiſe ſomething of Paſſion even toward *univerſal Nature* *. Yea, further, Deſire may be as ſtrong as poſſible toward a certainly fu-

* See *Marcus Aurelius*, in many places.

ture

ture Event, the fixed Time of its Exiſtence being alſo known, and yet we are not conſcious of any *Pain* attending ſuch Deſires. But tho this ſhould not be granted to be Fact with Men, yet the Difference of the Ideas of Deſire and Pain, may give ſufficient ground for abſtracting them; and for our making the Suppoſition of their being ſeparated. Sect. 2.

UPON this Suppoſition then, when any Object was deſired, if we found it *difficult* or *uncertain* to be obtained, but worthy of all the Labour it would coſt; we would ſet about it with Diligence, but would never chuſe to bring upon our ſelves any *painful Senſation* accompanying our Deſire, nor to increaſe our Toil by *Anxiety*. Whatever Satisfaction we had in our State before the Proſpect of this additional Good, we ſhould continue to enjoy it while this Good was in ſuſpenſe; and if we found it unattainable, we ſhould be juſt as we were before: And we ſhould never chuſe to bring upon our ſelves thoſe *Frettings* which now commonly ariſe from Diſappointments. Upon Opinion of any impending Evil, we ſhould *deſire* and *uſe all means* to prevent it, but ſhould never voluntarily bring upon our ſelves the uneaſy Senſation of *Fear*, which now naturally anticipates our Miſery, and gives us a Foretaſte of it, more ungrateful ſometimes than the Suffering itſelf. If the Evil did befal us, we ſhould never chuſe

Sect. 2. chuſe to increaſe it, by the Senſations of *Sorrow* or *Deſpair*; we ſhould conſider what was the Sum of Good remaining in our State, after ſubtracting this Evil; and ſhould enjoy our ſelves as well as a Being, who had never known greater Good, nor enjoyed greater Pleaſure, than the *abſolute Good* yet remaining with us; or perhaps we ſhould purſue ſome other attainable Good. In the like manner, did our *State* and the *Modifications* of our Mind depend upon our Choice, ſhould we be affected upon the apprehended Approach of Good or Evil, to thoſe whom we love; we ſhould have *deſires* of obtaining the one for them, and of defending them from the other, accompanied with no *uneaſy Senſations*. We do indeed find in fact, that our ſtronger Deſires, whether private or publick, are accompanied with *uneaſy Senſations*; but theſe Senſations do not ſeem the neceſſary *Reſult* of the Deſire itſelf: They depend upon the preſent *Conſtitution of our Nature*, which might poſſibly have been otherwiſe ordered. And in fact we find a conſiderable Diverſity of Tempers in this matter; ſome *ſedate Tempers* equally deſiring either publick or private Good with the more paſſionate Tempers; but without that Degree of *Ferment*, *Confuſion*, and *Pain*, which attend the ſame Deſires in the *Paſſionate*.

A c-

Sect. 2.

ACCORDING to the preſent Conſtitution of our Nature, we find that the *Modifications* or *Paſſions* of our Mind, are very different from thoſe which we would chuſe to bring upon our ſelves, upon their ſeveral Occaſions. The Proſpect of any conſiderable Good for our ſelves, or thoſe we love, raiſes Deſire; and this Deſire is accompanied with *uneaſy confuſed Senſations*, which often occaſion *Fretfulneſs*, *Anxiety*, and *Impatience*. We find violent *Motions* in our Bodies; and are often made unfit for ſerious Deliberation about the Means of obtaining the Good deſired. When it is firſt obtained, we find violent confuſed *Senſations of Joy*, beyond the Proportion of the Good itſelf, or its Moment to our Happineſs. If we are diſappointed, we feel a Senſation of *Sorrow* and *Dejection*, which is often entirely uſeleſs to our preſent State. Foreſeen Evils are antedated by painful Senſations of *Fear*; and Reflection, attended with Senſations of *Sorrow*, gives a tedious Exiſtence to tranſitory Misfortunes. Our *publick Deſires* are in the ſame manner accompanied with painful Senſations. The Preſence or Suſpence of Good or Evil *to others*, is made the Occaſion of the like confuſed Senſations. A little Reflection will ſhew, that none of theſe Senſations depend upon our Choice, but ariſe from the very *Frame*

of

Sect. 2. *of our Nature*, however we may regulate or moderate them.

The Neceſſity for theſe Senſations.

VI. LET us then examine " for what " Purpoſe our Nature was ſo conſtituted, " that Senſations do thus neceſſarily ariſe " in us." Would not thoſe *firſt ſorts of Senſations*, by which we apprehend Good and Evil in the Objects themſelves, have been ſufficient, along with our *Reaſon* and *pure Deſires*, without thoſe Senſations attending the very Deſires themſelves, for which they are called *Paſſions*, or thoſe *Senſations* which attend our Reflection upon the Preſence, Abſence, or Approach of Good or Evil?

THE common Anſwer, that " they " are given to us as uſeful *Incitements* or " *Spurs* to Action, by which we are " rouſed more effectually to promote our " private Good, or that of the Publick," is too general and undetermined. What need is there for rouſing us to Action, more than a *calm pure Deſire* of Good, and Averſion to Evil would do, without theſe confuſed Senſations? Say they, " we are " averſe to *Labour*; we are apt to be " hurried away by Avocations of *Curio-* " *ſity* or *Mirth*; we are often ſo *indolent* " and averſe to the vigorous Uſe of our " Powers, that we ſhould neglect our " true Intereſt without theſe ſolliciting

" Sen-

"Senſations." But may it not be anſwer- Sect. 2.
ed, that if Labour and vigorous Uſe of our Powers be attended with *Uneaſineſs* or *Pain*, why ſhould not this be brought into the Account? The Purſuit of a ſmall Good by great Toil is really fooliſh; violent *Labour* may be as pernicious as any thing elſe: Why ſhould we be excited to any *uneaſy Labour*, except for prepollent Good? And, when the Good is *prepollent*, what need of any further *Incitement* than the calm Deſire of it? The ſame may be ſaid of the Avocations of *Curioſity* or *Mirth*; if their *abſolute Pleaſures* be greater than that of the good from which they divert us, why ſhould we not be diverted from it? If not, then the *real Moment* of the Good propoſed is ſufficient to engage our Purſuit of it, in Oppoſition to our Curioſity or Mirth.

If indeed our Averſion to Labour, or our Propenſity to Mirth be accompanied with theſe Senſations, then it was neceſſary that other *Deſires* ſhould be attended with like Senſations, that ſo a Ballance might be preſerved. So if we have confuſed Senſation ſtrengthning and fixing our *private Deſires*, the like Senſation joined to *publick Affections* is neceſſary, leſt the former Deſires ſhould wholly engroſs our Minds: If weight be caſt into one Scale, as much muſt be put into the other to pre-

Sect. 2. ſerve an *Equilibrium*. But the firſt Queſtion is, "whence aroſe the Neceſſity of "ſuch additional Incitements on either "ſide?"

IT muſt be very difficult for Beings of ſuch imperfect Knowledge as we are, to anſwer ſuch Queſtions: we know very little of the Conſtitution of *Nature*, or what may be neceſſary for the Perfection of the *whole*. The Author of Nature has probably formed many active Beings, whoſe Deſires are not attended with confuſed Senſations, raiſing them into Paſſions like to ours. There is probably an infinite *Variety* of Beings, of all poſſible Degrees, in which the Sum of Happineſs exceeds that of Miſery. We know that our State is *abſolutely Good*, notwithſtanding a conſiderable Mixture of Evil. The Goodneſs of the great Author of Nature appears even in producing the *inferior Natures*, provided their State in the whole be abſolutely Good: Since we may probably conclude*, that there are in the Univerſe as many Species of *ſuperior Natures*, as was conſiſtent with the moſt perfect State of the whole. This is the Thought ſo much inſiſted upon by *Simplicius*, that the uni-

* See *Simplicius* on *Epictetus*, Cap. 34. And the Archbiſhop of *Dublin*, *de Origine Mali*, above all others on this Subject.

verſal

verſal Cauſe muſt produce τὰ μέσα, as well as τὰ πρῶτα, καὶ τὰ ἔσχατα. We know not if this Globe be a fit Place for the Habitation of Natures ſuperior to ours: If not, it muſt certainly be in the *whole* better that it ſhould have its *imperfect Inhabitants*, whoſe State is abſolutely Good, than that it ſhould be deſolate. Sect. 2.

ALL then which we can expect to do in this Matter, is only to ſhew, that "theſe "confuſed Senſations are neceſſary to ſuch "Natures as we are in other *reſpects*: Par- "ticularly that Beings of ſuch Degrees of "*Underſtanding*, and ſuch *Avenues* to "Knowledge as we have, muſt need theſe "*additional Forces*, which we call Paſ- "ſions, beſide the firſt *Senſations* by which "Objects are conſtituted Good or Evil, "and the *pure Deſire* or *Averſion* ariſing "from Opinion or Apprehenſion of Good "or Evil."

NOW our *Reaſon*, or *Knowledge of the Relations* of external Things to our Bodies, is ſo inconſiderable, that it is generally ſome *pleaſant Senſation* which teaches us what tends to their Preſervation; and ſome *painful Senſation* which ſhews what is pernicious. Nor is this Inſtruction ſufficient; we need alſo to be directed *when* our Bodies want ſupplies of Nouriſhment; to this our Reaſon could not extend: Here then

From the Imperfection of our Underſtanding, which required Senſations of Appetite.

Sect. 2. appears the firſt Neceſſity of *uneaſy Senſation*, preceding Deſire, and continuing to accompany it when it is raiſed.

AGAIN, our Bodies could not be preſerved without a Senſe of Pain, connected with *Inciſions*, *Bruiſes*, or violent *Labour*, or whatever elſe tends to deſtroy any part of their Mechaniſm; ſince our Knowledge does not extend ſo far, as to judge in time what would be pernicious to it: And yet, without a great deal of human Labour, and many Dangers, this Earth could not ſupport the tenth Part of its Inhabitants. Our Nature therefore required a Senſation, accompanying its Deſires of the *Means of Preſervation*, capable to ſurmount the Uneaſineſs of *Labour*: this we have in the Pains or Uneaſineſs accompanying the Deſires of Food.

IN like manner, the *Propagation of Animals* is a Myſtery to their *Reaſon*, but eaſy to their *Inſtinct*. An Offspring of ſuch Creatures as Men are, could not be preſerved without perpetual Labour and Care; which we find could not be expected from the more general Ties of *Benevolence*. Here then again appears the Neceſſity of ſtrengthning the Στοργὴ, or *natural Affection*, with ſtrong Senſations, or Pains of Deſire, ſufficient to counter-ballance the Pains of *Labour*, and the Senſations of the

ſelfiſh

ſelfiſh Appetites; ſince Parents muſt often check and diſappoint their own Appetites, to gratify thoſe of their Children. Sect. 2.

" WHEN a Neceſſity of joining ſtrong " Senſations to one Claſs of Deſires ap- " pears, there muſt appear a like Neceſſity " of ſtrengthning the reſt by like Senſa- " tions, to keep a juſt Ballance." We know, for inſtance, that the Pleaſures of the *Imagination* tend much to the Happineſs of Mankind: the Deſires of them therefore muſt have the like *Senſations* aſſiſting them, to prevent our indulging a naſty ſolitary Luxury. The Happineſs of human Life cannot be promoted without *Society* and *mutual Aid*, even beyond a Family; our *publick Affections* muſt therefore be ſtrengthned as well as the private, to keep a Ballance; ſo muſt alſo our Deſires of *Virtue* and *Honour*. *Anger*, which ſome have thought an uſeleſs Paſſion, is really as neceſſary as the reſt; ſince Mens Intereſts often ſeem to interfere with each other; and they are thereby led from Self-Love to do the worſt *Injuries* to their Fellows. There could not therefore be a wiſer Contrivance to reſtrain *Injuries*, than to make every mortal ſome way *formidable* to an unjuſt Invader, by ſuch a violent Paſſion. We need not have recourſe to a *Prometheus* in this matter, with the old Poets:

Sect 2. they might have aſcribed it to their *Optimus Maximus.*

——— *Inſani Leonis,*
Vim Stomacho appoſuiſſe noſtro.

A Ballance may be ſtill preſerved.

VII. WITH this *Ballance* of publick Paſſions againſt the private, with our *Paſſions* toward Honour and Virtue, we find that human Nature may be as really amiable in its low Sphere, as ſuperior Natures endowed with higher Reaſon, and influenced only by *pure Deſires*; provided we vigorouſly exerciſe the Powers we have in keeping this Ballance of Affections, and checking any Paſſion which grows ſo violent, as to be inconſiſtent with the publick Good. If we have ſelfiſh Paſſions for our own Preſervation, we have alſo *publick Paſſions*, which may engage us into vigorous and laborious Services to *Offſpring*, *Friends*, *Communities*, *Countries*. *Compaſſion* will engage us to ſuccour the diſtreſſed, even with our private Loſs or Danger. An Abhorrence of the injurious, and Love toward the injured, with a Senſe of Virtue, and Honour, can make us deſpiſe Labour, Expence, Wounds and Death.

THE Senſations of *Joy* or *Sorrow*, upon the Succeſs or Diſappointment of any Purſuit, either publick or private, have directly the Effect of *Rewards* or *Puniſhments*,

ments, to excite us to act with the utmoſt Vigor, either for our own Advantage, or that of others, for the future, and to puniſh paſt Negligence. The Moment of every Event is thereby increaſed: as much as the Senſations of *Sorrow* add to our *Miſery*, ſo much thoſe of *Joy* add to our *Happineſs*. Nay, ſince we have ſome conſiderable *Power* over our Deſires, as ſhall be explained hereafter, we may probably, by good Conduct, obtain more frequent *Pleaſures of Joy* upon our Succeſs, than *Pains of Sorrow* upon Diſappointment. Sect. 2.

A juſt Ballance very rare.

'Tis true indeed, that there are few Tempers to be found, wherein theſe Senſations of the ſeveral Paſſions are in ſuch a *Ballance*, as in all caſes to leave the Mind in a proper State, for conſidering the Importance of every Action or Event. The Senſations of *Anger* in ſome Tempers are violent above their proportion; thoſe of *Ambition*, *Avarice*, *deſire of ſenſual Pleaſure*, and even of *natural Affection*, in ſeveral Diſpoſitions, poſſeſs the Mind too much, and make it incapable of attending to any thing elſe. Scarce any one Temper is always conſtant and uniform in its Paſſions. The beſt State of human Nature poſſible might require a Diverſity of Paſſions and Inclinations, for the different Occupations neceſſary for the whole: But the Diſorder ſeems to be much greater than is

Sect. 2. requiſite for this End. *Cuſtom*, *Education*, *Habits*, and *Company*, may often contribute much to this Diſorder, however its Original may be aſcribed to ſome more univerſal Cauſe. But it is not ſo great, but that human Life is ſtill a deſirable State, having a ſuperiority of Goodneſs and Happineſs. Nor, if we apply our ſelves to it, does it hinder us from diſcerning that juſt *Ballance* and *Oeconomy*, which would conſtitute the moſt happy State of each Perſon, and promote the greateſt Good in the whole.

Diſpoſitions to ſome particular Paſſions.

LET Phyſicians or Anatomiſts explain the ſeveral Motions in the *Fluids* or *Solids* of the Body, which accompany any Paſſion; or the *Temperaments* of Body which either make Men prone to any Paſſion, or are brought upon us by the long Continuance, or frequent Returns of it. 'Tis only to our Purpoſe in general to obſerve, "that "probably certain *Motions* in the Body "do accompany every Paſſion by a fixed "Law of Nature; and alternately, *that* "*Temperament* which is apt to receive or "prolong theſe Motions in the Body, does "influence our *Paſſions* to heighten or "prolong them." Thus a certain *Temperament* may be brought upon the Body, by its being frequently put into Motion by the Paſſions of *Anger*, *Joy*, *Love*, or *Sorrow*; and the Continuance of this Temperament ſhall make Men prone to the ſeveral

veral Paſſions for the future. We find our Sect. 2.
ſelves after a long Fit of *Anger* or *Sorrow*, in an uneaſy State, even when we are not reflecting on the particular *Occaſion* of our Paſſion. During this State, every trifle ſhall be apt to provoke or deject us. On the contrary, after *good Succeſs*, after ſtrong *friendly Paſſions*, or a State of *Mirth*, ſome conſiderable *Injuries* or *Loſſes*, which at other times would have affected us very much, ſhall be overlooked, or meekly received, or at moſt but ſlightly reſented; perhaps becauſe our Bodies are not fit eaſily to receive theſe *Motions* which are conſtituted the Occaſion of the uneaſy Senſations of Anger. This *Diverſity* of Temper every one has felt, who reflects on himſelf at different Times. In ſome Tempers it will appear like *Madneſs*. Whether the only *Seat* of theſe Habits, or the Occaſion rather of theſe *Diſpoſitions*, be in the Body; or whether the *Soul* itſelf does not, by frequent Returns of any Paſſion, acquire ſome greater Diſpoſition to receive and retain it again, let thoſe determine, who ſufficiently underſtand the Nature of either the one or the other.

SECT.

SECT. III.

Particular Diviſions of the Affections and Paſſions.

I. THE Nature of any *Language* has conſiderable Influence upon Mens Reaſonings on all Subjects, making them often take all thoſe Ideas which are denoted by the ſame Word to be the ſame; and on the other hand, to look upon different Words as denoting different Ideas. We ſhall find that this Identity of Names has occaſioned much confuſion in Treatiſes of the Paſſions; while ſome have made larger, and ſome ſmaller Collections of Names, and have given the Explications of them as an Account of the Paſſions.

The Diviſion of the Stoicks.

CICERO, in the Fourth Book of *Tuſculan Queſtions*, gives from the Stoicks, this general Diviſion of the *Paſſions*: Firſt, into *Love* and *Hatred*, according as the Object is good or evil; and then ſubdivides each, according as the Object is *preſent* or *expected*. About Good we have theſe two, *Libido* & *Lætitia*, *Deſire* and *Joy*: About Evil we have likewiſe two, *Metus* & *Ægritudo*, *Fear* and *Sorrow*. To this general Diviſion he ſubjoins many

Sub-

Subdiviſions of each of theſe four Paſſions; according as in the *Latin* Tongue they had different Names for the ſeveral *Degrees* of theſe Paſſions, or for the ſame Paſſion employed upon different Objects. A Writer of *Lexicons* would probably get the moſt preciſe Meanings of the *Latin* Names in that Book; nor would it be uſeleſs in conſidering the Nature of them. Sect. 3.

THE *Schoolmen*, as their Fund of Language was much ſmaller, have not ſo full Enumerations of them, going no further than their admired *Ariſtotle*.

II. 'TIS ſtrange that the thoughtful MALEBRANCHE did not conſider, that "*Deſire* and *Averſion* are obviouſly different "from the other Modifications called *Paſſions*; that theſe two directly lead to "Action, or the Volition of Motion, "and are wholly diſtinct from all ſort of "Senſation." Whereas Joy and Sorrow are only a ſort of Senſations; and other Affections differ from Senſations only, by including Deſire or Averſion, or their correſpondent Propenſities: So that *Deſire* and *Averſion* are the only pure Affections in the ſtricteſt Senſe.

IF, indeed, we confine the Word *Senſation* to the "immediate Perceptions of "Pleaſure and Pain, upon the very Pre- "ſence *Senſation and Affection diſtinct.*

Sect. 3. " ſence or Operation of any Object or E-
" vent, which are occaſioned by ſome
" Impreſſion on our Bodies;" then we may denote by the Word *Affection*, thoſe *Pleaſures* or *Pains* not thus excited, but " reſulting from ſome *Reflection* upon, or " *Opinion* of our Poſſeſſion of any Ad-" vantage, or from a certain Proſpect of " future pleaſant Senſations on the one " hand, or from a like *Reflection* or *Proſ-" pect* of evil or painful Senſations on the " other, either to our ſelves or others."

Paſſion. WHEN more violent *confuſed Senſations* ariſe with the *Affection*, and are attended with, or prolonged by bodily Motions, we call the whole by the Name of *Paſſion*, eſpecially when accompanied with ſome *natural Propenſities*, to be hereafter explained.

Diviſion by Malebranche. IF this uſe of theſe Words be allowed, the Diviſion of MALEBRANCHE is very natural. Good Objects excite *Love*; evil Objects *Hatred:* each of theſe is ſubdivided, as the Object is *preſent* and *certain*, or *doubtfully expected*, or *certainly removed.* To theſe three Circumſtances correſpond three Modifications of the original Affections; *viz. Joy*, *Deſire* and *Sorrow.* Good preſent, raiſes Joy of Love, or *Love of Joy*: Good in ſuſpenſe, the *Love of Deſire*; Good loſt, *Love of Sorrow.* Evil preſent,

preſent, raiſes *Averſion of Sorrow*; Evil expected, *Averſion* or *Hatred of Deſire*; and Evil removed, *Averſion of Joy*. The *Joy of Love*, and the Joy of Hatred, will poſſibly be found nearly the ſame ſort of Senſations, tho upon different Occaſions; the ſame may be ſaid of the *Sorrow of Love*, and the *Sorrow of Averſion*: and thus this Diviſion will amount to the ſame with that of the Stoicks. Sect. 3.

PERHAPS it may be more eaſy to conceive our *Affections* and Paſſions in this manner. The Apprehenſion of Good, either to our ſelves or others, as attainable, raiſes *Deſire*: The like Apprehenſion of Evil, or of the Loſs of Good, raiſes *Averſion*, or Deſire of removing or preventing it. Theſe two are the proper *Affections*, diſtinct from all *Senſation*: We may call both *Deſires* if we pleaſe. The Reflection upon the Preſence or certain Futurity of any Good, raiſes the Senſation of Joy, which is diſtinct from thoſe immediate Senſations which ariſe from the Object itſelf. A like Senſation is raiſed, when we reflect upon the Removal or Prevention of Evil which once threatned our ſelves or others. The *Reflection* upon the Preſence of Evil, or the certain Proſpect of it, or of the Loſs of Good, is the Occaſion of the Senſation of *Sorrow*, diſtinct from thoſe

Deſire and Averſion.

Joy and Sorrow.

Sect. 3. thoſe *immediate Senſations* ariſing from the Objects or Events themſelves.

Affections may be diſtinguiſhed from Paſſions.

THESE Affections, *viz. Deſire, Averſion, Joy and Sorrow*, we may, after MALEBRANCHE, call *ſpiritual* or *pure Affections*; becauſe the pureſt Spirit, were it ſubject to any Evil, might be capable of them. But beſide theſe Affections, which ſeem to ariſe neceſſarily from a rational Apprehenſion of Good or Evil, there are in our Nature violent *confuſed Senſations*, connected with *bodily Motions*, from which our *Affections* are denominated *Paſſions*.

Affections attended with undeſigning Propenſities.

WE may further obſerve ſomething in our Nature, determining us very frequently to Action, diſtinct both from *Senſation* and *Deſire*; if by Deſire we mean a diſtinct Inclination to ſomething apprehended as Good either publick or private, or as the Means of avoiding Evil: *viz.* a certain *Propenſity of Inſtinct* to Objects and Actions, without any Conception of them as Good, or as the Means of preventing Evil. Theſe Objects or Actions are generally, tho not always, in effect the *Means* of ſome Good; but we are determined to them even without this Conception of them. Thus, as we obſerved above *, the *Propenſity to Fame*

* *Sect.* 1. near the End.

may

may continue after one has loſt all notion of *Good*, either publick or private, which could be the Object of a diſtinct Deſire. Our *particular Affections* have generally ſome of theſe *Propenſities* accompanying them; but theſe Propenſities are ſometimes without the Affections or diſtinct Deſires, and have a ſtronger Influence upon the Generality of Men, than the Affections could have alone. Thus in Anger, beſide the Intention of removing the uneaſy Senſation from the Injury received; beſide the Deſire of obtaining a Reparation of it, and Security for the future, which are ſome ſort of *Goods* intended by Men when they are calm, as well as during the Paſſion, there is in the paſſionate Perſon a Propenſity to occaſion *Miſery* to the Offender, a Determination to *Violence*, even where there is no *Intention* of any Good to be obtained, or Evil avoided by this Violence. And 'tis principally this Propenſity which we denote by the Name *Anger*, tho other Deſires often accompany it. Sect. 3. *Anger.*

So alſo our *Preſence* with the diſtreſſed is generally neceſſary to their relief; and yet when we have no Hopes nor Intention of relieving them, we ſhall find a *Propenſity* to run to ſuch Spectacles of Pity. Thus alſo, beſide the calm *Deſire* of the Happineſs of a Perſon beloved, we have a ſtrong Propenſity to their *Company*, to the very

Sect. 3. *Sight* of them, without any Conſideration of it as a Happineſs either to our ſelves or to the Perſon beloved. The ſudden Appearance of great Danger, determines us to ſhriek out or fly, before we can have any diſtinct Deſires, or any Conſideration that a Shriek or Flight are proper means of Relief. Theſe *Propenſities*, along with the Senſations above-mentioned, when they occur without rational Deſire, we may call *Paſſions*, and when they happen along with Deſires, denominate them *paſſionate*. This part of our Conſtitution is as intelligible as many others univerſally obſerved and acknowledged; ſuch as theſe, that Danger of falling makes us ſtretch out our Arms; noiſe makes us wink; that a Child is determined to ſuck; many other Animals to riſe up and walk; ſome to run into Water, before they can have any Notion of Good to be obtained, or Evil avoided by theſe means.

Love and Hatred. IT may perhaps be convenient to confine *Love* and *Hatred* to our Sentiments toward Moral Agents; *Love* denoting "*Deſire* of the Happineſs of another, "generally attended with ſome *Appro-* "*bation* of him as innocent at leaſt, or "being of a mixed Character, where Good "is generally prevalent:" And *Hatred* "denoting Diſapprobation by our *Senſe*, "with the Abſence of Deſire of their

" Happineſs." *Benevolence* may denote only " the Deſire of another's Happineſs;" and *Malice*, " the Deſire of their Miſery," abſtractly from any Approbation or Condemnation by our *Moral Senſe*. This ſort of Malice is never found in our Nature, when we are not tranſported with Paſſion. The Propenſities of Anger and Envy have ſome Reſemblance of it; yet Envy is not an ultimate Deſire of another's Miſery, but only a ſubordinate Deſire of it, as the Means of advancing our ſelves, or ſome Perſon more beloved than the Perſon envied. Sect. 3. *Envy.*

FEAR, as far as it is an *Affection*, and not an undeſigning Propenſity, is " a Mixture of *Sorrow* and *Averſion*, when we " apprehend the Probability of Evil, or " the Loſs of Good befalling our ſelves, or " thoſe we love:" There is more or leſs of Sorrow, according to the apprehended Degrees of Probability. Hope, if it be any way an Affection, and not an Opinion, is " a Mixture of *Deſire* and *Joy*, upon " the probability of obtaining Good, and " avoiding Evil." Both theſe Paſſions may have ſome *Propenſities* and *Senſations* attending them, diſtinct from thoſe of the other Affections. *Fear.* *Hope.*

THE confuſed Uſe of the Names, *Love*, *Hatred*, *Joy*, *Sorrow*, *Delight*, has made *Confuſed Uſe of Names.*

Sect. 3. ſome of the moſt important Diſtinctions of our Affections and Paſſions. to be overlooked. No Modifications of Mind can be more different from each other, than a *private Deſire*, and a publick; yet both are called *Love*. The *Love of Money*, for Inſtance, and the *Love of a generous Character*, or a *Friend:* The *Love of a fine Seat*, and *the Love of a Child*. In like manner, what can be more different than the *Sorrow for a Loſs befallen our ſelves*, and *Sorrow for the Death of a Friend*? Of this Men muſt convince themſelves by Reflection.

THERE is alſo a conſiderable Difference even among the *ſelfiſh Paſſions*, which bear the ſame general Name, according to the different *Senſes* which conſtitute the Objects good or evil. Thus the Deſire of *Honour*, and the Deſire of *Wealth*, are certainly very different ſorts of Affections, and accompanied with different Senſations: The *Sorrow* in like manner for our Loſs by a *Shipwreck*, and our *Sorrow* for having done a *baſe Action*, or *Remorſe:* Sorrow for our being ſubject to the *Gout* or *Stone*, and Sorrow for our being *deſpiſed* and *condemned*, or *Shame:* Sorrow for the Damage done by a *Fire*, and that Sorrow which ariſes upon an apprehended *Injury* from a Partner, or any other of our Fellows, which we call *Anger*. Where we get

get ſome ſpecial diſtinct *Names*, we more eaſily acknowledge a Difference, as it may appear in *Shame* and *Anger*; but had we other *Names*, appropriated in the ſame manner, we ſhould imagine, with good ground, as many diſtinct *Paſſions*. The like Confuſion is obſervable about our Senſes*. Sect. 3.

False Representations of our Nature rectified.

To ſay that the *Senſation* accompanying all ſorts of Joy is pleaſant, and *that* accompanying Sorrow uneaſy, will not argue that there is no farther Diverſity. Pains have many differences among themſelves, and ſo have Pleaſures, according to the different *Senſes* by which they are perceived. To enumerate all theſe *Diverſities*, would be difficult and tedious. But ſome Men have piqued themſelves ſo much upon repreſenting "all our Affections as *ſelfiſh*; as if "each Perſon were in his whole Frame "only a *ſeparate Syſtem* from his Fellows, "ſo that there was nothing in his Conſti- "tution leading him to a *publick Intereſt*, "further than he apprehended it ſubſervi- "ent to his own private Intereſt; and this "Intereſt made nothing elſe, than the gra- "tifying our *external Senſes* and *Imagi- "nation*, or obtaining the Means of it:" that thereby the Wiſdom and Goodneſs of

* *Treat.* 1. *Sect.* 1. *Art.* 10.

Sect. 3. the AUTHOR of our Nature is traduced, as if he had given us the ſtrongeſt *Diſpoſitions* toward what he had in his Laws prohibited; and directed us, by the Frame of our Nature, to the meaneſt and moſt contemptible Purſuits; as if *what* all good Men have repreſented as the *Excellence* of our Nature, were a *Force* or *Conſtraint* put upon it by *Art* or *Authority*. It may be uſeful to conſider our Affections and Paſſions more particularly, as "they are excited by ſome-"thing in our Frame different from *Self-*"*Love*, and tend to ſomething elſe than "the private Pleaſures of the *external* "*Senſes or Imagination*." This we may do under the following Heads, by ſhewing

1. HOW our Paſſions ariſe from the *Moral Senſe*, and *Senſe of Honour*.

2. HOW our Paſſions tend toward the *State of others*, abſtractly from any Conſideration of their *Moral Qualities*.

3. HOW the *publick Paſſions* are diverſified by the *Moral Qualities* of the Agents, when they appear to our Moral Senſe as virtuous or vicious.

4. HOW the publick Paſſions are diverſified by the *Relations* of ſeveral Agents to each other, when we conſider at once their *State*, as to Happineſs or Miſery, and their

their paſt as well as preſent *Actions* towards each other. Sect. 3.

5. How all theſe Paſſions may be complicated with the *ſelfiſh*. Under each of theſe Heads we may find the ſix Paſſions of *Malebranche*, or the four of *Zeno*; with many other Combinations of them.

III. 1. THE Paſſions about our own Actions occaſioned by the *Moral Senſe*. When we form the Idea of a *morally good Action*, or ſee it repreſented in the *Drama*, or read it in *Epicks* or *Romance*, we feel a *Deſire* ariſing of doing the like. This leads moſt Tempers into an imagined Series of *Adventures*, in which they are ſtill acting the generous and virtuous Part, like to the Idea they have received. If we have executed any good Deſign, we feel inward *Triumph of Joy*: If we are diſappointed thro' our own *Negligence*, or have been diverted from it by ſome *ſelfiſh View*, we ſhall feel a Sorrow called *Remorſe*.

1. *Paſſions about our own Actions.*

The Paſſion of Heroiſm in Caſtle-building.

Moral Joy or Self-Approbation.

Remorſe.

WHEN the Idea is in like manner formed of any *morally evil Action*, which we might poſſibly accompliſh, if we reflect upon the Cruelty or pernicious Tendency of it, there ariſes *Reluctance*, or Averſion: If we have committed ſuch a Crime, upon like Reflection we feel the Sorrow called *Remorſe*: If we have reſiſted the Temptation,

Reluctance.

Sect. 3. tion, we feel a ſecret *Joy* and *Self-Approbation*, for which there is no ſpecial Name.

We might enumerate ſix other Paſſions from the Senſe of *Honour*, according as we apprehend our Actions, or any other Circumſtances, ſhall affect the *Opinions* which others form concerning us. When any Action or Circumſtance occurs, from which we imagine Honour would ariſe, we feel *Deſire*; when we attain it, *Joy*; when we are diſappointed, *Sorrow*. When we firſt apprehend any Action or Circumſtance as *diſhonourable*, we feel *Averſion* ariſing; if we apprehend our ſelves involved in it, or in danger of being tempted to it, we feel a Paſſion we may call *Modeſty* or *Shame*; when we eſcape or reſiſt ſuch Temptations, or avoid what is diſhonourable, we feel a *Joy*, for which there is no ſpecial Name.

Modeſty. *Shame.*

Ambition. We give the Name *Ambition* to a violent Deſire of Honour, but generally in a bad Senſe, when it would lead the Agent into *immoral Means* to gratify it. The ſame Word often denotes the *Deſire of Power*. *Pride* denotes ſometimes the ſame Deſires of Honour and Power, with Averſion to their contraries; ſometimes *Pride* denotes Joy upon any apprehended *Right* or *Claim* to Honour; generally it is taken in a bad Senſe, when one claims that to which he has no Right.

Pride.

Men

Sect. 3.

MEN may feel the Paſſion of *Shame* for the diſhonourable Actions of others, when any part of the Diſhonour falls upon *themſelves*; as when the Perſon diſhonoured is one of their *Club*, or *Party*, or *Family*. The general Relation of *human Nature* may produce ſome uneaſineſs upon the Diſhonour of another, tho this is more owing to our *publick Senſe*. *Shame for others.*

IV. 2. THE ſecond Claſs are the *publick Paſſions* about the *State of others*, as to Happineſs or Miſery, abſtractly from their *Moral Qualities*. Theſe Affections or Paſſions extend to all perceptive Natures, when there is no real or imagined Oppoſition of Intereſt. We naturally *deſire* the abſent Happineſs of others; *rejoice* in it when obtained, and *ſorrow* for it when loſt. We have *Averſion* to any impending Miſery; we are *ſorrowful* when it befals any Perſon, and *rejoice* when it is removed. This Averſion and Sorrow we often call Pity or Compaſſion; the Joy we may call *Congratulation*. *2. Publick Paſſions abſtractly.* *Good-will.* *Compaſſion.* *Pity.* *Congratulation.*

SINCE our Moral Senſe repreſents *Virtue* as the greateſt Happineſs to the Perſon poſſeſſed of it, our publick Affections will naturally make us deſire the *Virtue of others*. When the Opportunity of a great Action occurs to any Perſon againſt whom we are

Sect. 3. no way prejudiced, we *wiſh* he would attempt it, and deſire his good Succeſs. If he ſucceeds, we feel *Joy*; if he is diſappointed, or quits the Attempt, we feel *Sorrow*. Upon like Opportunity of, or Temptation to a baſe Action, we have *Averſion* to the Event: If he reſiſts the Temptation, we feel *Joy*; if he yields to it, *Sorrow*. Our Affections toward the *Perſon* ariſe jointly with our Paſſions about this Event, according as he acquits himſelf virtuouſly or baſely.

3. Publick Paſſions with moral Perceptions.

V. 3. THE Paſſions of the third Claſs are our *publick Affections*, jointly with *moral Perceptions* of the Virtue or Vice of the Agents. When Good appears attainable by a Perſon of *Moral Dignity*, our Deſire of his Happineſs, founded upon *Eſteem* or *Approbation*, is much ſtronger than *that* ſuppoſed in the former Claſs. The Misfortune of ſuch a Perſon raiſes ſtronger *Sorrow*, *Pity*, or *Regret*, and *Diſſatisfaction* with the Adminiſtration of the World, upon a light View of it, with a Suſpicion of the *real Advantage* of Virtue. The Succeſs of ſuch a Character raiſes all the contrary Affections of *Joy* and *Satisfaction* with Providence, and *Security* in Virtue. When Evil threatens ſuch a Character, we have ſtrong *Averſion* to it, with *Love* toward the Perſon: His eſcaping the Evil raiſes *Joy*, *Confidence* in

Regret.

Pro-

Providence, with *Security* in Virtue. If the Evil befals him, we feel the contrary Paſſions, *Sorrow*, *Diſſatisfaction* with Providence, and *Suſpicion* of the Reality of Virtue. Sect. 3.

HENCE we ſee how unfit ſuch Repreſentations are in *Tragedy*, as make the perfectly Virtuous miſerable in the higheſt degree. They can only lead the Spectators into *Diſtruſt* of Providence, *Diffidence* of Virtue; and into ſuch Sentiments, as ſome Authors, who probably miſtake his meaning, tell us *Brutus* expreſs'd at his Death, "That "the Virtue he had purſued as a ſolid Good, "proved but an empty Name." But we muſt here remember, that, notwithſtanding all the frightful Ideas we have inculcated upon us of the *King of Terrors*, yet an *honourable Death* is far from appearing to a generous Mind, as the greateſt of Evils. The *Ruin of a Free State*, the *Slavery of a generous Spirit*, a *Life upon ſhameful Terms*, ſtill appear vaſtly greater Evils; beſide many other exquiſite *Diſtreſſes* of a more private nature, in compariſon of which, an honourable Death befalling a favourite Character, is looked upon as a Deliverance. *Which of them fit for the Drama.*

UNDER this Claſs are alſo included the Paſſions employed about the Fortunes of Characters, apprehended as *morally Evil*. Such Characters do raiſe *Diſlike* in any *Paſſions toward moral evil Agents.*

Sect. 3. Obſerver, who has a moral Senſe: But *Malice*, or the *ultimate Deſire* of their Miſery, does not neceſſarily ariſe toward them. Perhaps our Nature is not capable of deſiring the Miſery of any Being calmly, farther than it may be neceſſary to the Safety of the innocent: We may find, perhaps, that there is no Quality in any Object which would excite in us *pure diſintereſted Malice*, or calm Deſire of Miſery for its own ſake*. When we apprehend any Perſon as *injurious* to our ſelves, or to any innocent Perſon, eſpecially to a Perſon beloved, the Paſſion of *Anger* ariſes toward the Agent. By *Anger* is generally meant "a Propenſity to occaſion Evil to "another, ariſing upon apprehenſion of "an Injury done by him:" This violent Propenſity is attended generally, when the Injury is not very ſudden, with *Sorrow* for the Injury ſuſtained, or threatned, and *Deſire* of repelling it, and making the Author of it *repent* of his Attempt, or *repair* the Damage.

No diſintereſted or ultimate Malice in Men.

Anger.

Its Effects. THIS Paſſion is attended with the moſt violent *uneaſy Senſations*, and produces as great Changes in our Bodies as any whatſoever. We are precipitantly led by this Paſſion, to apprehend the *injurious* as

* *See* Sect. 5 Art. 5. *of this Treatiſe.*

di-

directly malicious, and deſigning the Miſery of others without farther Intention. While the Heat of this Paſſion continues, we ſeem naturally to purſue the Miſery of the injurious, until they relent, and convince us of their better Intentions, by expreſſing their Senſe of the Injury, and offering Reparation of Damage, with Security againſt future Offences. Sect. 3.

Now as it is plainly neceſſary, in a Syſtem of Agents *capable of injuring* each other, that every one ſhould be made *formidable* to an Invader, by ſuch a violent Paſſion, till the Invader ſhews his Reformation of Temper, as above, and no longer; ſo we find it is thus ordered in our Conſtitution. Upon theſe Evidences of Reformation in the Invader, our Paſſion naturally abates; or if in any perverſe Temper it does not, the *Senſe of Mankind* turns againſt him, and he is looked upon as cruel and inhumane.

In conſidering more fully the Paſſions about the Fortunes of evil Characters, diſtinct from *Anger*, which ariſes upon a freſh Injury, we may firſt conſider the evil Agents, ſuch as a ſudden View ſometimes repreſents them, *directly evil* and *malicious*; and then make proper Abatements, for *what* the worſt of Men come ſhort of this compleatly evil Temper. As Mathe-

Sect. 3. maticians ſuppoſe perfect *Hardneſs* in ſome Bodies, and *Elaſticity* in others, and then make Allowances for the imperfect Degrees in natural Bodies.

Joy of Hatred. THE Proſpect of Good to a Perſon apprehended as *entirely malicious*, raiſes *Averſion* in the Obſerver, or *Deſire* of his Diſappointment; at leaſt, when his Succeſs would confirm him in any evil Intention. His Diſappointment raiſes *Joy* in the Event, with *Truſt* in Providence, and *Security* in Virtue. His Succeſs raiſes the contrary Paſſions of *Sorrow*, *Diſtruſt*, and *Suſpicion*. The *Proſpect of Evil*, befalling an evil Character, at firſt, perhaps, ſeems grateful to the Obſerver, if he has conceived the Paſſion of *Anger*; but to a ſedate Temper, no Miſery is farther the Occaſion of *Joy*, than as it is neceſſary to ſome prepollent Happineſs in the whole. The *eſcaping* of Evil impending over ſuch a Character, by which he is confirmed in Vice, is the Occaſion of *Sorrow*, and *Diſtruſt* of Providence and Virtue; and the Evil befalling him raiſes *Joy*, and *Satisfaction* with Providence, and *Security* in Virtue. We ſee therefore, that the *Succeſs of evil Characters*, by obtaining Good, or avoiding Evil, is an unfit Repreſentation in *Tragedy*.

Sorrow of Hatred.

LET

Sect. 3.

LET any one reflect on this Claſs of Paſſions, eſpecially as they ariſe upon Occaſions which do not affect himſelf, and he will ſee how little of *Self-Love* there is in them; and yet they are frequently as violent as any Paſſions whatſoever. We ſeem conſcious of ſome *Dignity* in theſe Paſſions above the ſelfiſh ones, and therefore never conceal them, nor are we aſhamed of them. Theſe *complicated Paſſions* the Philoſophers have confuſedly mentioned, under ſome general Names, along with the ſimple ſelfiſh Paſſions. The *Poets* and *Criticks* have ſufficiently ſhown, that they felt theſe Differences, however it did not concern them to explain them. We may find Inſtances of them in all Dramatick Performances, both Antient and Modern.

Paſſions about mixed Characters.

THE *Abatements* to be made for what human Nature comes ſhort of the higheſt Degrees either of Virtue or Vice, may be thus conceived: When the Good in any *mixed Character* ſurpaſſes the Evil, the Paſſions ariſe as toward the *Good*; where the Evil ſurpaſſes the Good, the Paſſions ariſe as toward the *Evil*, only in both Caſes with leſs Violence. And further, the Paſſions in both Caſes are either *ſtopped*, or turned the contrary way, by want of due *Proportion* between the *State* and *Character*. Thus an imperfect good Character,

in

Sect. 3. in purſuit of a Good too great for his Virtue, or to the excluſion of more worthy Characters, inſtead of raiſing *Deſire* of his Succeſs, raiſes *Averſion*; his Succeſs raiſes *Envy*, or a Species of *Sorrow*, and his Diſappointment *Joy*. An imperfectly evil Character, threatned by an Evil greater than is neceſſary to make him relent and reform, or by a great Calamity, which has no direct tendency to reform him, inſtead of raiſing *Deſire* toward the Event, raiſes *Averſion*; his eſcaping it raiſes *Joy*, and his falling under it raiſes *Pity*, a Species of Sorrow.

Envy, Sorrow, Joy.

Pity.

The beſt Plots in Tragedy.

THERE is another Circumſtance which exceedingly varies our Paſſions of this Claſs, when the Agents themſelves, by their *own Conduct*, procure their Miſery. When an imperfect good Character, by an evil Action, procures the higheſt Miſery to himſelf; this raiſes theſe complicated Paſſions, *Pity* toward the Sufferer, *Sorrow* for the State, *Abhorrence* of Vice, *Awe* and *Admiration* of Providence, as keeping ſtrict Meaſures of Sanctity and Juſtice. Theſe Paſſions we may all feel, in reading the *Oedipus* of *Sophocles*, when we ſee the Diſtreſs of that Prince, occaſioned by his ſuperſtitious Curioſity about his future Fortunes; his raſh Violence of Temper, in Duelling without Provocation, and in pronouncing Execrations on Perſons unknown.

We

We feel the like Paſſions from the Fortunes of *Creon* in the *Antigone*; or from the Fates of *Pyrrhus* and *Oreſtes*, in the *Andromache of Racine*; or our *Diſtreſſed Mother*. We heartily pity theſe Characters, but without repining at Providence; their Miſery is the Fruit of their own Actions. It is with the juſteſt Reaſon, that *Ariſtotle* * prefers ſuch Plots to all others for *Tragedy*, ſince theſe Characters come neareſt to thoſe of the Spectators, and conſequently will have the ſtrongeſt Influence on them. We are generally conſcious of ſome good Diſpoſitions, mixed with many Weakneſſes: few imagine themſelves capable of attaining the *height* of perfectly good Characters, or arriving to their high Degrees of Felicity; and fewer imagine themſelves capable of ſinking into the Baſeneſs of perfectly *evil Tempers*, and therefore few dread the Calamities which befal them. Sect. 3.

THERE is one farther Circumſtance which ſtrengthens this Claſs of Paſſions exceedingly, that is, the *greatneſs of the Change of Fortune* in the Perſon, or the *Surprize* with which it comes. As this gives the Perſon a more *acute Perception* either of Happineſs or Miſery, ſo it *How theſe Paſſions are raiſed high and complicated.*

* *Ariſtotle Poetic.* Chap. 13.

ſtrengthens

Sect. 3. ſtrengthens our *Paſſions*, ariſing from Obſervation of his State. Of this the Poets are very ſenſible, who ſo often repreſent to us the former Proſperity of the Perſon, for whom they would move our pity; his *Projects*, his *Hopes*, his *half-executed Deſigns*. One left his *Palace unfiniſhed*, another his *betrothed Miſtreſs*, or *young Wife*; one promiſed himſelf *Glory*, and a fortunate *old Age*; another was heaping up *Wealth*, boaſted of his *Knowledge*, was honoured for his *fine Armour*, his *Activity*, his *Augury*.

Αλλ' οὐκ οἰωνοῖσιν ἐρύσσατο κῆρα μέλαιναν.
—— οὐδέ τί οἱ τόγ' ἐπίρκεσε λυγρὸν ὄλεθρον. Homer.

Sed non Augurio potuit depellere peſtem;
Sed non Dardaniæ medicari cuſpidis ictum
Invaluit. —— Virg.

THE Joy is in like manner increaſed upon the Misfortunes of evil Characters, by repreſenting their former *Proſperity*, *Pride* and *Inſolence*.

THIS Sorrow or Joy is ſtrangely diverſified or complicated, when the Sufferers are *multiplied*, by repreſenting the Perſons attached to the principal Sufferer, and ſetting before us their *Affections*, *Friendſhips*, *tender Solicitudes*, *care in Education*, *ſuccour in former Diſtreſſes*; this every one

one will find in reading the Stories of *Pallas*, *Camilla*, *Niſus*, and *Euryalus*; or in general, any Battle of *Homer* or *Virgil*. What there is in Self-Love to account for theſe Effects, let all Mankind judge. Sect. 3.

VI. THE Paſſions of the fourth Claſs ariſe from the ſame *moral Senſe* and *publick Affections*, upon obſerving the Actions of Agents ſome way *attached* to each other, by prior Ties of Nature or good Offices, or diſengaged by *prior Injuries*; when theſe *Relations* are known, the moral Qualities of the Actions appear conſiderably different, and our Paſſions are much diverſified by them: there is alſo a great *Complication* of different Paſſions, and a ſort of *Contraſte*, or aſſemblage of oppoſite Paſſions toward the ſeveral Perſons concerned. The moſt moving *Peripeties*, and *Remembrances*, in *Epick* and *Dramatick* Poetry, are calculated to raiſe theſe complicated Paſſions; and in *Oratory* we ſtudy to do the ſame. 4. *Publick Paſſions and Relations of Agents.* *Contraſtes and Complications of Paſſions.*

THUS ſtrong Sentiments of *Gratitude*, and vigorous Returns of good Offices obſerved, raiſe in the Spectator the higheſt *Love* and *Eſteem* toward both the *Benefactor*, and even the *Perſon obliged*, with *Security* and *Delight* in Virtue. —— *Ingratitude*, or returning bad Offices deſignedly, raiſes the greateſt *Deteſtation* a-

Sect. 3. gainſt the Ungrateful; and *Love* with *Compaſſion* toward the Benefactor, with *Dejection* and *Diffidence* in a virtuous Courſe of Life. —— *Forgiving of Injuries*, and much more *returning Good for Evil*, appears wonderfully great and beautiful to our moral Senſe: it raiſes the ſtrongeſt *Love* toward the Forgiver, *Compaſſion* for the Injury received; toward the Injurious, if *relenting*, ſome degree of *Good-will*, with *Compaſſion*; if not relenting, the moſt violent *Abhorrence* and *Hatred*.—— Mutual *good Offices* done deſignedly between morally *good Agents*, raiſe *Joy* and *Love* in the Obſerver toward both, with *delight* in Virtue.—— *Mutual Injuries* done by evil Agents deſignedly, raiſe *Joy* in the Events, along with *Hatred* to the Agents, with *Deteſtation* of Vice —— *Good Offices* done deſignedly by *good Agents* toward *Evil*, but not ſo as to encourage, or enable them to further Miſchief, raiſe *Love* toward the *good Agent*; *Diſplicence*, with ſome *Good-will* toward the evil Agent. —— *Good Offices* deſignedly done mutually among *evil Agents*, if theſe Offices do not promote their evil Intentions, diminiſh our Diſlike and Hatred, and introduce ſome *Compaſſion* and *Benevolence*. —— *Good Offices* from *good Agents*, to *Benefactors unknown* to the Agent, or to their unknown Friends or Poſterity, increaſe *Love* toward both; and raiſe great *Satisfaction* and *Truſt* in *Pro-*

Providence, with *Security* in Virtue, and *Joy* in the Event.—— *Undeſigned evil Returns* in like Caſe with the former, raiſe *Sorrow* in the Obſerver upon account of the Event, *Pity* toward both, with *Suſpicion* of Providence and Virtue.—An *undeſigned Return of Evil* to an evil Agent from a good one, whom he had injured, raiſes *Joy* upon account of the Event, and *Truſt* in Providence. —— *Undeſigned evil Offices mutually done* to each other by evil Agents, raiſe *Joy* in the Event, *Abhorrence* of Vice, and *Satisfaction* with Providence.—*Undeſigned good Offices* done by good Agents toward the evil, by which they are further excited or impowered to do evil, raiſe *Pity* toward the good Agent, *Indignation* and *Envy* toward the Evil, with *Diſtruſt* in Providence. —— *Undeſigned good Offices* done by good to evil Agents, by which they are not excited or enabled to do further miſchief, raiſe *Envy* or *Indignation* toward the evil Agent, if the Benefit be great; if not, they ſcarce raiſe any new Paſſion diſtinct from that we had before, of *Love* toward the one, and *Hatred* or *Diſlike* toward the other. Sect. 3.

THESE Paſſions might have been diverſified, according to *Malebranche's* Diviſion, as the Object or Event was *preſent*, or in *ſuſpenſe*, or *certainly removed*: And would appear in different Degrees of

Sect. 3. Strength, according as the Perſons concerned were more nearly attach'd to the Obſerver, by *Nature*, *Friendſhip*, or *Acquaintance*.

5. *Publick Paſſions join'd with the ſelfiſh.*

VII. THE Paſſions of the laſt Claſs, are thoſe in which any of the former Kinds are complicated with *ſelfiſh Paſſions*, when our own Intereſt is concerned. It is needleſs here to repeat them over again: Only this may be noted in general, that, as the Conjunction of ſelfiſh Paſſions will very much increaſe the Commotion of Mind, ſo the Oppoſition of any *ſelfiſh Intereſts*, which appear of great Importance, will often conquer the *publick Deſires* or Averſions, or thoſe founded upon the Senſe of *Virtue* or *Honour*; and this is the Caſe in vicious Actions done againſt *Conſcience*.

THESE Complications of Paſſions are often not reflected on by the Perſon who is acted by them, during their Rage: But a judicious Obſerver may find them by Reflection upon himſelf, or by Obſervation of others; and the Repreſentation of them never fails to affect us in the moſt lively manner.

——— *Æſtuat ingens*
Imo in Corde Pudor, mixtoque Inſania Luctu,
Et Furiis agitatus Amor, & conſcia Virtus. Virg.

IN

Sect. 3.

IN all this tedious Enumeration, let any one conſider, "How few of our Paſſions "can be any way deduced from *Self-* "*Love*, or deſire of private Advantage: "And how improbable it is, that Perſons "in the Heat of Action, have any of "thoſe *ſubtle Reflections*, and *ſelfiſh In-* "*tentions*, which ſome Philoſophers in- "vent for them: How great a part of "the Commotions of our Minds ariſe up- "on the *moral Senſe*, and from *publick* "*Affections* toward the good of others. "We ſhould find, that without theſe Prin- "ciples in our Nature, we ſhould not feel "the one half at leaſt of our preſent "*Pleaſures* or *Pains*; and that our Na- "ture would be almoſt reduced to *Indo-* "*lence*."

How Characters and Tempers of Men are formed.

AN accurate Obſervation of the ſeveral diſtinct *Characters* and *Tempers* of Men, which are conſtituted by the various Degrees of their *natural Sagacity*, their *Knowledge*, their *Intereſts*, their *Opinions*, or *Aſſociations* of Ideas, with the *Paſſions* which are prevalent in them, is a moſt uſeful and pleaſant Entertainment for thoſe, who have Opportunities of large Acquaintance and Obſervation. But our preſent Purpoſe leads only to conſider the firſt general *Elements*, from the various Combi-

Sect. 3. nations of which, the ſeveral *Tempers* and *Characters* are formed.

The Order of Nature partly vindicated.

THIS account of our Affections will, however, prepare the way for diſcerning conſiderable Evidences for the *Goodneſs of the Deity*, from the Conſtitution of our Nature; and for removing the Objections of voluptuous luxurious Men, againſt the Rules of Virtue laid down by Men of Reflection. While no other Ideas of *Pleaſure* or *Advantage* are given us, than thoſe which relate to the external Senſes; nor any other *Affections* repreſented as natural, ſave thoſe toward private Good: it may be difficult to perſuade many, even of thoſe who are not Enemies to Virtue from *Inclination*, of the Wiſdom of the Deity, in making the *Biaſs* of our Nature oppoſite to the Laws he would give us; and making all *Pleaſure*, the moſt natural Character of Good, attend the *prohibited Actions*, or the *indifferent* ones; while *Obedience* to the Law muſt be a *conſtrained* Courſe of Action, inforced only by *Penalties* contrary to our *natural Affections* and *Senſes*. *Nature* and *Grace* are by this Scheme made very oppoſite: Some would queſtion whether they could have the ſame Author. Whereas, if the preceding Account be juſt, we ſee no ſuch Inconſiſtency: "Every Paſſion

"or

" or Affection in its *moderate Degree* Sect. 3.
" is innocent, many are directly *amiable*,
" and *morally good*: we have *Senſes* and
" *Affections* leading us to *publick Good*,
" as well as to *private*; to *Virtue*, as well
" as to external Pleaſure."

SECT. IV.

How far our ſeveral Affections *and* Paſſions *are under our* Power, *either to govern them when raiſed, or to prevent their ariſing: with ſome general Obſervations about their* Objects.

Affections and Paſſions depend much upon Opinions.

I. FROM what was ſaid above it appears, that our Paſſions are not ſo much in our *Power*, as ſome ſeem to imagine, from the *Topicks* uſed either to raiſe or allay them. We are ſo conſtituted by Nature, that, as ſoon as we form the Idea of certain Objects or Events, our *Deſire* or *Averſion* will ariſe toward them; and conſequently our Affections muſt very much depend upon the *Opinions* we form, concerning any thing which occurs to our Mind, its *Qualities*, *Tendencies*, or *Effects*. Thus the Happineſs of every ſenſitive Nature is deſired, as ſoon as we remove all *Opinion* or *Apprehenſion* of *Oppoſition of Intereſt* between this Being and others. The *Apprehenſion* of morally good Qualities, is the neceſſary Cauſe of *Approbation*, by our moral Senſe, and of ſtronger *Love*. The Cauſe of *Hatred*, is the *Apprehenſion*

prehenſion of the oppoſite Qualities. *Fear*, in like manner, muſt ariſe from *Opinion of Power*, and *Inclination* to hurt us: *Pity* from the Opinion of another's *undeſerved Miſery*: *Shame* only ariſes from *Apprehenſion* of *Contempt* from others: *Joy*, in any Event, muſt ariſe from an Opinion of its Goodneſs. Our *ſelfiſh Paſſions* in this, do not differ from our *publick ones*. Sect. 4.

THIS may ſhew us ſome Inconſiſtency in Topicks of Argument, often uſed to inculcate *Piety* and *Virtue*. Whatever Motives of Intereſt we ſuggeſt, either from a preſent or future *Reward*, muſt be ineffectual, until we have firſt laboured to form *amiable Conceptions* of the *Deity*, and of our *Fellow Creatures*. And yet in many Writers, even in this Cauſe, "Mankind "are repreſented as *abſolutely evil*, or "at beſt as *entirely ſelfiſh*; nor are there "any nobler Ideas of the DEITY ſuggeſted. "It is grown a *faſhionable Topick*, to put "ſome *ſly ſelfiſh Conſtruction* upon the "moſt generous human Actions; and he "paſſes for the *ſhreudeſt Writer*, or *Ora*-"*tor*, who is moſt artful in theſe Inſinua-"tions."

II. THE Government of our Paſſions muſt then depend much upon our *Opinions*: But we muſt here obſerve an obvious Difference among our Deſires, *viz.* that *Appetites and Affections diſtinguiſhed.*

"ſome

Sect. 4. " ſome of them have a *previous*, painful, " or uneaſy Senſation, antecedently to " any *Opinion* of Good in the Object; " nay, the Object is often chiefly eſteem- " ed good, only for its *allaying this Pain* " or Uneaſineſs; or if the Object gives " alſo poſitive Pleaſure, yet the *uneaſy* " *Senſation* is previous to, and indepen- " dent of this *Opinion* of Good in the " Object." Theſe Deſires we may call *Appetites*. " Other Deſires and Averſions " neceſſarily preſuppoſe an *Opinion* of Good " and Evil in their Objects; and the De- " ſires or Averſions, with their concomi- " tant uneaſy Senſations, are produced or " occaſioned by this *Opinion* or *Appre-* " *henſion*." Of the former kind are *Hunger* and *Thirſt*, and the Deſires between the *Sexes*; to which Deſires there is an uneaſy Senſation *previous*, even in thoſe who have little other Notion of Good in the Objects, than allaying this *Pain* or *Uneaſineſs*. There is ſomething like to this in the Deſire of *Society*, or the Company of our fellow Creatures. Our Nature is ſo much formed for this, that altho the *Abſence of Company* is not immediately painful, yet if it be long, and the Perſon be not employed in ſomething which tends to *Society* at laſt, or which is deſigned to fit him for Society, an uneaſy *Fretfulneſs*, *Sullenneſs*, and *Diſcontent*, will grow upon him by degrees, which Company alone

lone can remove. He ſhall not perhaps be ſenſible always, that it is the Abſence of Company which occaſions his Uneaſineſs: A painful Senſation dictates nothing of it ſelf; it muſt be therefore ſome *Reflection* or *Inſtinct*, diſtinct from the Pain, which ſuggeſts the Remedy. Our Benevolence and Compaſſion preſuppoſe indeed ſome *Knowledge* of other ſenſitive Beings, and of what is good or evil to them: But they do not ariſe from any previous *Opinion*, that "the Good of others tends to "the Good of the Agent." They are *Determinations of our Nature*, previous to our Choice from Intereſt, which excite us to Action, as ſoon as we know other ſenſitive or rational Beings, and have any Apprehenſion of their Happineſs or Miſery. Sect 4.

In other Deſires the Caſe is different. No Man is diſtreſſed for want of *fine Smells*, *harmonious Sounds*, *beautiful Objects*, *Wealth*, *Power*, or *Grandeur*, previouſly to ſome Opinion formed of theſe things as good, or ſome *prior Senſation* of their Pleaſures. In like manner, *Virtue* and *Honour* as neceſſarily give us Pleaſure, when they occur to us, as Vice and Contempt give us Pain; but, antecedently to ſome *Experience* or *Opinion* of this Pleaſure, there is no previous uneaſy Senſation in their Abſence, as there is in the Abſence of the Objects of *Appetite*. The Neceſſity of

Sect. 4. of theſe Senſations previous to our Appetites, has been conſidered already *. The Senſations accompanying or ſubſequent to our other Deſires, by which they are denominated *Paſſions*, keep them in a juſt Ballance with our *Appetites*, as was before obſerved.

BUT this holds in general, concerning all our Deſires or Averſions, that according to the *Opinion* or *Apprehenſion* of Good or Evil, the Deſire or Averſion is increaſed or diminiſhed: Every *Gratification* of any Deſire gives at firſt Pleaſure; and Diſappointment Pain, proportioned to the Violence of the Deſire. In like manner, the *eſcaping* any Object of Averſion, tho it makes no permanent Addition to our Happineſs, gives at firſt a pleaſant *Senſation*, and relieves us from Miſery, proportioned to the Degree of *Averſion* or *Fear*. So when any Event, to which we had an Averſion, befals us, we have at firſt Miſery proportioned to the Degree of Averſion. So that ſome Pain is ſubſequent upon all *Fruſtration* of Deſire or Averſion, but it is previous to thoſe Deſires only, which are called *Appetites*.

* Sect. 2. Art. 6.

III. HENCE

Sect. 4.

III. HENCE we ſee how impoſſible it is for one to judge of the *Degrees* of Happineſs or Miſery in others, unleſs he knows their *Opinions*, their *Aſſociations* of Ideas, and the *Degrees* of their Deſires and Averſions. We ſee alſo of how much Conſequence our *Aſſociations* of Ideas and *Opinions* are to our Happineſs or Miſery, and to the Command of our Paſſions.

Aſſociations of Ideas and Opinions increaſe or diminiſh the ſtrength of our Deſires.

FOR tho in our *Appetites* there are uneaſy Senſations, previous to any Opinion, yet our very Appetites may be ſtrengthned or weakned, and variouſly alter'd by *Opinion*, or *Aſſociations* of Ideas. Before *their* Intervention, the bodily Appetites are eaſily ſatisfied: Nature has put it in almoſt every one's power, ſo far to gratify them, as to ſupport the Body, and remove Pain. But when *Opinion*, and *confuſed Ideas*, or *Fancy* comes in, and repreſents ſome particular kinds of Gratifications, or great Variety of them, as of great Importance; when Ideas of *Dignity*, *Grandure*, *Magnificence*, *Generoſity*, or any other *moral Species*, are joined to the Objects of Appetites, they may furniſh us with endleſs Labour, Vexation, and Miſery of every kind.

AS to the other Deſires which preſuppoſe ſome *Opinion* or *Apprehenſion* of Good,

Sect. 4. Good, previous to any Senſation of uneaſineſs; they muſt ſtill be more directly influenced by *Opinion*, and *Aſſociations* of Ideas. The higher the *Opinion* or *Apprehenſion* of Good or Evil is, the ſtronger muſt the *Deſire* or *Averſion* be; the greater is the Pleaſure of *Success* at firſt, and the greater the Pain of *Diſappointment*. Our publick Deſires are influenced in the ſame manner with the private: what we conceive as Good, we ſhall deſire for thoſe we love, as well as for our ſelves; and that in proportion to the *Degree of Good* apprehended in it: whatever we apprehend as Evil in any degree to thoſe we love, to that we ſhall have proportionable Averſion.

THE common Effect of theſe *Aſſociations* of Ideas is this, "that they raiſe the "Paſſions into an extravagant Degree, be- "yond the proportion of real Good in "the Object: And commonly beget ſome "ſecret Opinions to juſtify the Paſſions. "But then the *Confutation* of theſe falſe "Opinions is not ſufficient to break the "*Aſſociation*, ſo that the *Deſire* or *Paſ-* "*ſion* ſhall continue, even when our Un- "derſtanding has ſuggeſted to us, that the "Object is not good, or not proportioned "to the Strength of the Deſire." Thus we often may obſerve, that Perſons, who by reaſoning have laid aſide all Opinion of

Spirits

Spirits being in the dark more than in the light, are ſtill uneaſy to be alone in the dark*. Sect. 4.

Thus the *luxurious*, the *extravagant Lover*, the *Miſer*, can ſcarce be ſuppoſed to have *Opinions* of the ſeveral Objects of their Purſuit, proportioned to the Vehemence of their Deſires; but the conſtant *Indulgence* of any Deſire, the frequent *Repetition* of it, the *diverting* our Minds from all other Purſuits, the Strain of *Converſation* among Men of the ſame Temper, who often haunt together, the *Contagion* in the very Air and Countenance of the paſſionate, beget ſuch wild *Aſſociations* of Ideas, that a ſudden *Conviction of Reaſon* will not ſtop the Deſire or Averſion, any more than an Argument will ſurmount the *Loathings* or *Averſions*, acquired againſt certain Meats or Drinks, by Surfeits or emetick Preparations.

The *Luxurious* are often convinced, when any Accident has revived a *natural Appetite*, of the ſuperior Pleaſures in a plain Dinner, with a ſharp Stomach †: but

---

* Ac veluti pueri trepidant, atque omnia cæcis
In tenebris metuunt, ſic nos in luce timemus
Interdum nihilo quæ ſunt metuenda magis. Luc.

† —— Leporem ſectatus, equove
Laſſus ab indomito, vel ſi Romana fatigat
Militia aſſuetum Græcari ——
Cum labor extuderit faſtidia
—— Cum ſale panis
Latrantem ſtomachum bene leniet —— Hor.

this

Sect. 4. this does not reform them; they have got all the Ideas of *Dignity*, *Grandure*, *Excellence*, and *Enjoyment of Life* joined to their Table. Explain to a Miſer the Folly of his Conduct, ſo that he can allege nothing in his Defence; yet he will go on,

Ut locuples moriatur egenti vivere ſſto. Juv.

He has likewiſe all Ideas of *Good*, of *Worth*, and *Importance* in Life confounded with his Coffers.

A ROMANTICK Lover has in like manner no Notion of Life without his *Miſtreſs*, all *Virtue* and *Merit* are ſummed up in his *inviolable Fidelity*. The *Connoiſſeur* has all Ideas of valuable *Knowledge*, *Gentlemanlike Worth* and *Ability* aſſociated with his beloved Arts. The Idea of *Property* comes along with the Taſte, and makes his Happineſs impoſſible, without *Poſſeſſion* of what he admires. A plain Queſtion might confute the *Opinion*, but will not break the *Aſſociation*: "What "Pleaſure has the Poſſeſſor more than "others, to whoſe Eyes they are expoſed "as well as his?"

OUR *publick Deſires* are affected by confuſed Ideas, in the ſame manner with our private Deſires. What is apprehended as

as Good, thro' an Aſſociation of foreign Ideas, ſhall be purſued for *thoſe we love*, as well as what is really good for them. Our *benevolent Paſſions* in the nearer Ties, are as apt to be too violent as any whatſoever: this we may often experience in the *Love of Offſpring, Relations, Parties, Cabals.* The Violence of our Paſſion makes us ſometimes incapable of purſuing effectually their Good, and ſinks us into an uſeleſs State of Sorrow upon their Misfortunes. *Compaſſion* often makes the Evil greater to the Spectator than to the Sufferer; and ſometimes ſubjects the Happineſs of a Perſon of great Worth, to every Accident befalling one entirely void of it. Sect. 4.

THE Deſire of Virtue, upon extenſive impartial Schemes of publick Happineſs, can ſcarce be too ſtrong; but, upon *miſtaken or partial Views* of publick Good, this Deſire of Virtue may often lead Men into very pernicious Actions. One may conceive a ſort of *Extravagancy*, and *effeminate Weakneſs* even of this Deſire; as when Men are diſſatisfied with themſelves for *Diſappointments* in good Attempts, which it was not in their Power to accompliſh; when ſome *heroick Tempers* ſhew no Regard to private Good; when the Purſuit of the lovely Form is ſo paſſionate, that the Agent does not reliſh his *paſt Conduct*

Sect. 4. by agreeable Reflection, but like the Ambitious,

Nil actum reputat ſi quid ſupereſſet agendum. Lucan.

But the moſt pernicious *Perverſions* of this Deſire are, "ſome *partial Admi-* "*rations* of certain moral Species, ſuch as "*Fortitude*, *Propagation of true Reli-* "*gion*, *Zeal for a Party*; while other "Virtues are overlooked, and the very "*End* to which the admired Qualities are "ſubſervient is forgotten. Thus ſome "*Phantoms* of Virtue are raiſed, wholly "oppoſite to its true Nature, and to the "ſole End of it, *the publick Good*."

Honour, in like manner, has had its fooliſh Aſſociations, and the true Nature of it has been overlooked, ſo that the Deſire of it has run into *Enthuſiaſm*, and pernicious *Madneſs*. Thus, "however our "Deſires, when our *Opinions* are true, "and the Deſire is proportioned to the "*true Opinion*, are all calculated for good, "either publick or private; yet *falſe* "*Opinions*, and *confuſed Ideas*, or too "great a *Violence* in any of them, above "a due Proportion to the reſt, may "turn the beſt of them into deſtructive "Follies."

This

Sect. 4.

Malicious or cruel Tempers, how they ariſe.

THIS is probably the Caſe in thoſe Affections which ſome ſuppoſe *natural*, or at leaſt incident to our Natures, and yet *abſolutely evil*: Such as *Rancour*, or *diſintereſted Malice*, *Revenge*, *Miſanthropy*. We indeed find our Nature determined to diſapprove an *Agent* apprehended as evil, or malicious, thro' *direct Intention*; we muſt deſire the Deſtruction of ſuch a Being, not only from Self-Love, but from our Benevolence to others. Now when we raſhly form Opinions of *Sects*, or *Nations*, as abſolutely evil; or get aſſociated Ideas of *Impiety*, *Cruelty*, *Profaneneſs*, recurring upon every mention of them: when, by repeated Reflection upon Injuries received, we ſtrengthen our Diſlike into an *obdurate Averſion*, and conceive that the Injurious are *directly malicious*; we may be led to act in ſuch a manner, that Spectators, who are unacquainted with our *ſecret Opinions*, or *confuſed Apprehenſions of others*, may think we have *pure diſintereſted Malice* in our Nature; a very *Inſtinct* toward the Miſery of others, when it is really only the *overgrowth* of a juſt natural Affection, upon falſe Opinions, or confuſed Ideas; even as our *Appetites*, upon which our natural Life depends, may acquire accidental *Loathings* at the moſt wholeſom Food. Our Ideas and Opinions of Mankind are often very raſhly formed, but our *Affec-*

Sect. 4. *tions* are generally ſuited to our *Opinions*. When our Ideas and Opinions of the moral Qualities of others are juſt, our Affections are generally regular and good: But when we give looſe Reins to our *Imagination* and *Opinion*, our Affections muſt follow them into all Extravagance and Folly, and inadvertent Spectators will imagine ſome *Diſpoſitions* in us wholly uſeleſs, and abſolutely and directly *evil*.

Now the *Gratification* of theſe deſtructive Deſires, like thoſe of all the reſt, gives at firſt ſome *Pleaſure*, proportioned to their Violence; and the *Diſappointment* gives proportioned *Pain*. But as to the *Continuance* of theſe Pleaſures or Pains, we ſhall find hereafter great Diverſity.

FROM this view of our Deſires, we may ſee "the great Variety of *Objects*, *Circum-* "*ſtances*, *Events*, which muſt be of Im- "portance to the Happineſs of a Creature, "furniſhed with ſuch a *Variety of Senſes* "of Good and Evil, with equally various "*Deſires* correſponding to them: eſpeci- "ally conſidering the ſtrange *Combinations* "*of Ideas*, giving Importance to many Ob- "jects, in their own Nature indifferent."

How far the ſeveral Deſires muſt neceſſarily ariſe in us.

IV. WE muſt in the next Place enquire "how far theſe ſeveral *Deſires* muſt "neceſ-

" neceſſarily ariſe, or may be prevented by Sect. 4.
" our Conduct."

THE Pleaſures and Pains of the *external Senſes* muſt certainly be perceived by every one who comes into the World; the one raiſing ſome Degree of Deſire, and the other Averſion: the *Pains of Appetites* ariſe yet more certainly than others, and are previous to any *Opinion*. But then it is very much in our power to keep theſe Senſations *pure* and *unmixed* with any foreign Ideas: ſo that the plaineſt Food and Raiment, if ſufficiently nouriſhing and healthful, may keep us eaſy, as well as the *rareſt* or moſt *expenſive*. Nay the Body, when accuſtomed to the ſimpler Sorts, is eaſieſt in the Uſe of them: And we are raiſed to an higher Degree of *Chearfulneſs*, by a ſmall Improvement in our Table, than it is poſſible to bring a *pampered Body* into, by any of the Productions of Nature. Whatever the Body is once accuſtomed to, produces no conſiderable Change in it. 1. *That of external pleaſures.*

THE Pleaſures of the *Imagination*, or of *the internal Senſe of Beauty*, and *Decency*, and *Harmony*, muſt alſo be perceived by us. The *Regularity*, *Proportion* and *Order* in external Forms, will as neceſſarily ſtrike the Mind, as any Perceptions of the external Senſes. But then, as we have no uneaſineſs of *Appetite*, previous to the 2. *The Deſires of the Pleaſures of the Imagination.*

59703

Sect. 4. Reception of thoſe grateful Ideas, we are not *neceſſarily* made miſerable in their Abſence; unleſs by ſome fantaſtick *Habit* we have raiſed very violent Deſires, or by a long Purſuit of them, have made ourſelves incapable of other Enjoyments.

AGAIN, the Senſe and Deſire of *Beauty* of ſeveral kinds is entirely abſtracted from *Poſſeſſion* or *Property*; ſo that the fineſt *Reliſh* of this kind, and the ſtrongeſt ſubſequent *Deſires*, if we admit no fooliſh Conjunctions of Ideas, may almoſt every where be gratified with the Proſpects of *Nature*, and with the Contemplation of the more curious *Works of Art*, which the Proprietors generally allow to others without Reſtraint. But if this Senſe or Deſire of Beauty itſelf be accompanied with the Deſire of *Poſſeſſion* or *Property*; if we let it be guided by *Cuſtom*, and receive *Aſſociations* of foreign Ideas in our Fancy of *Dreſs*, *Equipage*, *Furniture*, *Retinue*; if we reliſh only the Modes of the *Great*, or the Marks of *Diſtinction* as beautiful; if we let ſuch Deſires grow ſtrong, we muſt be very *great* indeed, before we can have any Pleaſure by this Senſe: and every Diſappointment or Change of Fortune muſt make us miſerable. The like Fate may attend the Purſuit of *ſpeculative Sciences*, *Poetry*, *Muſick*, or *Painting*; to excel in theſe things is granted but to few.

A

A violent Deſire of *Diſtinction* and *Eminence* may bring on Vexation and Sorrow for the longeſt Life. Sect. 4.

THE Pleaſures and Pains of the *publick Senſe* will alſo neceſſarily ariſe in us. Men cannot live without the *Society* of others, and their *good Offices*; they muſt obſerve both the *Happineſs* and *Miſery*, the *Pleaſures* and *Pains* of their Fellows: *Deſire* and *Averſion* muſt ariſe in the Obſerver. Nay farther, as we cannot avoid more near Attachments of Love, either from the Inſtinct between the *Sexes*, or that toward *Offspring*, or from Obſervation of the *benevolent Tempers* of others, or their particular *Virtues* and *good Offices*, we muſt feel the Senſations of *Joy* and *Sorrow*, from the State of others even in the ſtronger Degrees, and have the publick Deſires in a greater Height. All we can do to prevent the *Pains* of general Benevolence, will equally leſſen the *Pleaſures* of it. If we reſtrain our *publick Affection* from growing ſtrong, we abate our Pleaſures from the good Succeſs of others, as much as we leſſen our Compaſſion for their Misfortunes: If we confine our Deſires to a ſmall *Circle* of Acquaintance, or to a *Cabal* or *Faction*, we contract our Pleaſures as much as we do our Pains. The Diſtinction of Pleaſures and Pains into *real* and *imaginary*, or rather into *neceſſary* and *voluntary*, 3. *The publick Deſires.*

Sect. 4. would be of ſome uſe, if we could correct the *Imaginations* of others, as well as our own; but if we cannot, we are ſure, whoever thinks himſelf miſerable, is really ſo; however he might poſſibly, by a better Conduct of his Imagination, have prevented this Miſery. All we can do in this affair, is to enjoy a great Share of the Pleaſures of the *ſtronger Ties*, with fewer *Pains* of them, by confining the ſtronger Degrees of Love, or our Friendſhips, to Perſons of *corrected Imaginations*, to whom as few of the uncertain Objects of Deſire are neceſſary to Happineſs as is poſſible. Our Friendſhip with ſuch Perſons may probably be to us a much greater Source of Happineſs than of Miſery, ſince the Happineſs of ſuch Perſons is more probable than the contrary.

SINCE there is nothing in our Nature determining us to *diſintereſted Hatred* toward any Perſon; we may be ſecure againſt all the Pains of *Malice*, by preventing falſe *Opinions* of our Fellows as abſolutely evil, or by guarding againſt *habitual Anger*, and raſh *Averſions*.

THE *moral Ideas* do ariſe alſo neceſſarily in our Minds. We cannot avoid obſerving the *Affections* of thoſe we converſe with; their *Actions*, their *Words*, their *Looks* betray them. We are conſcious of our

our own Affections, and cannot avoid Reflection upon them ſometimes: the kind and generous Affections will appear amiable, and all Appearance of Cruelty, Malice, or even very ſelfiſh Affections, will be diſapproved, and appear odious. Our *own Temper*, as well as that of others, will appear to our moral Senſe either lovely or deformed, and will be the Occaſion either of Pleaſure or Uneaſineſs. We have not any proper *Appetite* toward Virtue, ſo as to be uneaſy, even antecedently to the Appearance of the lovely Form; but as ſoon as it appears to any Perſon, as it certainly muſt very early in Life, it never fails to raiſe *Deſire*, as Vice does raiſe *Averſion*. This is ſo rooted in our Nature, that no *Education, falſe Principles, depraved Habits*, or even *Affectation* itſelf can entirely root it out. LUCRETIUS and HOBBES ſhew themſelves in innumerable Inſtances ſtruck with ſome *moral Species*; they are full of Expreſſions of *Admiration, Gratitude, Praiſe, Deſire of doing Good*; and of *Cenſure, Diſapprobation, Averſion to ſome Forms of Vice*. Sect. 4.

SINCE then there is no avoiding theſe Deſires and Perceptions of *Morality*, all we can do to ſecure our ſelves in the poſſeſſion of Pleaſures of this kind, without Pain, conſiſts in "a vigorous Uſe of our "Reaſon, to diſcern what Actions really "tend

Sect. 4. " tend to the publick Good in the *whole*,
" that we may not do *that* upon a partial
" View of Good, which afterwards, upon
" a fuller Examination, we ſhall condemn
" and abhor our ſelves for; and withal, to
" fix our *Friendſhips* with Perſons of like
" Diſpoſitions, and juſt Diſcernment." Men of partial Views of publick Good, if they never obtain any better, may be eaſy in a very pernicious Conduct, ſince the *moral Evil* or *Deformity* does not appear to them. But this is ſeldom to be hop'd for in any partial Conduct. Thoſe who are injured by us fail not to complain; the Spectators, who are diſengaged from our partial Attachments, will often take the Freedom to expreſs their Sentiments, and ſet our Conduct in a full Light: This muſt very probably occaſion to us *Shame* and *Remorſe*. " It
" cannot therefore be an indifferent Mat-
" ter, to an Agent with a moral Senſe,
" what *Opinions* he forms of the Tenden-
" cy of Actions; what partial *Attach-*
" *ments* of Love he has toward *Parties*
" or *Factions*. If he has true Opinions
" of the Tendencies of *Actions*; if he
" carefully examines the real Dignity of
" *Perſons* and *Cauſes*, he may be ſure
" that the Conduct which he now ap-
" proves he ſhall always approve, and have
" delight in Reflection upon it, however
" it be cenſured by others. But if he takes
" up at hazard *Opinions* of Actions; if
" he

" he has a fooliſh *Admiration* of particular Sects, and as fooliſh *Averſions* and Diſ- Sect. 4.
" like to others, not according to any real
" Importance or Dignity, he ſhall often
" find occaſion for *Inconſtancy* and *Change*
" of his Affections, with *Shame* and *Re-*
" *morſe* for his paſt Conduct, and an in-
" ward *Diſlike* and *Self-Condemnation*."

WHAT moſt deeply affects our Happineſs or Miſery, are the Diſpoſitions of thoſe Perſons with whom we voluntarily contract ſome *nearer Intimacies* of Friendſhip: If we act wiſely in this Point, we may ſecure to our ſelves the greateſt Pleaſures with the feweſt Pains, by attaching our ſelves to Perſons of real Goodneſs, good Offices toward whom are uſeful to the World. The Ties of *Blood* are generally very ſtrong, eſpecially toward *Offſpring*; they need rather the Bridle than the Spur, in all Caſes wherein the Object is not recommended to a ſingular Love by his good Qualities. We may, in a conſiderable meaſure, reſtrain our *natural Affection* toward a worthleſs Offſpring, by ſetting our *publick Affections* and our *moral Senſe* againſt it, in frequent Contemplation of their Vices, and of the Miſchief which may ariſe to Perſons of more worth from them, if we give them any Countenance in their Vices.

THE

Sect. 4.

THE regulating our Apprehenſions of the *Actions of others*, is of very great Importance, that we may not imagine Mankind worſe than they really are, and thereby bring upon our ſelves a Temper full of *Suſpicion*, *Hatred*, *Anger* and *Contempt* toward others; which is a conſtant State of Miſery, much worſe than all the Evils to be feared from *Credulity*. If we examine the true *Springs* of human Action, we ſhall ſeldom find their Motives worſe than *Self-Love*. Men are often ſubject to *Anger*, and upon ſudden *Provocations* do Injuries to each other, and that only from Self-Love, without Malice; but the greateſt part of their Lives is employed in Offices of *natural Affection*, *Friendſhip*, *innocent Self-Love*, or *Love of a Country*. The little *Party-Prejudices* are generally founded upon Ignorance, or falſe Opinions, rather apt to move *Pity* than *Hatred*. Such Conſiderations are the beſt Preſervative againſt *Anger*, *Malice*, and *Diſcontent* of Mind with the Order of Nature. "When "you would make your ſelf chearful and "eaſy (ſays the Emperor *) conſider the "*Virtues* of your ſeveral Acquaintances, "the *Induſtry* and *Diligence* of one, the "*Modeſty* of another, the *Generoſity* or

* Marcus Antoninus, *Lib.* vi. *C.* 48.

"*Li-*

" *Liberality* of a third; and in other Per- Sect. 4.
" ſons ſome other Virtue. There is no-
" thing ſo delightful, as the Reſemblances
" of the *Virtues* appearing in the Conduct
" of your Contemporaries as frequently as
" poſſible. Such Thoughts we ſhould ſtill
" retain with us."

WHEN the *moral Senſe* is thus aſſiſted by a ſound Underſtanding and Application, our own Actions may be a conſtant Source of ſolid Pleaſure, along with the Pleaſures of *Benevolence*, in the higheſt Degree which our Nature will admit, and with as few of its Pains as poſſible.

How far our Senſe of Honour is in our power.

AS to the Deſires of *Honour*, ſince we cannot avoid obſerving or hearing of the Sentiments of others concerning our Conduct, we muſt feel the Deſire of the *good Opinions* of others, and Averſion to their *Cenſures* or *Condemnation:* ſince the one neceſſarily gives us Pleaſure, and the other Pain. Now it is impoſſible to bring all Men into the ſame Opinions of particular Actions, becauſe of their different Opinions of *publick Good*, and of the *Means* of promoting it; and becauſe of *oppoſite Intereſts*; ſo that it is often impoſſible to be ſecure againſt all Cenſure or Diſhonour from ſome of our Fellows. No one is ſo much Maſter of *external Things*, as to make his honourable Intentions ſucceſsful; and yet

Suc-

Sect. 4. *Succeſs* is a Mark by which many judge of the Goodneſs of Attempts. Whoever therefore ſuffers his Deſire of *Honour* or *Applauſe* to grow violent, without Diſtinction of the *Perſons* to whoſe Judgment he ſubmits, runs a great hazard of Miſery. But our natural Deſire of Praiſe, to ſpeak in the Mathematical Style, is in a compounded Proportion of the *Numbers* of Applauders, and their *Dignity*. "He "therefore who makes *Diſtinction* of Perſons juſtly, and acts wiſely for the *publick Good*, may ſecure himſelf from much "uneaſineſs upon injudicious Cenſure, and "may obtain the Approbation of thoſe "whoſe Eſteem alone is valuable, or at "leaſt far over-ballances the Cenſure of "others."

The Deſire of Wealth and Power.

THE *Deſire of Wealth* muſt be as neceſſary as any other Deſires of our Nature, as ſoon as we apprehend the uſefulneſs of Wealth to gratify all other Deſires. While it is deſired as the *Means* of ſomething farther, the Deſire tends to our Happineſs, proportionably to the good Oeconomy of the *principal Deſires* to which it is made ſubſervient. It is in every man's power, by a little Reflection, to prevent the Madneſs and Enthuſiaſm with which Wealth is inſatiably purſued, even for itſelf, without any direct Intention of uſing it. The Conſideration of the ſmall Addition often made

made by Wealth to the Happineſs of the Poſſeſſor, may check this Deſire, and prevent that *Inſatiability* which ſometimes attends it. Sect. 4.

POWER in like manner is deſired as the Means of gratifying other *original Deſires*; nor can the Deſire be avoided by thoſe who apprehend its uſefulneſs. It is eaſy to prevent the *Extravagance* of this Deſire, and many of its conſequent Pains, by conſidering "the *Danger* of affecting it by "injurious Means, ſupporting it by *Force*, "without conſent of the Subject, and "employing it to *private Intereſt*, in op-"poſition to publick Good." No Mortal is eaſy under ſuch Subjection; every Slave to ſuch a Power is an *Enemy*: The Poſſeſſor muſt be in a continual State of *Fear*, *Suſpicion* and *Hatred*.

The Occaſion of fantaſtick Deſires.

THERE is nothing in our Nature leading us neceſſarily into the *fantaſtick Deſires*; they wholly ariſe thro' our *Ignorance* and *Negligence*; when, thro' want of Thought, we ſuffer fooliſh *Aſſociations* of Ideas to be made, and imagine certain trifling Circumſtances to contain ſomething *honourable and excellent* in them, from their being uſed by Perſons of *Diſtinction*. We know how the *Inadvertences*, *Negligences*, *Infirmities*, and even *Vices*, either of great or ingenious Men, have been affected,

Sect. 4. fected, and imitated by thoſe who were incapable of imitating their Excellencies. This happens often to young Gentlemen of plentiful Fortunes, which ſet them above the Employments neceſſary to others, when they have not cultivated any reliſh for the Pleaſures of the *Imagination*, ſuch as *Architecture*, *Muſick*, *Painting*, *Poetry*, *Natural Philoſophy*, *Hiſtory*: When they have no farther Knowledge of theſe things, than ſtupidly to praiſe what they hear others praiſe: When they have neglected to cultivate their *publick Affections*, are bantered a long time from *Marriage* and *Offſpring*; and have neither themſelves Minds fit for *Friendſhips*, nor any intimate Acquaintance with ſuch as are fit to make Friends of: When their *moral Senſe* is weakned, or, if it be ſtrong in any points, theſe are fixed at random, without any *regular Scheme*: When thro' Ignorance of *publick Affairs*, or want of *Eloquence* to ſpeak what they know, they deſpair of the *Eſteem* or *Honour* of the Wiſe: When their Hearts are too gay to be entertained with the dull Thoughts of increaſing their *Wealth*, and they have not Ability enough to hope for *Power*; ſuch poor empty Minds have nothing but Trifles to purſue; any thing becomes agreeable, which can ſupply the Void of Thought, or prevent the ſullen Diſcontent which muſt grow upon a Mind conſcious of no *Merit*, and expecting the

the *Contempt* of its Fellows; as a *Pack of* Sect. 4.
Dogs, an *Horſe*, a *Jewel*, an *Equipage*, a *Pack of Cards*, a *Tavern*; any thing which has got any confuſed Ideas of *Honour*, *Dignity*, *Liberality*, or *genteel Enjoyment of Life* joined to it. Theſe fantaſtick Deſires any Man might have baniſhed at firſt, or entirely prevented. But if we have loſt the *Time* of ſubſtituting better in their ſtead, we ſhall only change from one ſort to another, with a perpetual Succeſſion of *Inconſtancy* and *Diſſatisfaction*.

——— *Cui ſi vitioſa Libido*
Fecerit Auſpicium ———
Iidem eadem poſſunt horam durare probantes.
Hor. *Ep.* 1.

V. THE End of all theſe Conſiderations, is to find out the moſt effectual way of advancing the Happineſs of Mankind; in order to which, they may perhaps appear of conſiderable Conſequence, ſince Happineſs conſiſts in "the higheſt and moſt durable "Gratifications of, either all our *Deſires*, "or, if all cannot be gratify'd at once, of "thoſe which tend to the greateſt and "moſt durable *Pleaſures*, with exemption "either from all *Pains* and Objects of *A-*"*verſion*, or at leaſt from thoſe which "are the moſt grievous." The following general Obſervations may be premiſed concerning their Objects.

Sect. 4.

The full Purſuit of all kinds of Pleaſure is impoſſible.

1. "IT is plainly impoſſible that any "Man ſhould purſue the Gratifications of "all theſe *Deſires* at once, with Prudence, "Diligence, and Vigor, ſufficient to ob- "tain the higheſt Pleaſures of each kind, "and to avoid their oppoſite Pains." For, not to mention the *Narrowneſs* of the Powers of our Minds, which makes them incapable of a Multiplicity of Purſuits at once; the very *Methods* of obtaining the higheſt Gratification of the ſeveral Senſes and Deſires, are directly inconſiſtent with each other. For example, the violent Purſuit of the Pleaſures of the *external Senſes*, or *Senſuality*, is oppoſite to the Pleaſures of the *Imagination*, and to the Study of the ingenious *Arts*, which tend to the Ornament of Life: Theſe require Labour and Application, inconſiſtent with the *Voluptuouſneſs* of the external Senſes, which by itſelf would engroſs the whole Application of our Minds, thro' vain Aſſociations of Ideas.

AGAIN: The violent Purſuits of either of the former kinds of Pleaſures, is often directly inconſiſtent with *publick Affections*, and with our *moral Senſe*, and *Senſe of Honour*. Theſe Pleaſures require a quite different Temper, a Mind little ſet upon ſelfiſh Pleaſures, ſtrongly poſſeſſed with Love for others, and Concern for their

Int-

Intereſts capable of Labour and Pain. However our deſire of Honour be really *ſelfiſh*, yet we know it is never acquired by Actions appearing ſelfiſh; but by ſuch as appear publick-ſpirited, with neglect of the Pleaſures of the external Senſes and Wealth. *Selfiſhneſs* is generally attended with *Shame*;* and hence we conceal even our *Deſire of Honour* itſelf, and are aſhamed of *Praiſe* in our own Preſence, even when we are doing beneficent Actions, with deſign to obtain it. The Purſuits of *Wealth* and *Power* are often directly oppoſite to the Pleaſures of all the other kinds, at leaſt for the preſent, however they may be intended for the future Enjoyment of them. Sect. 4.

2. "THERE is no ſuch *Certainty* in "human Affairs, that a Man can aſſure "himſelf of the perpetual Poſſeſſion of "theſe Objects which gratify any one "Deſire," except that of *Virtue* itſelf: which, ſince it does not depend upon external Objects and Events †, but upon our own *Affections* and *Conduct*; we may promiſe to our ſelves that we ſhall always enjoy. But then Virtue conſiſts in Benevolence, or Deſire of the publick Good: *The Happineſs of others* is very uncertain, ſo *No Certainty of Succeſs in any Purſuit, ſave that of Virtue.*

* *Treat.* 2. *Sect.* 5. *Art.* 7.

† *Treat.* 2. *Sect.* 3. laſt Paragraph.

Sect. 4. that our publick Deſires may often be diſappointed; and every Diſappointment is uneaſy, in proportion to the Degree of Deſire. And therefore, however the *Admiration* and fixed *Purſuit of Virtue* may always ſecure one ſtable and conſtant Pleaſure of *Self-Approbation*, yet this Enjoyment preſuppoſes a *Deſire of publick Good*, ſubject to frequent Diſappointments, which will be attended with Uneaſineſs proportioned to the Degree of publick Deſire, or the *Virtue* upon which we reflect. There ſeems therefore no poſſibility of ſecuring to our ſelves, in our preſent State, an *unmixed Happineſs* independently of all other Beings. Every Apprehenſion of Good raiſes deſire, every Diſappointment of Deſire is uneaſy; every Object of Deſire is uncertain except Virtue, but the *Enjoyment of Virtue* ſuppoſes the Deſire of an uncertain Object, *viz.* the *publick Happineſs*. To ſecure therefore independently of all other Beings invariable and pure Happineſs, it would be neceſſary either to have the *Power* of directing all Events in the Univerſe, or to root out all *Senſe of Evil*, or Averſion to it, while we retained our *Senſe of Good*, but without previous Deſire, the Diſappointment of which could give Pain. The *rooting* out of all Senſes and Deſires, were it practicable, would cut off all Happineſs as well as Miſery: The removing or ſtopping a part of them, might indeed be

of conſequence to the Happineſs of the *Individual* on ſome occaſions, however pernicious it might be to the *Whole*. But 'tis plain, we have not in our power the modelling of our *Senſes or Deſires*, to form them for a private Intereſt: They are fixed for us by the AUTHOR of our Nature, ſubſervient to the Intereſt of the *Syſtem*; ſo that each Individual is made, previouſly to his own Choice, a Member of a *great Body*, and affected with the Fortunes of the Whole, or at leaſt of many Parts of it; nor can he break himſelf off at pleaſure. Sect. 4.

THIS may ſhew the Vanity of ſome of the lower rate of Philoſophers of the *Stoick Sect*, in boaſting of an undiſturbed Happineſs and Serenity, independently even of the DEITY, as well as of their Fellow-Creatures, wholly inconſiſtent with the *Order* of Nature, as well as with the Principles of ſome of their great Leaders: for which, Men of Wit in their own Age did not fail to ridicule them. *The Miſtakes of the Stoicks about compleat Happineſs.*

THAT muſt be a very fantaſtick Scheme of Virtue, which repreſents it as a *private ſublimely ſelfiſh Diſcipline*, to preſerve our ſelves wholly unconcerned, not only in the Changes of Fortune as to our *Wealth* or *Poverty*, *Liberty* or *Slavery*, *Eaſe* or *Pain*, but even in all *external Events*

Sect. 4. whatſoever, in the Fortunes of our deareſt *Friends* or *Country*, ſolacing our ſelves that we are eaſy and undiſturbed. If there be any thing amiable in human Nature, the Reflection upon which can give us pleaſure, it muſt be kind *diſintereſted Affections* towards our Fellows, or towards the *whole*, and its AUTHOR and Cauſe. Theſe Affections, when reflected upon, muſt be one conſtant Source of Pleaſure in *Self-Approbation*. But ſome of theſe very Affections, being toward an uncertain Object, muſt occaſion Pain, and directly produce one ſort of Miſery to the virtuous in this Life. 'Tis true indeed, it would be a much greater Miſery to want ſuch an amiable Temper, which alone ſecures us from the baſeſt and moſt deteſtable State of *Self-Condemnation* and *Abhorrence*. But, allowing ſuch a Temper to be the neceſſary Occaſion of one ſort of Happineſs, even the greateſt we are capable of, yet it may alſo be the Occaſion of no inconſiderable Pains in this Life.

THAT this *affectionate Temper* is true Virtue, and not that *undiſturbed Selfiſhneſs*, were it attainable, every one would readily own who ſaw them both in Practice. Would any honeſt Heart reliſh ſuch a Speech as this from a *Cato* or an *Æmilius Paulus*? "I foreſee the Effects of this Defeat, my "*Fellow-Creatures*, my *Countrymen*, my "honoura-

" honourable *Acquaintances*; many a ge- Sect. 4.
" nerous gallant *Patriot* and *Friend*, *Fa-*
" *thers*, *Sons*, and *Brothers*, *Husbands*
" and *Wives*, ſhall be inſlaved, tortured,
" torn from each other, or in each others
" ſight made ſubject to the *Pride*, *Ava-*
" *rice*, *Petulancy*, or *Luſt* of the Conque-
" ror. I have, for my *own Pleaſure*, to
" ſecure agreeable *Reflections*, laboured in
" their Defence. I am unconcerned in
" their Misfortunes; their *bodily Tortures*,
" or more exquiſite *Diſtreſſes of Mind*
" for each other, are to me indifferent. I
" am entirely abſolute, compleat in my ſelf;
" and can behold their Agonies with as
" much Eaſe or Pleaſure, as I did their
" Proſperity." This is the plain Language of ſome boaſting *Refiners* upon Virtue; Sentiments as diſagreeable as thoſe of *Catiline*.

THE Deſire of Virtue is toward an Object ἐκ τῶν ἐφ' ἡμῖν, or *in our power*, ſince all Men have naturally *kind Affections*, which they may increaſe and ſtrengthen; but theſe kind Affections tend toward an *uncertain Object*, which is not in our power. Suppoſe the *Stoick* ſhould alledg, " Vice is the only " Evil, and Virtue the only Good." If we have *Benevolence* to others, we muſt wiſh them to be virtuous, and muſt have compaſſion toward the vicious: thus ſtill we may be ſubjected to Pain or Uneaſineſs,

Sect. 4. by our *very Virtue*; unleſs we ſuppoſe, *what* no Experience can confirm, that Men may have ſtrong Deſires, the Diſappointment of which will give no *Uneaſineſs*, or that Uneaſineſs is no Evil. Let the *Philoſopher* regulate his own Notions as he pleaſes about Happineſs or Miſery; whoever imagines himſelf unhappy, is ſo in reality; and whoever has *kind Affections* or Virtue, muſt be uneaſy to ſee others really unhappy.

But tho a pure unmixed Happineſs is not attainable in this Life, yet all their Precepts are not rendered uſeleſs.

Eſt quoddam prodire tenus, ſi non datur ultra.

3. The full Senſe of Good may be preſerved, without the greater Pains of Deſire, in many Caſes.

3. For we may obſerve, thirdly, that "the *Senſe of Good* can continue in its full "Strength, when yet we ſhall have but "*weak Deſires*." In this caſe we are capable of enjoying all the Good in any Object, when we obtain it, and yet expoſed to no great Pain upon *Diſappointment*. This may be generally obſerved, that "the *Vio-* "*lence of Deſire* does not proportionably "enliven the Senſation of Good, when it "is obtained; nor does *diminiſhing the* "*Deſire* weaken the Senſation, tho it will "diminiſh the *Uneaſineſs of Diſappoint-* "*ment*, or the *Miſery of contrary Evils*." Our high Expectations of Happineſs from any

any Object, either thro' the *Acuteneſs* of our Senſes, or from our *Opinions* or *Aſſociations* of Ideas, never fail to increaſe Deſire: But then the *Violence of Deſire* does not proportionably enliven our *Senſation* in the Enjoyment. During the firſt confuſed Hurry of our Succeſs, our *Joy* may perhaps be increaſed by the Violence of our *previous Deſire*, were it only by allaying the great Uneaſineſs accompanying the Deſire itſelf. But this Joy ſoon vaniſhes, and is often ſucceeded by *Diſguſt* and *Uneaſineſs*, when our *Senſe* of the Good, which is more fixed in Nature than our *Fancy* or *Opinions*, repreſents the Object far below our Expectation. Now he who examines all *Opinions* of Good in Objects, who prevents or corrects *vain Aſſociations* of Ideas, and thereby prevents *extravagant Admirations*, or *enthuſiaſtick Deſires*, above the real Moment of Good in the Object, if he loſes the *tranſient Raptures* of the firſt Succeſs, yet he enjoys all the *permanent Good* or Happineſs which any Object can afford; and eſcapes, in a great meaſure, both the uneaſy Senſations of the more *violent Deſires*, and the *Torments of Diſappointment*, to which Perſons of irregular Imaginations are expoſed. Sect. 4.

THIS is the Caſe of the *Temperate* and the *Chaſte*, with relation to the Appetites; of the Men of *Moderation* and *Frugality*, and

Sect. 4. and *corrected Fancy*, with regard to the Pleaſures of *Imagination*; of the *Humble* and the *Content*, as to *Honour*, *Wealth* or *Power*. Such Perſons upon good Succeſs, want only the firſt *tranſitory Ecſtaſies*; but have a full and lively *Senſe* of all the laſting Good in the Objects of their Purſuit; and yet are in a great meaſure ſecure againſt both the Uneaſineſs of *violent Deſire*, and the *Dejection* of Mind, and *abject Sorrow* upon Diſappointment, or upon their being expoſed to the contrary Evils.

FURTHER, Perſons of *irregular Imaginations* are not ſoon reformed, nor their Aſſociations of Ideas broke by every *Experience* of the Smallneſs of the Good in the admired Object. They are often rather ſet upon *new Purſuits* of the ſame kind, or of greater *Variety* of like Objects. So their experience of *Diſappointment*, or of contrary Evils, does not ſoon correct their Imaginations about the Degrees of Good or Evil. The Loſs of Good, or the Preſſure of any Calamity, will continue to torment them, thro' their *vain Notions* of theſe Events, and make them inſenſible of the real Good which they might ſtill enjoy in their preſent State. Thus the *Covetous* have ſmaller Pleaſure in any given *Degree of Wealth*; the *Luxurious* from a *ſplendid Table*; the *Ambitious* from any given *Degree*

Degree of Honour or Power, than Men of more moderate Deſires: And on the other hand, the Miſeries of *Poverty*, *mean Fare*, *Subjection*, *or Contempt*, appear much greater to them, than to the moderate. Experience, while theſe confuſed Ideas remain, rather increaſes the Diſorder: But if juſt *Reflection* comes in, and tho late, applies the proper Cure, by correcting the *Opinions* and the *Imagination*, every Experience will tend to our Advantage. Sect. 4.

THE ſame way may our *publick Deſires* be regulated. If we prevent confuſed Notions of Good, we diminiſh or remove many Anxieties for our *Friends* as well as our ſelves. Only this muſt be remembred, that weakning our *publick Affections*, neceſſarily weakens our *Senſe* of publick Good founded upon them, and will deprive us of the Pleaſures of the *moral Senſe*, in reflecting on our Virtue.

4. WE may laſtly remark, "That the "*Expectation* of any Pain, or the fre- "quent *Conſideration* of the Evils which "may befal us, or the Loſs of Good we "now enjoy, before theſe Events actually "threaten us, or raiſe any *Conſternation* "in our Minds by their Approach, does "not diminiſh our *Joy* upon eſcaping Evil, "or our *Pleaſure* upon the arrival of any "Good

4. *Laying our account to meet with Evil, often leſſens our Miſery.*

Sect. 4. "Good beyond Expectation: But this "previous Expectation generally diminiſhes "our *Fear*, while the Event is in ſuſ- "pence, and our *Sorrow* upon its arrival;" Since thereby the Mind examines the *Nature* of the Event, ſees how far it is neceſſarily Evil, and what Supports under it are in its power: This *Conſideration* may break vain Conjunctions of foreign Ideas, which occaſion our greateſt Fears in Life, and even in Death itſelf. If, indeed, a *weak Mind* does not ſtudy to correct the *Imagination*, but ſtill dwells upon its poſſible Calamities, under all their *borrowed Forms* of Terror; or if it induſtriouſly aggravates them to it ſelf, this previous Conſideration may embitter its whole Life, without arming it againſt the ſmalleſt Evil.

THIS Folly is often occaſioned by that Delight which moſt Men find in the *Pity of others* under Misfortunes; thoſe eſpecially who are continually indulged as the *Favorites of Families* or *Company*, being long enured to the Pleaſure ariſing from the perpetual *Marks of Love* toward them from all their Company, and from their tender *Sympathy* in Diſtreſs: this often leads them even to *feign Miſery* to obtain Pity, and to raiſe in themſelves the moſt dejected Thoughts, either to procure *Conſolation*, or the Pleaſure of obſerving the *Sympathy* of others. This *peeviſh* or *pettiſh*

tiſh Temper, tho it ariſes from ſomething ſociable in our Frame, yet is often the Fore-runner of the greateſt Corruption of Mind. It diſarms the Heart of its natural *Integrity*; it induces us to throw away our true *Armour*, our *natural Courage*, and cowardly to commit our ſelves to the vain Protection of others, while we neglect our own Defence. Sect. 4.

SECT.

SECT. V.

A Compariſon of the Pleaſures and Pains of the ſeveral Senſes, as to Intenſeneſs and Duration.

I. HAVING conſidered how far theſe Deſires muſt neceſſarily affect us, and when they are the Occaſions of Pleaſure or Pain; ſince by the firſt general *Obſervation*, the Purſuits of their ſeveral Pleaſures, and the avoiding their ſeveral Pains, may often be inconſiſtent with each other; let us next examine, which of theſe ſeveral Pleaſures are *the moſt valuable*, ſo as to deſerve our Purſuit, even with neglect of the others; and which of theſe Pains are *moſt grievous*, ſo as to be ſhunned even by the enduring of other Pains if neceſſary.

"THE *Value* of any Pleaſure, and the "*Quantity* or *Moment* of any Pain, is in "a compounded Proportion of the *Intenſe-* "*neſs* and *Duration*." In examining the Duration of Pleaſure, we muſt include not only the Conſtancy of the *Object*, but even of our *Fancy*; for a Change in either of theſe will put an end to it.

Sect. 5.

To compare theſe ſeveral Pleaſures and Pains as to their *Intenſeneſs*, ſeems difficult, becauſe of the Diverſity of *Taſtes*, or *Turns of Temper* given by *Cuſtom* and *Education*, which make ſtrange *Aſſociations of Ideas*, and form *Habits*; from whence it happens, that, tho all the ſeveral kinds of original Senſes and Deſires ſeem equally natural, yet ſome are led into a conſtant Purſuit of the Pleaſures of one kind, as the only Enjoyment of Life, and are indifferent about others. Some purſue, or ſeem to purſue only the Pleaſures of the *external Senſes*, and all other Purſuits are made ſubſervient to them: Others are chiefly ſet upon the Pleaſures of *Imagination* or *internal Senſes*; *ſocial* and *kind Affections* employ another ſort, who ſeem indifferent to all private Pleaſure: This laſt Temper has generally joined with it an high *moral Senſe*, and *Love of Honour*. We may ſometimes find an high *Senſe of Honour*, and deſire of *Applauſe*, where there is indeed a *moral Senſe*, but a very weak one, very much perverted, ſo as to be influenced by *popular Opinion*, and made ſubſervient to it: In this *Character* the Pleaſures of the external Senſes, or even of the Imagination, have little room, except ſo far as they may procure *Diſtinction*. Now upon comparing the ſeveral Pleaſures, perhaps the Sentence of the *Luxurious* would be quite oppoſite

The difficulty in comparing the ſeveral Pleaſures, as to Intenſeneſs.

to

Sect. 5. to that of the *Virtuous*. The *Ambitious* would differ from both. Thoſe who are devoted to the *internal Senſes* or *Imagination*, would differ from all the three. The *Miſer* would applaud himſelf in his Wealth above them all. Is there therefore no diſputing about Taſtes? Are all Perſons alike happy, who obtain the ſeveral Enjoyments for which they have a Reliſh? If they are, the Diſpute is at an end: A Fly or Maggot in its proper haunts, is as happy as a *Hero*, or *Patriot*, or *Friend*, who has newly delivered his *Country* or *Friend*, and is ſurrounded with their grateful *Praiſes*. The *Fly* or *Maggot* may think ſo of itſelf; but who will ſtand to its Judgment, when we are ſure that it has experienced only one ſort of Pleaſure, and is a ſtranger to the others? May we not in like manner find ſome Reaſons of *appealing* from the Judgment of certain Men? Or may not ſome *Characters* be found among Men, who alone are capable of judging in this matter?

The Pleaſures of a moral Kind proved ſuperior, by the Teſtimony of the Virtuous.

II. It is obvious that "thoſe alone are "capable of judging, who have experi-"enced all the ſeveral *kinds of Pleaſure*, "and have their *Senſes* acute and fully ex-"erciſed in them all." Now a high Reliſh for *Virtue*, or a ſtrong *moral Senſe*, with its concomitant *publick Senſe and Affections*, and a *Senſe of Honour*, was never alledged to impair our *external Senſes*, or to

to make us incapable of any pleaſure of the *Imagination*; *Temperance* never ſpoiled a *good Palate*, whatever *Luxury* may have done; a generous affectionate publick Spirit, reflecting on itſelf with delight, never vitiated any Organ of *external Pleaſure*, nor weakned their Perceptions. Now all virtuous Men have given *Virtue* this Teſtimony, that its Pleaſures are ſuperior to any other, nay to all others jointly; that a friendly generous *Action* gives a *Delight* ſuperior to any other; that other Enjoyments, when compared with the Delights of *Integrity*, *Faith*, *Kindneſs*, *Generoſity*, and *publick Spirit*, are but trifles ſcarce worth any regard *. Sect. 5.

By the Teſtimony of the Vicious.

NAY, we need not confine our Evidence to the Teſtimony of the *perfectly Virtuous*. The *vicious Man*, tho no fit judge, were he entirely abandoned, ſince he loſes his *Senſe* of the Pleaſures of the *moral Kind*, or at leaſt has not experienced them fully, yet he generally retains ſo much of human Nature, and of the *Senſes* and *Affections* of our Kind, as ſometimes to experience even *moral Pleaſures*. There is ſcarce any Mortal, who is wholly inſenſible to all *Species of Morality*.

* See this Argument in *Plato de Repub.* Lib. 9. And Lord *Shafteſbury*'s Inquiry concerning Virtue.

Sect. 5.

A LUXURIOUS *Debauchee* has never perhaps felt the *Pleaſures* of a wiſe publick-ſpirited Conduct, of an entirely upright, generous, ſocial, and affectionate Life, with the Senſe of his own *moral Worth*, and merited *Eſteem* and *Love*; this courſe of Life, becauſe unknown to him, he may deſpiſe in compariſon of his *Pleaſures*. But if in any particular Affair, a *moral Species*, or *Point of Honour* has affected him, he will ſoon deſpiſe his ſenſual Pleaſures in compariſon of the Moral. Has he a Perſon whom he calls his *Friend*, whom he loves upon whatever fantaſtick Reaſons, he can quit his *Debauch* to ſerve him, nay can run the Hazard of *Wounds* and *Death* to reſcue him from Danger? If his *Honour* be concerned to reſent an *Affront*, will he not quit his Pleaſures, and run the hazard of the greateſt bodily Pain, to ſhun the Imputation of *Cowardice* or *Falſhood*? He will ſcorn one who tells him, that "a "*Lyar*, or a *Coward*, may be happy e-"nough, while he has all things neceſſary "to *Luxury*." 'Tis in vain to alledge, "that "there is no diſputing about *Taſtes*:" To every Nature there are certain *Taſtes* aſſigned by the great AUTHOR of all. To the *human Race* there are aſſigned a *publick Taſte*, a *moral one*, and a *Taſte for Honour*. Theſe Senſes they cannot extirpate, more than their *external Senſes*: They

They may pervert them, and weaken them by falſe *Opinions*, and fooliſh *Aſſociations* of Ideas; but they cannot be happy but by keeping them in their natural State, and gratifying them. The Happineſs of an *Inſect* or *Brute*, will only make an *Inſect* or *Brute* happy. But a Nature with further *Powers*, muſt have further *Enjoyments*. Sect. 5.

NAY, let us conſider the different *Ages* in our own Species. We once knew the time when an *Hobby-Horſe*, a *Top*, a *Rattle*, was ſufficient Pleaſure to us. We grow up, we now reliſh *Friendſhips*, *Honour*, *good Offices*, *Marriage*, *Offſpring*, *ſerving a Community or Country*. Is there no difference in theſe Taſtes? We were happy before, are we no happier now? If not, we have made a fooliſh Change of Fancy. An Hobby-Horſe is more eaſily procured than an *Employment*; a Rattle kept in order with leſs trouble than a *Friend*; a Top than a *Son*. But this Change of Fancy does not depend upon our *Will*. "Our Nature de-
"termines us to certain Purſuits in our ſe-
"veral Stages; and following her Dictates,
"is the only way to our Happineſs. Two
"States may both be happy, and yet the
"one infinitely preferable to the other:
"Two Species may both be *content*, and
"yet the Pleaſures of the one, greater be-
"yond all compariſon, than thoſe of the
"other." The *virtuous Man*, who has

Sect. 5. as true a Senſe of all external Pleaſure as any, gives the preference to *moral Pleaſures*. The Judgment of the *Vicious* is either not to be regarded, becauſe of his Ignorance on one ſide; or, if he has experience of *moral Sentiments* in any particular Caſes, he agrees with the *Virtuous*.

Experience proves the ſame.

III. AGAIN, we ſee in fact, that in the virtuous Man, *publick Affections*, a *moral Senſe*, and *Senſe of Honour*, actually overcome all other Deſires or Senſes, even in their full Strength. Here there is the faireſt Combate, and the Succeſs is on the ſide of Virtue.

THERE is indeed an obvious Exception againſt this Argument. "Do not we ſee, "in many Inſtances, the *external Senſes* "overcome the *moral*?" But the Reply is eaſy. A conſtant Purſuit of the Pleaſures of the external Senſes can never become agreeable, without an Opinion of *Innocence*, or the *Abſence* of moral Evil; ſo that here the moral Senſe is not engaged in the Combat. Do not our * luxurious Debauchees, among their Intimates, continually defend their Practices as *innocent*? Tranſient Acts of Injuſtice may be done, contrary to the moral Sentiments of the

* *Treat.* 2. *Sect.* 4. *Art.* 4. laſt Paragraph.

Agent, to obtain relief from ſome preſſing Evil, or upon ſome violent Motion of *Appetite:* and yet even in theſe caſes, Men often argue themſelves into ſome *moral Notions* of their *Innocence.* But for a continued Courſe of Life diſapproved by the Agent, how few are the Inſtances? How avowedly miſerable is that State, wherein all *Self-Approbation*, all *conſciouſneſs of Merit or Goodneſs* is gone? We might here alſo alledge, what univerſal Experience confirms, " that not only an Opinion of *In-*
" *nocence* is a neceſſary Ingredient in a
" Courſe of *ſelfiſh Pleaſures*, ſo that
" there ſhould be no Oppoſition from the
" moral Senſe of the Agent; but that
" ſome *publick Affections*, ſome *Species*
" *of moral Good*, is the moſt powerful
" *Charm* in all ſenſual Enjoyments." And yet, on the other hand, " *Publick Affec-*
" *tions*, *Virtue*, *Honour*, need no Species
" of ſenſual Pleaſure to recommend them;
" nor even an Opinion or Hope of Ex-
" emption from external Pain. Theſe
" powerful Forms can appear amiable, and
" engage our Purſuit thro' the rugged Paths
" of *Hunger*, *Thirſt*, *Cold*, *Labour*, *Ex-*
pences, *Wounds and Death.*"

Sect. 5.

THUS, when a Proſpect of external Pleaſure, or of avoiding bodily Pain, engages Men into Actions really evil, the *moral Senſe* of the Agent is not really over-

Sect. 5. come by the *external Senſes*. The Action or Omiſſion does not appear morally evil to the Agent. The *Temptation* ſeems to extenuate, or wholly excuſe the Action. Whereas when a *Point of Honour*, or a *moral Species*, makes any one deſpiſe the Pleaſures or Pains of the *external Senſes*, there can be no queſtion made of a real Victory. The external Senſes repreſent theſe Objects in the ſame manner, when they are conquered. None denies to the Virtuous their *Senſe of Pain*, *Toil or Wounds*. They are allowed as lively a Senſe as others, of all *external Pleaſure* of every kind. The Expences of *Generoſity*, *Humanity*, *Charity* and *Compaſſion* are allowed, even when yielded to Virtue, to be known to the full. But the moral Senſe, weak as it often is, does not yield even to known *external Pleaſure*, *Eaſe* or *Advantage*: but, where there is a depraved *Taſte*, and a weak *Underſtanding*, private Advantage, or the avoiding of ſome external Evil, may make Actions appear *innocent*, which are not; and then the moral Senſe gives no Oppoſition. All the Conqueſt on ſuch Occaſions is only this, that private external *Advantage* ſurmounts our Averſion to *Diſhonour*, by making us do Actions which *others* will cenſure, but we eſteem *innocent*. In theſe Caſes we generally fear only the Reproach of a *Party*,

of

of whom we have conceived an unfavourable Opinion *. Sect. 5.

NAY farther: It was before obſerved, that "fantaſtick *Aſſociations* of Ideas do "not really increaſe the Pleaſure of *Enjoyment*, however they increaſe the previous *Deſire*. The want of ſuch Aſſociations does not abate the external "*Pain*, tho it diminiſhes the previous "*Fear*, or takes away ſome farther *Fears* "which may attend the Pain." So that a Man of the moſt correct Imagination does feel and know all the *Good* in external Pleaſure, and all the *Evil* in Pain. "When "therefore the *moral Senſe*, and *publick* "*Affections*, overcome all *ſenſual Pleaſure*, or *bodily Pain*, they do it by their "own Strength, without *foreign Aids*. "*Virtue* is never blended with *bodily* "*Pleaſure*, nor *Vice* with *bodily Pain* in "our Imaginations. But when the external Senſes ſeem to prevail againſt the "moral Senſe, or publick Affections, it "is continually by *Aid* borrowed from the "*moral Senſe, and publick Affections* "themſelves, or from our Senſe of Honour." The Conqueſt is over a weakned moral Senſe, upon partial views of Good, not by external Pleaſure alone, but

* *Sect.* 4. *Art.* 3.

Sect. 5. by ſome *moral Species*, raiſed by a falſe Imagination.

SET before Men in the cleareſt Light all external Pleaſures, but ſtrip them of their borrowed Notions of *Dignity*, *Hoſpitality*, *Friendſhip*, *Generoſity*, *Liberality*, *Communication of Pleaſure*; let no regard be had to the *Opinions* of others, to *Credit*, to avoiding *Reproach*, to *Company*: Separate from the Purſuit of Wealth all Thoughts of a *Family*, *Friends*, *Relations*, *Acquaintance*; let Wealth be only regarded as the Means of private Pleaſure of the *external Senſes*, or of the *Imagination*, to the Poſſeſſor alone; let us divide our confuſed Ideas, and conſider things barely and apart from each other: and in oppoſition to theſe Deſires, ſet but the weakeſt *moral Species*, and ſee if they can prevail over it. On the other hand, let us examine as much as we pleaſe, a *friendly*, *generous*, *grateful*, or *publick-ſpirited Action*; diveſt it of all external Pleaſure, ſtill it will appear the more lovely; the longer we fix our Attention to it, the more we admire it. What is it which we feel in our own Hearts, determining as it were our Fate as to Happineſs or Miſery? What ſort of Senſations are the moſt lively and delightful? In what ſort of Poſſeſſions does the higheſt Joy and Self-Satisfaction conſiſt? Who has ever felt the Pleaſure of a generous friendly

friendly *Temper*, of *mutual Love*, of *compaſſionate Relief and Succour* to the diſtreſſed; of having *ſerved a Community*, and render'd Multitudes happy; of a ſtrict *Integrity*, and *thorow Honeſty*, even under external Diſadvantages, and amidſt Dangers; of Congratulation and publick Rejoycing, in the Wiſdom and Proſperity of Perſons beloved, ſuch as Friends, Children, or intimate Neighbours? Who would not, upon Reflection, prefer that *State of Mind*, theſe *Senſations of Pleaſure*, to all the Enjoyments of the *external Senſes*, and of the *Imagination* without them? * Sect. 5.

IV. THE truth, in a Queſtion of this nature, one might expect would be beſt known by the Judgment of *Spectators*, concerning the Purſuits of others. Let them ſee one entirely employed in Solitude, with the moſt exquiſite Taſtes, Odors, Proſpects, Painting, Muſick; but without any *Society*, *Love* or *Friendſhip*, or any Opportunity of doing a kind or generous *Action*; and ſee alſo a † Man employed in protecting the Poor and Fatherleſs, receiving the Bleſſings of thoſe who were ready to periſh, and making the Widow to ſing for *Our Judgments in the Caſe of others proves the ſame.*

* See this Subject fully treated, in the ſecond Part of Lord *Shafteſbury's Inquiry concerning Virtue.*

† See the Character of *Job*, *Ch.* 31. See alſo *Treat.* 2. *Sect.* 6.

Joy;

Sect. 5. Joy; a Father to the Needy, an Avenger of Oppreſſion; who never deſpiſed the Cauſe of his very Slave, but conſidered him as his Fellow-Creature; formed by the ſame Hand; who never eat his Morſel alone, without the Orphan at his Table, nor cauſed the Eyes of the Poor to fail; who never ſuffered the Naked to periſh, but warmed them with the Fleece of his Sheep; who never took advantage of the Indigent in Judgment, thro' Confidence in his own Power or Intereſt: Let this Character be compared with the former; nay, add to this latter ſome conſiderable *Pains* of the *external Senſes*, with *Labour* and kind *Anxiety:* which of the two would a Spectator chuſe? Which would he admire, or count the happier, and moſt ſuitable to human Nature? Were he given to *Caſtle-building*, or were he adviſing a *Son*, or a *Friend*, which of theſe States would he chuſe or recommend? Such a Trial would ſoon diſcover the Prevalence of the *moral Species* above all Enjoyments of Life.

Little Happineſs in malicious Pleaſures.

V. THERE are a ſort of Pleaſures oppoſite to thoſe of the publick Senſe, ariſing from the Gratification of *Anger* or *Hatred*. To compare theſe Pleaſures with thoſe of Benevolence, we muſt obſerve what holds univerſally of all Mankind. The Joy, and Gaiety, and Happineſs of any Nature, of which we have formed no previous Opinion,

nion, either favourable or unfavourable, nor obtained any other Ideas than merely that it is *ſenſitive*, fills us with Joy and Delight: The apprehending the Torments of any ſuch ſenſitive Nature, gives us Pain. The Poets know how to raiſe delight in us by ſuch *paſtoral Scenes*, they feel the Power of ſuch *pleaſing Images*: they know that the human Heart can dwell upon ſuch Contemplations with *delight*; that we can continue long with Pleaſure, in the View of *Happineſs* of any Nature whatſoever. When we have received unfavourable Apprehenſions of any Nature, as *cruel* and *ſavage*, we begin indeed from our very publick Affections, to deſire their Miſery as far as it may be neceſſary to the Protection of others. Sect. 5.

BUT that the Miſery of another, for its *own ſake*, is never grateful, we may all find by making this Suppoſition: "That "had we the moſt ſavage Tyger, or Cro- "codile, or ſome greater Monſter of our "own Kind, a *Nero*, or *Domitian*, chained "in ſome Dungeon, that we were perfectly "aſſured they ſhould never have power of "doing farther *Injuries*; that no Mortal "ſhould ever know their Fate or Fortunes, "nor be influenced by them; that the "*Puniſhments* inflicted on them would "never reſtrain others by way of example, "nor any *Indulgence* ſhown be diſcovered; "that

Sect. 5. " that the firſt Heat of our *Reſentment* " were allayed by Time" — No Mortal, in ſuch a Caſe, would incline to torture ſuch wretched Natures, or keep them in continual Agonies, without ſome proſpect of *Good* ariſing from their Sufferings. What farther would the fierceſt Rage extend to, if once the Tyrant, thus eternally confined from Miſchief, began himſelf to feel *Remorſe* and *Anguiſh* for his Crimes? Nay, did he continue without Reflection on his paſt Life, ſo as neither to betray Remorſe nor Approbation, were Mankind well ſecured againſt his Temper, who would delight to load him with *uſeleſs Miſery*?

If the Miſery of others then be not grateful for itſelf, whence ariſes the Pleaſure of *Cruelty* and *Revenge*? The Reaſon is plainly this: Upon apprehending *Injury* to our ſelves or others, Nature wiſely determines us to ſtudy *Defenſe*, not only for the preſent, but for the future. *Anger* ariſes with its moſt *uneaſy Senſations*, as every one acknowledges. The *Miſery* of the Injurious allays this furious Pain. Our Nature ſcarce leads to any farther Reſentment, when once the Injurious ſeems to us fully ſeized with *Remorſe*, ſo that we fear no farther Evils from him, or when all his Power is gone. Thoſe who continue their *Revenge* further, are prepoſſeſſed with ſome

ſome *falſe Opinion* of Mankind, as worſe than they really are; and are not eaſily inclined to believe their hearty Remorſe for Injuries, or to think themſelves ſecure. Some *Point of Honour*, or *Fear* of Reproach, engages Men in cruel Acts of Revenge: But this farther confirms, that the *Miſery of another* is only grateful as it allays, or ſecures us againſt a furious Pain; and cannot be the Occaſion, by itſelf, of any Satisfaction. Who would not prefer *Abſence of Injury* to *Injury revenged*? Who would not chuſe an untainted *Reputation, for Courage* gained in a juſt War, in which, without *Hatred* or *Anger*, we acted from Love of our Country, rather than the Fame acquired by aſſerting our queſtioned Courage with furious *Anger* in a *Duel*, and with continued *Hatred* toward the Perſon conquered? Who can dwell upon a *Scene of Tortures*, tho practis'd upon the vileſt Wretch; or can delight either in the Sight or Deſcription of *Vengeance*, prolonged beyond all neceſſity of *Self-Defenſe*, or *publick Intereſt*? "The "Pleaſure of Revenge then is to the Plea- "ſures of Humanity and Virtue, as the ſla- "king the burning, and conſtantly recur- "ring Thirſt of a Fever, to the natural En- "joyments of grateful Food in Health."

Sect. 5.

VI. WERE we to compare, in like manner, the *Pains* of the publick and moral Senſe, and of the Senſe of Honour, with other

Moral Evil compared with other Evils, appears greater.

Sect. 5. other *Pains of the external Senſes*, or with the greateſt external Loſſes, we ſhould find the former by far ſuperior. And yet nothing is more ordinary, than to find Men, who will allow "the *Pleaſures* of the "former Claſſes ſuperior to any other, and "yet look upon *external Pain* as more "intollerable than any." There are two Reaſons for this Miſtake. 1. "They "compare the moſt *acute Pains* of the external Senſes with ſome *ſmaller Pains* of "the other Senſes." Whereas, would they compare the ſtrongeſt of both Kinds, they would find the Ballance on the other ſide. How often have Parents, Husbands, Friends, Patriots, endured the greateſt *bodily Pains*, to avoid the Pains of their *publick* and *moral Senſe*, and *Senſe of Honour*? How do they every day ſuffer Hunger, Thirſt, and Toil, to prevent like Evils to thoſe they love? How often do Men endure, for their *Party* or *Faction*, the greateſt external Evils, not only when they are unavoidable, but, when by counter-acting their *publick* or *moral Senſe*, or *Senſe of Honour*, they could extricate themſelves? Some Crimes appear ſo horrid, ſome Actions ſo cruel and deteſtable, that there is hardly any Man but would rather ſuffer *Death*, than be conſcious of having done them.

Cauſes of Miſtake.

4

THE

Sect. 5.

THE ſecond Cauſe of Miſtake in this Matter, is this, "The avoiding moral "Evil by the Sufferance of *external Pain*, "does not diminiſh the *Senſe* of the Pain; "but on the other hand, the *Motive* of "avoiding grievous Pain, really diminiſhes "the *moral Evil* in the Action done with "that deſign." So that in ſuch Inſtances we compare *external Pain* in its full ſtrength, with a *moral Pain* of the lighter ſort, thus alleviated by the Greatneſs of the *Temptation**. To make a juſt Compariſon, it ſhould be thus: "Whether would a "Man chuſe to be tortured to Death, "or to have, without any *Temptation* or "*Neceſſity*, tortured another, or a dear "Friend, or Child to Death?" Not whether a Man will betray his Friend or Country, for fear of Tortures; but "whether "it be better voluntarily, and under no "fear, to betray a Friend, or our Country, "than to ſuffer Tortures, or the Pain of "the Gout or Stone equal to Tortures?" Upon ſuch Compariſons as theſe, we ſhould find ſome other Pains and Miſery ſuperior to any *external Pain*. When we judge of the *State of others*, we would not be long in ſuſpenſe which of theſe Evils to

* *Treat.* 2. *Sect.* 7, 9. *Cor.* 3.

chuſe

Sect. 5. chuſe as the lighteſt for thoſe whom we † moſt regarded.

Publick Affections compared with our Deſire of Virtue.

VII. We have hitherto only compared on the one ſide the *publick and moral Senſe*, and the *Senſe of Honour* jointly, with the *external Senſes*, the *Pleaſures of Imagination*, and *external Advantage* or *Diſadvantage* jointly. The reaſon of joining them thus muſt be obvious, ſince, to a Mind not prepoſſeſſed with any *falſe Apprehenſions* of things, the former three Senſes and Deſires really concur, in exciting to the ſame Courſe of Action; for promoting the publick Good, can never be oppoſite to *private Virtue*; nor can the *Deſire of Virtue* ever lead to any thing pernicious to the Publick: Had Men alſo true Opinions, *Honour* could only be obtained by *Virtue*, or ſerving the Publick.

But ſince there may be ſome *corrupt partial Notions of Virtue*, as when Men have inadvertently engaged themſelves into ſome Party or Faction pernicious to the Publick, or when we miſtake the *Tendencies* of Actions, or have ſome Notions of the Deity, ‡ as requiring ſome Actions appre-

† *Treat.* 2. *Sect.* 6. *Art.* 1.

‡ Such miſtaken Notions of Religion, and of ſome particular moral Species, have produced theſe monſtrous Deciſions

apprehended pernicious to the publick, as *Duties* to himſelf; in ſuch caſes there is room to compare our *publick Senſe or Deſires* with our *moral*, to ſee which is prevalent. The Pleaſures of theſe Senſes, in ſuch caſes, need not be compared; the following either the one or the other will give little Pleaſure: The Pain of the counteracted *Senſe* will prevent all *Satisfaction*. This State is truly deplorable, when a Perſon is thus diſtracted between two noble Principles, his *publick Affections*, and *Senſe of Virtue*. But it may be inquired, which of theſe Senſes, when counteracted, would occaſion the *greater Pain?* Perhaps nothing can be anſwered *univerſally* on either ſide. With Men of *recluſe contemplative Lives*, who have dwelt much upon ſome *moral Ideas*, but without large *extenſive View* of publick Good, or without engaging themſelves to the full in the *pub-* Sect. 5.

ſions or Apothegms; viz. "*Some Actions are not lawful,* "*tho they were neceſſary not only to univerſal temporal Happineſs, but to the eternal Salvation of the whole World,* "*or to avoid univerſal eternal Miſery.*"

"*Fiat Juſtitia & ruat Cœlum.*"

Whereas the only Reaſon why ſome Actions are looked upon as univerſally and neceſſarily Evil, is only this, "that in "our preſent Conſtitution of Nature, they cannot poſſibly "produce any *good*, prepollent to their *evil Conſequences*." Whatever Action would do ſo, in the *whole of its Effects* muſt neceſſarily be *good*. This Propoſition is *Identick*.

Sect. 5. *lick Affections*, and common *Affairs of Life*: The *Senſe of Virtue*, in ſome partial confined View of it, would probably prevail; eſpecially ſince theſe partial Species of Virtue have always ſome ſort of *kind Affection* to aſſiſt them. With *active Men*, who have fully exerciſed their *publick Affections*, and have acquired as it were an *Habit* this way, 'tis probable the *publick Affections* would be prevalent. Thus we find that active Men, upon any *publick Neceſſity*, do always break thro' the *limited narrow Rules* of Virtue or Juſtice, which are publickly received, even when they have ſcarce any *Scheme of Principles* to juſtify their Conduct: Perhaps, indeed, in ſuch caſes, their *moral Senſe* is brought over to the Side of their *Affections*, tho their *ſpeculative Opinions* are oppoſite to both.

The Moral Senſe compared with the Senſe of Honour.

VIII. It is of more conſequence to compare the *publick and moral Senſes*, in oppoſition to the *Senſe of Honour*. Here there may be direct Oppoſition, ſince Honour is conferred according to the moral Notions of thoſe who confer it, which may be contrary to thoſe of the *Agent*, and contrary to what he thinks conducive to the publick Good.

To allow the Prevalence of *Honour*, cannot with any Perſon of juſt Reflection, weaken

weaken the Cauſe of Virtue, ſince Honour preſuppoſes * a *moral Senſe*, both in thoſe who deſire it, and thoſe who confer it. But it is enough for ſome *Writers*, who affect to be wondrous ſhrewd in their Obſervations on human Nature, and fond of making all the World, as well as themſelves, a *ſelfiſh Generation*, incapable of any real *Excellence* or *Virtue*, without any *natural Diſpoſition* toward a *publick Intereſt*, or toward any *moral Species*; to get but a "Set of different *Words* from thoſe com-"monly uſed, yet including the ſame *natu-*"*ral Diſpoſitions*,† or preſuppoſing them," however an inadvertent Reader may not obſerve it; and they are ſufficiently furniſhed to ſhew, that there is no real *Virtue*, that all is but *Hypocriſy*, *Diſguiſe*, *Art*, or *Intereſt*. "To be *honoured*, *highly* "*eſteemed*, *valued*, *praiſed*, or on the "contrary, to be *deſpiſed*, *undervalued*, "*cenſured* or *condemned*; to be *proud* or "*aſhamed*, are Words without any mean-"ing, if we take away a *moral Senſe*." Let this Senſe be as *capricious*, *inconſtant*, *different* in different Perſons as they pleaſe to alledge, "a *Senſe of Morality* there muſt "be, and *natural* it muſt be, if the *De-*"*ſire of Eſteem*, *Pride* or *Shame* be na-"tural."

Sect. 5.

* See *Treat.* 2. *Sect.* 5. *Art.* 4. † *Ibid.*

Sect. 5.

To make this compariſon between the *publick* and *moral Senſes* on the one hand, and that of *Honour* on the other, 'tis to be obſerved, that all *Averſion to Evil* is ſtronger than *Deſire of poſitive Good*. There are many ſorts of poſitive Good, without which any one may be eaſy, and enjoy others of a different kind: But Evil of almoſt any *kind*, in a high Degree, may make Life intolerable. The *avoiding of Evil* is always allowed a more extenuating Circumſtance in a *Crime*, than the *Proſpect of poſitive Good*: to make therefore juſt Compariſons of the Prevalence of ſeveral Deſires or Senſes, their ſeveral *Goods* ſhould be oppoſed to each other, and their *Evils* to each other, and not the *Pleaſures* of one compared with the *Pains* of another.

PUBLICK *Affections*, in their nearer Ties, frequently overcome not only the Pleaſures of *Honour*, but even the *Pains of Shame*. This is the moſt common Event in Life, that for ſome apprehended Intereſt of *Offspring*, *Families*, *Friends*, Men ſhould neglect Opportunities of gaining *Honour*, and even incur *Shame* and *Contempt*. In Actions done for the Service of a *Party*, there can be no compariſon, for *Honour* is often a Motive on both ſides.

'TIS

Sect. 5.

'Tis alſo certain, that the *Fear of Shame*, in ſome Inſtances, will overcome all other Deſires whatſoever, even *natural Affection*, Love of *Pleaſure*, *Virtue*, *Wealth*, and even of *Life* itſelf. This Fear has excited Parents to the Murder of their Offſpring; has perſuaded Men to the moſt dangerous Enterprizes; to ſquander away their *Fortunes*, to counteract their *Duty*, and even to throw away their *Lives*. The Diſtraction and Convulſion of Mind obſervable in theſe *Conflicts* of Honour, with Virtue and publick Affection, ſhews how *unnatural* that State is, wherein the ſtrongeſt *Principles of Action*, naturally deſigned to co-operate and aſſiſt each other, are thus ſet in Oppoſition.

'Tis perhaps impoſſible to pronounce any thing univerſally concerning the Superiority of the Deſire of *Honour* on the one hand, or that of the Deſire of *Virtue* and *publick Good* on the other. *Habits* or *Cuſtom* may perhaps determine the Victory on either ſide. Men in high Stations, who have long indulged the Deſire of *Honour*, and have formed the moſt frightful Apprehenſions of *Contempt* as the worſt of Evils; or even thoſe in lower Stations, who have been long enured to value *Reputation* in any particular, and dread *Diſhonour* in that point, may have *Fear of Shame* ſuperior

Sect. 5. rior to all Averſions. Men, on the contrary, who have much indulged *good Nature*, or reflected much upon the Excellency of *Virtue* itſelf, abſtracted from *Honour*, may find Affections of this kind prevalent above the Fear of Shame.

To compare the *moral Senſe* with the Senſe of *Honour*, we muſt find caſes where the Agent condemns an Action with all its preſent Circumſtances as evil, and yet fears *Infamy* by omitting it, without any unequal Motives of other kinds on either ſide: Or when one may obtain *Praiſe* by an Action, when yet the Omiſſion of it would appear to himſelf as conſiderable a Virtue, as the *Praiſe* to be expected from the Action would repreſent the Action to be. The common Inſtances, in which ſome, who pretend deep Knowledge of *human Nature*, triumph much, have not theſe neceſſary Circumſtances. When a Man condemns *Duelling* in his private Sentiments, and yet practiſes it, we have indeed a conſiderable Evidence of the Strength of this *Deſire of Honour*, or *Averſion to Shame*, ſince it ſurpaſſes the Fear of Death. But here on one hand, beſides the *Fear of Shame*, there is the *Fear of conſtant Inſults*, of loſing all the *Advantages* depending upon the Character of Courage, and ſometimes even ſome *Species of Virtue* and *publick Good*, in reſtraining an inſolent Villain;

Duels no proper Inſtances.

Villain: On the other hand is the *Fear of* Sect. 5.
Death. The *moral Senſe* is ſeldom much
concerned: for however Men may condemn *voluntary Duelling*; however they may blame the *Age* for the Cuſtom, or cenſure the *Laws* as defective, yet generally, in their preſent Caſe, Duelling appears a neceſſary Piece of *Self-Defence* againſt opprobrious Injuries and Affronts, for which the Law has provided no Redreſs, and conſequently leaves Men to the natural Rights of *Self-Defence* and *Proſecution of Injuries.* The Caſe ſeems to them the ſame with that of *Thieves* and *Night-Robbers*, who may be put to Death by private Perſons, when there is no hope of overtaking them by Law. Theſe are certainly the Notions of thoſe who condemn *Duelling*, and yet practiſe it.

It is foreign to our preſent Purpoſe, to detect the Fallacy of theſe Arguments, in defence of *Duels*, as they are commonly practiſed among us; when Men from a ſudden Anger, upon ſome trifling or imaginary *Affronts* the deſpiſing of which would appear honourable in every wiſe Mans Eyes, expoſe themſelves, and often their deareſt Friends to Death, and hazard the Ruin of their own Families, as well as that of their Adverſary; tho the *Succeſs* in ſuch Attempts can have no tendency to juſtify them

Sect. 5. againſt the diſhonourable *Charge*, or to procure any Honour from Men of worth.

Nor the Caſe of Lucretia.

THE magnified Inſtance of *Lucretia* * is yet leſs to our purpoſe. Some talk, as if "ſhe indeed would rather have died than "conſented to the Crime; but the *Crime* "did not appear ſo great an Evil as the "*Diſhonour*; to the Guilt ſhe ſubmitted to "avoid the Shame." Let us conſider this renowned Argument. Was there then no Motive on either ſide, but *Fear of Shame*, and a *Senſe of Duty*? If we look into the Story, we ſhall find, that to perſuade her to conſent, there conſpired, beſide the *Fear of Shame*, and of *Death*, which ſhe little regarded, the Hope of *noble Revenge*, or rather of *Juſtice* on the Raviſher, and the whole Tyrant's Family; nay, the Hopes of a *nobler Fame* by her future Conduct; the *Fear* of ſuffering that contumely by *force*, which ſhe was tempted to conſent to, and that in ſuch a manner as ſhe could have had no Redreſs. All theſe Conſiderations concurred to make her conſent. On the other ſide, there was only the *moral Senſe* of a Crime thus extenuated by the moſt grievous *Neceſſity*, and by hopes of *doing Juſtice* to her Husband's Honour, and *reſcuing her Country*: Nay,

* Livy, *Lib.* i. *c.* 57.

could

could ſhe not have at once ſaved her *Character* and her *Life* by conſenting; when in that virtuous Age ſhe might have expected *Secrecy* in the Prince, ſince boaſting of ſuch Attempts would have been dangerous to the greateſt Man in *Rome?* Sect. 5.

IT is not eaſy to find juſt Room for a Compariſon even in fictitious Caſes, between theſe two *Principles*. Were there a Perſon who had no Belief of any DEITY, or of any reality in *Religion*, in a Country where his *ſecular Intereſt* would not ſuffer by a Character of *Atheiſm*; and yet he knew that the Profeſſion of zealous Devotion would tend to his *Honour*: If ſuch a Perſon could have any Senſe of *Morality*, particularly an Averſion to *Diſſimulation*, then his *Profeſſion of Religion* would evidence the Superiority of the *Senſe of Honour*; and his *Diſcovery* of his Sentiments, or *Neglect* of Religion, would evidence the Ballance to be on the other ſide. I preſume in *England* and *Holland*, we have more Inſtances of the latter than the former. 'Tis true, our Gentlemen who affect the Name of *Freedom*, may have now their Hopes of *Honour* from their own *Party*, as well as others.

THE Adherence to any particular *Religion* by one in a ſtrange Country, where it was diſhonourable, would not be allowed a good

Sect. 5. good Inſtance of the Prevalence of a *moral Species*; it is a very common thing indeed, but here are *Intereſts* of another Life, and Regard to a *future Return* to a Country where this Religion is in repute.

The Pleaſures of Imagination greater than thoſe of external Senſes.

IX. THE Pleaſures of the *internal Senſes*, or of the Imagination, are allowed by all, who have any tolerable Taſte of them, as a much ſuperior Happineſs to thoſe of the *external Senſes*, tho they were enjoyed to the full.

OTHER Compariſons might be made but with leſs uſe, or certainty in any general Concluſions, which might be drawn from them.

THE Pleaſures of *Wealth* or *Power*, are proportioned to the Gratifications of the *Deſires* or *Senſes*, which the Agent intends to gratify by them: So that, for the Reaſons above offered, Wealth and Power give greater Happineſs to the *Virtuous*, than to thoſe who conſult only *Luxury* or *external Splendor*. If theſe Deſires are grown *enthuſiaſtick* and *habitual*, without regard to any other end than *Poſſeſſion*, they are an endleſs Source of Vexation, without any real *Enjoyment*; a perpetual *Craving*, without *Nouriſhment* or *Digeſtion*; and they may ſurmount all other Affections, by

by Aids borrowed from other Affections themſelves. Sect. 5.

THE *fantaſtick Deſires* are violent, in proportion to the Senſes from which the *aſſociated Ideas* are borrowed. Only it is to be obſerved, that however the Deſires may be violent, yet the obtaining the *Object deſired* gives little Satisfaction; the *Poſſeſſion* diſcovers the Vanity and Deceit, and the *Fancy* is turned toward different Objects, in a perpetual Succeſſion of inconſtant Purſuits.

X. THESE ſeveral kinds of Pleaſure or Pain are next to be compared as to their *Duration*. Here we are not only to conſider the *Certainty* of the Objects occaſioning theſe Senſations, but the *Conſtancy* of our Reliſh or Fancy. *A Compariſon of the ſeveral Pleaſures as to Duration.*

1. THE Objects neceſſary to remove the Pains of *Appetite*, and to give as grateful *external Senſations* as any others, to a Perſon of a *correct Imagination*, may be univerſally ſecured by common Prudence and Induſtry. But then the *Senſations* themſelves are ſhort and tranſitory; the *Pleaſure* continues no longer than the *Appetite*, nor does it leave any thing behind it, to ſupply the *Intervals* of Enjoyment. When the Senſation is paſt, we are no happier for it, there is no pleaſure in *Re-*

Sect. 5. *Reflection*; nor are paſt Senſations any ſecurity againſt, or ſupport under either *external Pain*, or any other ſort of evil incident to us. If we keep theſe Senſes pure, and unmixed with *foreign Ideas*, they cannot furniſh Employment for Life: If *foreign Ideas* come in, the Objects grow difficult and uncertain, and our *Reliſh* or *Fancy* full of Inconſtancy and Caprice.

2. In like manner, the Pleaſures of the *Imagination* may be enjoyed by all, and be a ſure Foundation of Pleaſure, if we abſtract from *Property*, and keep our Imagination pure. Such are the Pleaſures in the Obſervation of *Nature*, and even the Works of *Art*; which are ordinarily expoſed to view. But as theſe give leſs Pleaſure the more *familiar* they grow, they cannot ſufficiently employ or entertain Mankind, much leſs can they ſecure us againſt, or ſupport us under the *Calamities of Life*, ſuch as *Anger*, *Sorrow*, *Diſhonour*, *Remorſe*, or *external Pain*. If the *monſtrous* or *trifling Taſte* take place, or the Ideas of *Property*, they may indeed give ſufficient Employment, but they bring along with them little Pleaſure, frequent *Diſguſts*, *Anxieties*, and *Diſappointments*, in the acquiring and retaining their Objects.

3. The

Sect. 5.

3. THE *publick Happineſs* is indeed, as to external Appearance, a very uncertain Object; nor is it often in our power to remedy it, by changing the Courſe of *Events*. There are perpetual Changes in Mankind from Pleaſures to Pains, and often from Virtue to Vice. Our *publick Deſires* muſt therefore frequently ſubject us to *Sorrow*; and the Pleaſures of the *publick Senſe* muſt be very inconſtant. 'Tis true indeed, that a general *Good-will* to our kind, is the moſt conſtant Inclination of the Mind, which grows upon us by Indulgence; nor are we ever diſſatisfied with the *Fancy*: the *Incertainty* therefore is wholly owing to the *Objects*. If there can be any Conſiderations found out to make it probable, that in the Whole all Events tend to Happineſs, this implicit Hope indeed may make our *publick Affections* the greateſt and moſt conſtant Source of Pleaſure. Frequent *Reflection* on this, is the beſt Support under the Sorrow ariſing from particular evils, befalling our Fellow-Creatures. In our *nearer Attachments* brought upon our ſelves, we may procure to our ſelves the greateſt Enjoyments of this kind, with conſiderable *Security* and *Conſtancy*, by chuſing for our *Friends*, or *deareſt Favourites*, Perſons of juſt Apprehenſions of Things, who are ſubjected only to the *neceſſary Evils* of Life, and can enjoy all the

Sect. 5. the certain and conſtant Good. And in like manner, our Attachment to a *Country* may be fixed by ſomething elſe than the *Chance of our Nativity*. The Enjoyments of the publick Senſe cannot indeed ſecure us againſt bodily *Pains* or *Loſs*; but they are often a conſiderable Support under them. Nothing can more allay *Sorrow* and *Dejection* of Mind for private Misfortunes, than good Nature, and Reflection upon the *Happineſs* of thoſe we love.

4. THE *moral Senſe*, if we form *true Opinions* of the Tendencies of Actions, and of the *Affections* whence they ſpring, as it is the Fountain of the moſt *intenſe Pleaſure*, ſo " it is in itſelf *conſtant*, not " ſubject to Caprice or Change. If we re- " ſolutely incourage this Senſe, it grows " more acute by frequent *Gratification*, " never cloys, nor ever is ſurfeited. We " not only are ſure never to want *Oppor-* " *tunities* of doing good, which are in " every one's power in the higheſt De- " gree; * but each good Action is Matter " of pleaſant *Reflection* as long as we live. " Theſe Pleaſures cannot indeed wholly " ſecure us againſt all kinds of *Uneaſineſs*, " yet they never tend naturally to increaſe " them. On the contrary, their general

* *Treat.* 2. *Sect.* 3. laſt Paragraph.

" Tendency is to lead the virtuous Agent Sect. 5.
" into all Pleaſures, in the higheſt Degree
" in which they are conſiſtent with each
" other. Our *external Senſes* are not
" weakned by Virtue, our *Imaginations*
" are not impaired; the *temperate Enjoy-*
" *ment* of all external Pleaſures is the
" higheſt. A virtuous Conduct is generally
" the moſt prudent, even as to outward
" *Proſperity*. Where Virtue coſts us
" much, its own *Pleaſures* are the more
" ſublime. It directly advances the Plea-
" ſures of the *publick Senſe*, by leading us
" to promote the publick Happineſs as far
" as we can; and *Honour* is its natural
" and ordinary Attendant. If it cannot
" remove the *neceſſary Pains* of Life, yet
" it is the beſt Support under them. Theſe
" moral Pleaſures do ſome way more nearly
" affect us than any other: They make
" us delight in our *ſelves*, and reliſh our
" very *Nature*. By theſe we perceive an
" *internal Dignity* and *Worth*; and ſeem
" to have a Pleaſure like to that aſcribed
" often to the DEITY, by which we en-
" joy our own *Perfection*, and that of e-
" very other Being."

IT may perhaps ſeem too *metaphyſical* to alledge on this Subject, that other *Senſations* are all dependent upon, or related by the Conſtitution of our Nature, to ſomething different from our *ſelves*; to a *Body*

Sect. 5. *Body* which we do not call *Self*, but ſomething belonging to this *Self*. That other *Perceptions* of *Joy* or *Pleaſure* carry with them Relations to *Objects*, and *Spaces* diſtinct from this *Self*; whereas "the "Pleaſures of Virtue are the very *Perfec-* "*tion of this* SELF, and are immediately "perceived as ſuch, independent of exter- "nal Objects."

OUR Senſe of *Honour* may afford very conſtant Pleaſures by good Oeconomy: If our *moral Senſe* be not perverted; if we form juſt Apprehenſions of the *Worth of others*, Honour ſhall be pleaſant to us in a compound Proportion of the *Numbers* and *Worth* of thoſe who confer it. If therefore we cannot approve our ſelves to all, ſo as to obtain *univerſal Honour* among all to whom we are known, yet there are ſtill Men of juſt Thought and Reflection, whoſe *Eſteem* a virtuous Man may procure. Their *Dignity* will compenſate the Want of *Numbers*, and ſupport us againſt the Pains of *Cenſure* from the Injudicious.

THE Inconſtancy of the Pleaſures of *Wealth* and *Power* is well known, and is occaſioned, not perhaps by Change of Fancy, for theſe Deſires are found to continue long enough, ſince they tend toward the *univerſal Means* of gratifying all other Deſires; but by the Uncertainty of *Objects*

or *Events* neceſſary to gratify ſuch continually increaſing Deſires as theſe are, where there is not ſome fixed View different from the *Wealth* or *Power* itſelf. When indeed they are deſired only as the Means of gratifying ſome other well-regulated *Deſires*, we may ſoon obtain ſuch a Portion as will ſatisfy us. But if once the *End* be forgotten, and Wealth or Power become grateful *for themſelves*, no farther Limits are to be expected: the Deſires are inſatiable, nor is there any conſiderable *Happineſs* in any given *Degree* of either. Sect. 5.

XI. WERE we to conſider the *Duration* of the ſeveral Pains, we may find it generally as the Duration of their Pleaſures. As to the external Senſes, the old *Epicurean* Conſolation is generally juſt: "Where the Pain is violent it ſhortens our "*Duration*; when it does not ſhorten "our *Duration*, it is generally either *tole-* "*rable*, or admits of frequent *Intermiſ-* "*ſions*;" and then, when the external Pain is once paſt, no Mortal is the worſe for having endured it. There is nothing uneaſy in the *Reflection*, when we have no preſent *Pain*, or fear no *Return* of it. *The Durations of the ſeveral Pains conſidered.*

THE *internal Senſes* are not properly *Avenues of Pain*. No *Form* is neceſſarily the Occaſion of poſitive Uneaſineſs.

Sect. 5.

THE Pains of the *moral Senſe* and Senſe of *Honour*, are almoſt perpetual. *Time*, the Refuge of other Sorrows, gives us no *Relief* from theſe. All other Pleaſures are made inſipid by theſe Pains, and Life itſelf an uneaſy Burden. Our very *Self*, our Nature is diſagreeable to us. 'Tis true, we do not always obſerve the Vicious to be uneaſy. The *Deformity* of *Vice* often does not appear to thoſe who continue in a Courſe of it. Their Actions are under ſome Diſguiſe of *Innocence*, or even of *Virtue* itſelf. When this Mask is pulled off, as it often happens, nor can any vicious Man prevent its happening, Vice will appear as a *Fury*, whoſe Aſpect no Mortal can bear. This we may ſee in one *Vice*, which perhaps has had fewer falſe or fantaſtick Aſſociations of favourable Ideas than any, *viz. Cowardice*, or ſuch a ſelfiſh Love of Life, and Averſion to Death, or to the very Hazard of it, as hinders a Man from ſerving his Country or his Friend, or ſupporting his own Reputation. How few of our gay Gentlemen can bear to be reputed *Cowards*, or even ſecretly to imagine themſelves void of *Courage*? This is not tolerable to any, how negligent ſoever they may be about other Points of Morality. Other *Vices* would appear equally odious and deſpicable, and bear as horrid an Aſpect, were they equally ſtript of the *Diſguiſes of Vir-*

Virtue. A vicious Man has no other Se- Sect. 5.
curity againſt the Appearances of this ter-
rifying *Form*, than *Ignorance* or *Inadver-*
tence. If *Truth* break in upon him, as it
often muſt, when any *Adverſity* ſtops his
intoxicating Pleaſures, or Spectators uſe
Freedom with his Conduct, he is render'd
perpetually miſerable, or muſt fly to the
only Remedy which Reaſon would ſuggeſt,
all poſſible *Reparation* of Injuries, and a
new Courſe of Life, the Neceſſity of which
is not ſuperſeded by any *Remedy* ſuggeſted
by the *Chriſtian Revelation.*

THE Pains of the *publick Senſe* are very laſting. The *Miſery* of others, either in paſt or preſent Ages, is matter of very uneaſy *Reflection*, and muſt continue ſo, if their State appears in the whole *abſolutely Evil.* Againſt this there is no Relief but the Conſideration of a "*good governing* "MIND, ordering all for good in the "whole, with the Belief of a *future* "*State*, where the particular ſeeming Diſ- "orders are rectified." A firm Perſuaſion of theſe Things, with ſtrong *publick Affections* intereſting us ſtrongly in this *Whole*, and conſidering this *Whole* as one great *Syſtem*, in which all is wiſely ordered for good, may ſecure us againſt theſe Pains, by removing the Opinion of any *abſolute Evil.*

Sect. 5.

THE Pains ariſing from fooliſh *Aſſociations of moral Ideas*, with the Gratifications of *external Senſes*, or with the Enjoyment of Objects of *Beauty*, or *Grandeur*, or from the Deſires of *Property*, the Humour of *Diſtinction*, may be as conſtant as the Pains of the *Senſes* from which theſe Ideas are borrowed. Thus what we gain by theſe Aſſociations is very little. "The *Deſires* of Triſles are often made "very ſtrong and uneaſy; the *Pleaſures* "*of Poſſeſſion* very ſmall and of ſhort Con- "tinuance, only till the Object be famili- "ar, or the *Fancy* change: But the *Pains* "*of Diſappointment* are often very laſting "and violent. Would we guard againſt "theſe Aſſociations, every real *Pleaſure* "in Life remains, and we may be eaſy "without theſe things, which to others "occaſion the greateſt Pains."

Gemmas, Marmor, Ebur, Tyrrhena Sigilla, Tabellas,
Argentum, veſtes Getulo Murice tinctas,
Eſt qui non habet, eſt qui nec curat habere. Hor.

SECT.

SECT. VI.

Some general Concluſions *concerning the beſt* Management *of our Deſires. With ſome Principles neceſſary to* Happineſs.

WE ſee therefore, upon comparing the ſeveral kinds of Pleaſures and Pains, both as to *Intention* and *Duration*, that "the whole Sum of Intereſt lies upon "the Side of *Virtue*, *Publick-ſpirit*, and "*Honour*. That to *forfeit* theſe Pleaſures "in whole, or in part, for any other *En-*"*joyment*, is the moſt fooliſh Bargain; "and on the contrary, to ſecure them "with the *Sacrifice* of all others, is the "*trueſt Gain*."

Conſtant Diſcipline neceſſary.

THERE is one general *Obſervation* to be premiſed, which appears of the greateſt Neceſſity for the juſt *Management* of all our Deſires; *viz.* that we ſhould, as much as poſſible, in all Affairs of Importance to our ſelves or others, prevent the *Violence* of their *confuſed Senſation*, and ſtop their *Propenſities* from breaking out into Action, till we have fully examined the real *Moment* of the Object, either of our Deſires

Sect. 6. or Averſions. The only way to affect this is, " a conſtant *Attention* of Mind, " an habitual *Diſcipline* over our ſelves, " and a fixed *Reſolution* to ſtop all Action, " before a calm *Examination* of every " Circumſtance attending it; more parti- " cularly, the real *Values* of external Ob- " jects, and the *moral Qualities* or *Tem- " pers* of rational Agents, about whom our " Affections may be employed." This Power we may obtain over our ſelves, by a frequent Conſideration of the great *Calamities*, and pernicious Actions, to which even the *beſt of our Paſſions* may lead us, when we are raſhly hurried into Action by their Violence, and by the *confuſed Senſations*, and *fantaſtick Aſſociations* of Ideas which attend them: Thus we may raiſe an *habitual Suſpicion* and *Dread* of every *violent Paſſion*, which, recurring along with them continually, may in ſome meaſure counter-ballance their *Propenſities* and *confuſed Senſations*. This *Diſcipline* of our Paſſions is in general neceſſary. The *unkind* or *deſtructive Affections*, our *Anger*, *Hatred*, or *Averſion* to rational Agents, ſeem to need it moſt; but there is alſo a great Neceſſity for it, even about the *tender* and *benign Affections*, leſt we ſhould be hurried into *univerſal* and *abſolute Evil*, by the Appearance of *particular Good*: And conſequently it muſt be of the higheſt Importance to all, to ſtrengthen as much

as poſſible, by frequent Meditation and Re-flection, the calm Deſires either private or publick, rather than the particular Paſſions, and to make the *calm univerſal Benevolence* ſuperior to them. Sect. 6.

THAT the neceſſary *Reſignation* of other Pleaſures may be the more eaſy, we muſt frequently ſuggeſt to our ſelves theſe Conſiderations above-mentioned. "*External Pleaſures* are ſhort and tranſitory, leave no agreeable *Reflection*, and are no manner of *Advantage* to us when they are paſt; we are no better than if we had wanted them altogether." *Reſignation of ſenſual Pleaſures.*

IN like manner, "paſt Pains give us no unpleaſant *Reflection*, nor are we the worſe for having endured them. If they are violent, our Exiſtence will probably be ſhort; if not, they are tolerable, or allow long Intervals of Eaſe." Let us join to theſe a *ſtoical Conſideration*; "that *external Pains* give us a noble Opportunity of *moral Pleaſures* in Fortitude, and *Submiſſion* to the Order of the whole, if we bear them reſolutely; but if we fret under them, we do not alleviate the Suffering, but rather increaſe it by *Diſcontent* or *Sullenneſs*." When *external Pains* muſt be endured voluntarily to avoid *moral Evil*, we muſt, as much as poſſible, preſent to our ſelves

Sect. 6. " the *moral Species* itſelf, with the *publick* " *Good* to enſue, the *Honour* and *Appro-* " *bation* to be expected from all good " Men, the DEITY, and our own Hearts, " if we continue firm; and on the con- " trary, the *Remorſe*, *Shame* and Appre- " henſion of *future Puniſhments*, if we " yield to this Temptation."

How neceſſary it is to break off the vain Aſſociations of *moral Ideas*, from the Objects of *external Senſes*, will alſo eaſily appear. This may be done, by conſidering how trifling the *Services* are which are done to our Friends or Acquaintances, by *ſplendid Entertainments*, at an Expence, which, otherways employed, might have been to them of conſiderable Importance. Men who are at eaſe, and of as *irregular Imaginations* as our ſelves, may admire and praiſe our *Magnificence*; but thoſe who need more *durable Services*, will never think themſelves much obliged. We cannot expect any *Gratitude* for what was done only to pleaſe our own *Vanity*: The *Indigent* eaſily ſee this, and juſtly conſider upon the whole how much they have profited.

If the Wealth of the *Luxurious* fails, he is the Object of *Contempt*: No body pities him nor honours him: his *perſonal Dignity* was placed by himſelf in his *Ta-* *ble*,

ble, Equipage and *Furniture*; his Admirers placed it alſo in the ſame: When theſe are gone all is loſt. Sect. 6.

——Non eſt melius quo inſumere poſſis?
Cur eget indignus quisquam te Divite? quare
Templa ruunt antiqua Deûm? cur improbe caræ
Non aliquid Patriæ ex tanto emetiris acervo?
Uni nimirum tibi rectè ſemper erunt res:
O magnus poſthac inimicis Riſus. —— Hor.

THERE is no Enjoyment of external Pleaſure, which has more impoſed upon Men of late, by ſome confuſed *Species of Morality*, than *Gallantry*. The ſenſible Pleaſure alone muſt, by all Men who have the leaſt Reflection, be eſteemed at a very low rate: But the Deſires of this kind, as they were by Nature intended to found the moſt conſtant uninterrupted *Friendſhip*, and to introduce the moſt venerable and lovely *Relations*, by *Marriages* and *Families*, ariſe in our Hearts, attended with ſome of the *ſweeteſt Affections*, with a diſintereſted *Love* and *Tenderneſs*, with a moſt gentle and obliging Deportment, with ſomething great and heroick in our Temper. The Wretch who riſes no higher in this Paſſion than the mean *ſenſual Gratification*, is abhorred by every one: But theſe ſublimer Senſations and Paſſions do often ſo fill the Imaginations of the *Amorous*, that they are unawares led into the moſt

Sect. 6. moſt contemptible and cruel Conduct which can be imagined. When for ſome trifling tranſitory *Senſations*, which they might have innocently enjoyed along with the higheſt *moral Pleaſures* in Marriage, they expoſe the very Perſon they love and admire to the deepeſt *Infamy* and *Sorrow*, to the *Contempt* of the World, to perpetual *Confuſion*, *Remorſe*, and *Anguiſh*; or, to what is worſe, an *Inſenſibility* of all Honour or Shame, Virtue or Vice, Good or Evil, to be the Scorn and Averſion of the World; and all this coloured over with the gay Notions of *Pleaſantry*, *Genteelneſs*, *Politeneſs*, *Courage*, *high Enjoyment of Life*.

WOULD Men allow themſelves a little Time to reflect on the *whole Effect* of ſuch capricious Purſuits, the *Anguiſh* and *Diſtraction* of Mind which theſe Sallies of Pleaſure give to *Husbands*, *Fathers*, *Brothers*; would they conſider how they themſelves would reſent ſuch Treatment of a *Wife*, a *Child*, a *Siſter*; how much deeper ſuch Diſtreſſes are, than thoſe trifling Loſſes or Damages, for which we think it juſt to bring the Authors of them to the Gallows; ſure none but a thorow Villain could either practiſe or approve the one more than the other.

Sect. 6.

A WISE Man in his Oeconomy, muſt do much even in Complaiſance to the *Follies* of others, as well as his own *Conveniency*, to ſupport that general *good Opinion* which muſt be maintained by thoſe who would be publickly uſeful. His *Expences* muſt be ſome way ſuited to his *Fortune*, to avoid the Imputation of *Avarice*. If indeed what is ſaved in *private Expences*, be employed in *generous Offices*, there is little danger of this Charge Such a *Medium* may be kept as to be above *Cenſure*, and yet below any *Affectation of Honour* or *Diſtinction* in theſe matters. If one corrects his own *Imagination* in theſe things, he will be in no danger of doing any thing pernicious to pleaſe others. He is ſtill in a State fit to judge of the real *Importance* of every thing which occurs to him, and will gratify the falſe *Reliſh* of others, no farther than it is conſiſtent with, and ſubſervient to *ſome nobler Views*.

Conduct neceſſary about the Pleaſures of Imagination,

II. TO make the Pleaſures of *Imagination* a conſtant Source of *Delight*, as they ſeem intended in the Frame of our Nature, with no hazard of *Pain*, it is neceſſary to keep the Senſe free from foreign *Ideas of Property*, and the *Deſire of Diſtinction*, as much as poſſible. If this can be done, we may receive Pleaſure from every *Work of Nature or Art* around us. We enjoy not

Sect. 6. not only the whole of *Nature*, but the united Labours of all about us. To prevent the Idea of *Property*, let us conſider "how little the *Proprietor* enjoys more "than the *Spectator:* Wherein is he the "better or the happier?" The *Poet*, or the *Connoiſſeur*, who judges nicely of the Perfection of the Works of Art, or the Beauties of Nature, has generally a *higher Taſte* than the Poſſeſſor. The *magnificent Palace*, the *grand Apartments*, the *Viſtas*, the *Fountains*, the *Urns*, the *Statues*, the *Grottos* and *Arbours*, are expoſed either in their own *Nature*, or by the Inclination of the *Proprietor*, to the Enjoyment of others. The *Pleaſure of the Proprietor* depends upon the *Admiration* of others. he robs himſelf of his chief Enjoyment if he excludes *Spectators:* Nay, may not a Taſte for Nature be acquired, giving greater Delight than the Obſervation of Art?

Deterius Lybicis olet, aut nitet, Herba lapillis?
Purior in vicis aqua tendit rumpere Plumbum,
Quam quæ per pronum trepidat cum murmure rivum?
Nempe inter varias nutritur Sylva Columnas,
Laudaturque Domus, longos quæ proſpicit Agros.
Naturam expellas furca licet, uſque recurret. Hor.

Muſt an *artful Grove*, an *Imitation* of a Wilderneſs, or the more confined *Forms* or *Ever-greens*, pleaſe more than the real *Foreſt*,

reſt, with the *Trees of God?* Shall a *Sta-* Sect. 6.
tue give more Pleaſure than the *human Face Divine?*

WHERE the *Humour of Diſtinction* is not corrected, our Equals become our Adverſaries: The Grandeur of another is our *Miſery*, and makes our Enjoyments inſipid. There is only one way of making this Humour tolerable, but this way is almoſt inconſiſtent with the *Inclination* itſelf, *viz.* "continually to haunt with our Infe-"riors, and compare our ſelves with them." But if inconſtant *Fortune*, or their own Merit do raiſe any of them to equal us, our *Pleaſure* is loſt, or we muſt ſink our ſelves to thoſe who are ſtill *Inferior*, and abandon the Society of every Perſon whoſe *Art* or *Merit* raiſes him. How poor a Thought is this!

THE Purſuits of the *Learned* have often as much Folly in them as any others, when Studies are not valued according to their *Uſe in Life*, or the real Pleaſures they contain, but for the *Difficulty* and *Obſcurity*, and conſequently the *Rarity* and *Diſtinction*. Nay, an abuſe may be made of the moſt noble and manly Studies, even of *Morals*, *Politicks*, and *Religion* itſelf, if our Admiration and Deſire terminate upon the *Knowledge* itſelf, and not upon the

Sect 6 the Poſſeſſion of the *Diſpoſitions* and *Affections* inculcated in theſe Studies. If theſe Studies be only matter of *Amuſement* and *Speculation*, inſtead of leading us into a conſtant *Diſcipline* over our ſelves, to correct our Hearts, and to guide our Actions, we are not much better employed, than if we had been ſtudying ſome uſeleſs Relations of *Numbers*, or Calculations of *Chances*.

THERE is not indeed any part of Knowledge which can be called entirely *uſeleſs*. The moſt *abſtracted Parts* of *Mathematicks*, and the Knowledge of *mythological Hiſtory*, or antient *Allegories*, have their own Pleaſures not inferior to the more gay Entertainments of *Painting*, *Muſick*, or *Architecture*; and it is for the Advantage of Mankind that ſome are found, who have a Taſte for theſe Studies. The only Fault lies, in letting any of thoſe *inferior Taſtes* engroſs the whole Man to the Excluſion of the nobler Purſuits of *Virtue* and *Humanity*.

CONCERNING all theſe Pleaſures of the Imagination, let us conſider alſo "how "little ſupport they can give Men under "any of the Calamities of Life," ſuch as the Treachery or Baſeneſs of a *Friend*, a *Wife*, a *Child*, or the perplexing Intricacies

cies of our common Affairs, or the Appre- Sect. 6.
henſion of *Death*.

Re veraque Metus hominum, Curæque ſequaces
Nec metuunt ſonitus Armorum, nec fera Tela;
Audaciterque inter Reges, rerumque Potentes
Verſantur, nec fulgorem reverentur ab auro,
Nec clarum veſtis ſplendorem purpureaï
Quid dubitas quin omne ſit hoc rationis egeſtas? Luc.

III. UNDER this Head of our Internal Senſe, we muſt obſerve one natural Effect of it, that it leads us into *Apprehenſions of a* DEITY. Grandeur, Beauty, Order, Harmony, wherever they occur, raiſe an Opinion of a MIND, of *Deſign*, and *Wiſdom*. Every thing great, regular, or proportioned, excites *Veneration*, either toward itſelf, if we imagine it animated, if not animated, toward ſome apprehended Cauſe. No Determination of our Mind is more *natural* than this, no Effect more *univerſal*. One has better Reaſon to deny the Inclination between the *Sexes* to be natural, than a Diſpoſition in Mankind to *Religion*. *Ideas of Divinity ariſe from the Internal Senſes.*

WE cannot open our Eyes, without diſcerning *Grandeur and Beauty* every where. Whoever receives theſe Ideas, feels an inward *Veneration* ariſe. We may fall into a Thouſand vain Reaſonings: fooliſh limited Notions of DIVINITY may be formed, as attached to the particular *Places*

or

Sect. 6. or *Objects*, which ſtrike us in the moſt lively manner. Cuſtom, Prejudice of Senſe or Education, may confirm ſome fooliſh Opinion about the *Nature* or *Cauſe* of theſe Appearances: But wherever a ſuperior MIND, a governing INTENTION or DESIGN is imagined, there *Religion* begins in its moſt ſimple Form, and an inward *Devotion* ariſes. Our Nature is as much determined to this, as to any other Perception or Affection. How we manage theſe Ideas and Affections, is indeed of the greateſt Importance to our Happineſs or Miſery.

THE Apprehenſion of an univerſal MIND with Power and Knowledge, is indeed an agreeable Object of Contemplation. But we muſt form our Ideas of all intelligent Natures, with ſome Reſemblance or Analogy to our ſelves: We muſt conceive ſomething correſpondent to our *Affections* in the DIVINITY, with ſome *moral Apprehenſions* of the Actions and Tempers of his Creatures. The *Order of Nature* will ſuggeſt many Confirmations of this. We muſt conclude ſome *Worſhip* acceptable, and ſome Expreſſions of *Gratitude* as our Duty. The Conceptions of the DEITY muſt be various, according to the different Degrees of *Attention* and *Reaſoning* in the Obſervers, and their own Tempers and Affections. Imagining the divine MIND as *cruel, wrathful,*

wrathful, or capricious, muſt be a perpe- Sect. 6.
tual Source of Dread and Horror; and will
be apt to raiſe a *Reſemblance* of Temper in
the Worſhipper, with its attendant *Miſery*.
A contrary Idea of the DIVINITY, as
good, and kind, delighting in univerſal Hap-
pineſs, and ordering all Events of the Uni-
verſe to this End, as it is the moſt delight-
ful Contemplation, ſo it fills the good Mind
with a conſtant *Security* and *Hope*, amidſt
either publick Diſorders, or private Cala-
mities.

To find out which of theſe two Repre-
ſentations of the DEITY is the true one,
we muſt conſult the *Univerſe*, the *Effect*
of his Power, and the Scene of his Actions.
After what has been obſerved by ſo many
ingenious Authors, both *Antient* and *Mo-
dern*, one cannot be at a loſs which Opi-
nion to chuſe. We may only on this oc-
caſion conſider the Evidences of divine
Goodneſs appearing in the *Structure of
our own Nature*, and in the Order of our
Paſſions and *Senſes*.

Evidences of the Goodneſs of God in the Frame of our Senſes and Affections.

It was obſerved above, how admirably
our Affections are contrived for good in the
whole. Many of them indeed do not pur-
ſue the *private Good* of the Agent; nay,
many of them, in various Caſes, ſeem to
tend to his detriment, by concerning him
violently in the Fortunes of *others*, in their

Sect. 6. *Adverſity*, as well as their Proſperity. But they all aim at *good*, either private or publick: and by them each particular Agent is made, in a great meaſure, ſubſervient to the *good of the whole*. Mankind are thus inſenſibly link'd together, and make one great *Syſtem*, by an inviſible Union. He who *voluntarily* continues in this Union, and delights in employing his Power for his *Kind*, makes himſelf happy: He who does not continue this Union freely, but affects to break it, makes himſelf wretched; nor yet can he break the *Bonds of Nature*. His *publick Senſe*, his *Love of Honour*, and the very *Neceſſities* of his Nature, will continue to make him depend upon his *Syſtem*, and engage him to ſerve it, whether he inclines to it or not. Thus we are formed with a View to a general good *End*; and may in our own Nature diſcern a univerſal Mind watchful for the whole.

THE ſame is obſervable in the Order of our *external Senſes*. The ſimple Productions of Nature, which are uſeful to any Species of Animals, are alſo *grateful* to them; and the pernicious or uſeleſs Objects are made diſagreeable. Our external Senſations are no doubt often *painful*, when our Bodies are in a dangerous State; when they want ſupplies of Nouriſhment; when any thing external would be injurious to them. But if it appears, "that the *general Laws* "are

" are wiſely conſtituted, and that it is ne- Sect. 6.
" ceſſary to the Good of a Syſtem of
" ſuch Agents, to be under the Influence
" of *general Laws*, upon which there is
" occaſion for *Prudence* and *Activity*;"
the particular *Pains* occaſioned by a neceſſary *Law* of Senſation, can be no Objection againſt the Goodneſs of the Author.

Now that there is no room for complaint, that " our external Senſe of *Pain* " is made too acute," muſt appear from the Multitudes we daily ſee ſo careleſs of preſerving the Bleſſing of *Health*, of which many are ſo prodigal as to laviſh it away, and expoſe themſelves to external *Pains* for very trifling Reaſons. Can we then repine at the friendly *Admonitions* of Nature, joined with ſome *Auſterity*, when we ſee that they are ſcarce ſufficient to reſtrain us from Ruin? The ſame may be ſaid of the *Pains* of other kinds. *Shame* and *Remorſe* are never to be called too ſevere, while ſo many are not ſufficiently reſtrained by them. Our *Compaſſion* and friendly *Senſe of Sorrow*, what are they elſe but the *Alarms* and *Exhortations* of a kind impartial *Father*, to engage his *Children* to relieve a diſtreſſed *Brother*? Our *Anger* itſelf is a neceſſary Piece of Management, by which every pernicious Attempt is made *dangerous* to its Author.

Sect. 6.

WOULD we allow room to our Invention, to conceive what ſort of *Mechaniſm*, what *Conſtitutions* of Senſes or Affections a *malicious powerful Being* might have formed, we ſhould ſoon ſee how few Evidences there are for any ſuch Apprehenſion concerning the AUTHOR of this World. Our *Mechaniſm*, as far as we have ever yet diſcovered, is wholly contrived for good. No cruel *Device*, no *Art* or *Contrivance* to produce evil: No ſuch *Mark* or *Scope* ſeems ever to be aimed at. How eaſy had it been to have contrived ſome neceſſary Engines of *Miſery* without any uſe; ſome *Member* of no other ſervice but to be matter of *Torment*; *Senſes* incapable of bearing the ſurrounding Objects without Pain; Eyes pained with the *Light*; a Palate offended with the *Fruits* of the Earth; a Skin as tender as the Coats of the *Eye*, and yet ſome more furious Pain forcing us to bear theſe Torments? Human *Society* might have been made as uneaſy as the Company of *Enemies*, and yet a perpetual more violent Motive of *Fear* might have forc'd us to bear it. *Malice*, *Rancour*, *Diſtruſt*, might have been our natural Temper. Our *Honour* and *Self-Approbation* might have depended upon *Injuries*; and the *Torments* of others been made our *Delight*, which yet we could not have enjoyed thro' perpetual *Fear*. Many ſuch Contrivances we may

may eaſily conceive, whereby an evil *Mind* could have gratified his *Malice* by our *Miſery*. But how unlike are they all to the Intention or Deſign of the Mechaniſm of this World! Sect. 6.

Our *Paſſions* no doubt are often matter of Uneaſineſs to ourſelves, and ſometimes occaſion Miſery to *others*, when any one is indulged into a Degree of Strength beyond its *Proportion*. But which of them could we have wanted, without greater Miſery in the whole? They are by Nature ballanced againſt each other, like the *Antagoniſt Muſcles* of the Body; either of which ſeparately would have occaſioned *Diſtortion* and irregular *Motion*, yet jointly they form a Machine, moſt accurately ſubſervient to the *Neceſſities*, *Convenience*, *and Happineſs* of a *rational Syſtem*. We have a Power of *Reaſon* and *Reflection*, by which we may ſee what Courſe of Action will naturally tend to procure us the moſt valuable *Gratifications* of all our Deſires, and prevent any intolerable or unneceſſary *Pains*, or provide ſome ſupport under them. We have Wiſdom ſufficient to form Ideas of *Rights*, *Laws*, *Conſtitutions*; ſo as to preſerve large Societies in Peace and Proſperity, and promote a *general Good* amidſt all the *private Intereſts*.

Sect. 6.

IF from the preſent Order of Nature, in which *Good* appears far ſuperior to *Evil*, we have juſt Preſumptions to conclude the DEITY to be benevolent, it is not conceivable "that any Being, who deſires the "Happineſs of others, ſhould not deſire a "*greater Degree* of Happineſs to them "rather than a leſs; and that conſequent-"ly the whole *Series of Events* is the "beſt poſſible, and contains in the whole "the greateſt poſſible *abſolute Good*:" eſpecially ſince we have no Preſumption of any *private Intereſt*, which an *univerſal* MIND can have in view, in oppoſition to the greateſt Good of the whole. Nor are the particular Evils occurring to our Obſervation, any juſt Objection againſt the perfect Goodneſs of the univerſal PROVIDENCE to us, who cannot know how far theſe Evils may be neceſſarily connected with the *Means* of the greateſt poſſible abſolute Good.

The Conduct of our publick Senſe and Affections.

IV. IN managing our *publick Senſe* of the State of others, we muſt beware of one common Miſtake, *viz.* "apprehending "every Perſon to be miſerable in thoſe "Circumſtances, which we imagine would "make our ſelves miſerable." We may eaſily find, that the *lower Rank* of Mankind, whoſe only Revenue is their bodily Labour, enjoy as much *Chearfulneſs, Contentment,*

tentment, *Health*, *Gaiety*, in their own way, Sect. 6.
as any in the higheſt Station of Life. Both their Minds and Bodies are ſoon fitted to their State. The *Farmer* and *Labourer*, when they enjoy the bare Neceſſaries of Life, are eaſy. They have often more *correct Imaginations*, thro' *Neceſſity* and *Experience*, than others can acquire by *Philoſophy*. This Thought is indeed a poor Excuſe for a baſe ſelfiſh *Oppreſſor*, who, imagining Poverty a great Miſery, bears hard upon thoſe in a low Station of Life, and deprives them of their natural *Conveniences*, or even of bare *Neceſſaries*. But this Conſideration may ſupport a compaſſionate Heart, too deeply touched with apprehended Miſeries, of which the *Sufferers* are themſelves inſenſible.

The Pains of this *Senſe* are not eaſily removed. They are not allayed by the Diſtinction of Pains into *real* and *imaginary*. Much leſs will it remove them, to conſider how much of human Miſery is owing to their own *Folly* and *Vice*. Folly and Vice are themſelves the moſt pityable Evils. It is of more conſequence to conſider, what Evidences there are "that the "Vice and Miſery in the World are ſmaller "than we ſometimes in our melancholy "Hours imagine." There are no doubt many furious Starts of Paſſion, in which

Sect. 6. Malice may ſeem to have place in our Conſtitution; but how ſeldom, and how ſhort, in compariſon of Years ſpent in fixed kind Purſuits of the Good of a *Family*, a *Party*, a *Country*? How great a Part of human Actions flow directly from *Humanity* and *kind Affection*? How many cenſurable Actions are owing to the ſame Spring, only chargeable on *Inadvertence*, or an Attachment to too *narrow a Syſtem*? How few owing to any thing worſe than *ſelfiſh* Paſſions above their Proportion?

HERE Men are apt to let their Imaginations run out upon all the *Robberies*, *Piracies*, *Murders*, *Perjuries*, *Frauds*, *Maſſacres*, *Aſſaſſinations*, they have ever either heard of, or read in Hiſtory; thence concluding all Mankind to be very wicked: as if a *Court of Juſtice* were the proper Place of making an Eſtimate of the *Morals* of Mankind, or an *Hoſpital* of the *Healthfulneſs* of a Climate. Ought they not to conſider, that the Number of honeſt *Citizens* and *Farmers* far ſurpaſſes that of all ſorts of Criminals in any State; and that the innocent or kind Actions of even Criminals themſelves, ſurpaſs their Crimes in Numbers? That 'tis the *Rarity* of Crimes, in compariſon of innocent or good Actions, which engages our Attention to them, and makes them be recorded in Hiſtory; while incomparably more honeſt, generous, domeſ-

domeſtick Actions are overlooked, only Sect. 6.
becauſe they are ſo common; as one great *Danger*, or one *Month's Sickneſs*, ſhall become a frequently repeated Story, during a long Life of Health and Safety.

THE Pains of the *external Senſes* are pretty frequent, but how ſhort in compariſon of the long Tracts of Health, Eaſe and Pleaſure? How rare is the Inſtance of a Life, with one tenth ſpent in violent Pain? How few want abſolute Neceſſaries; nay, have not ſomething to ſpend on *Gaiety* and *Ornament*? The Pleaſures of *Beauty* are expoſed to all in ſome meaſure. Theſe kinds of Beauty which require *Property* to the full Enjoyment of them, are not ardently deſired by many. The Good of every kind in the Univerſe, is plainly ſuperior to the Evil. How few would accept of *Annihilation*, rather than Continuance in Life in the middle State of Age, Health and Fortune? Or what ſeparated Spirit, who had conſidered human Life, would not, rather than periſh, take the hazard of it again, by returning into a Body in the State of Infancy?

——— *Who would loſe,*
For fear of Pain, this intellectual Being,
Theſe Thoughts which wander thro' Eternity,
To periſh rather, ſwallowed up and loſt
In the wide Womb of uncreated Night,
Devoid of Senſe and Motion ——?
Milton's *Par. loſt*, Book. 2.

THESE

Sect. 6.

THESE Thoughts plainly ſhew a *Prevalence* of Good in the World. But ſtill our publick Senſe finds much matter of compaſſionate Sorrow among Men. The *Many* are in a tolerable good State; but who can be unconcerned for the diſtreſſed *Few*? They are few in compariſon of the whole, and yet a great *Multitude*.

WHAT Parent would be much concerned at the Pains of breeding of *Teeth*, were they ſure they would be ſhort, and end well? Or at the Pain of a Medicine, or an Inciſion, which was neceſſary for the Cure, and would certainly accompliſh it? Is there then no *Parent* in NATURE, no *Phyſician* who ſees what is neceſſary for the *Whole*, and for the good of each Individual in the whole of his Exiſtence, as far as is conſiſtent with the general Good? Can we expect, in this our *Childhood* of Exiſtence, to underſtand all the Contrivance and Art of this Parent and Phyſician of Nature? May not ſome harſh Diſcipline be neceſſary to Good? May not many natural Evils be neceſſary to prevent future moral Evils, and to correct the Tempers of the Agents, nay to introduce moral Good? Is not *Suffering* and *Diſtreſs* requiſite, before there can be room for generous Compaſſion, *Succour*, and *Liberality*? Can there be *Forgiveneſs*, *Returns of good for evil*,

unleſs there be ſome *moral Evil*? Muſt the *Whole* want the eternally delightful *Conſciouſneſs* of ſuch *Actions* and *Diſpoſitions*, to prevent a few tranſient Senſations of Pain, or natural Evil? May there not be ſome unſeen Neceſſity for the greateſt univerſal Good, that * there ſhould be an *Order of Beings* no more perfect than we are, ſubject to Error and wrong Affections ſometimes? May not all the preſent Diſorders which attend this State of *prevalent Order*, be rectified by the *directing Providence* in a future Part of our Exiſtence? This Belief of a DEITY, a PROVIDENCE, and a *future State*, are the only ſure Supports to a good Mind. Let us then acquire and ſtrengthen our Love and Concern for this *Whole*, and acquieſce in what the governing MIND, who preſides in it, is ordering in the wiſeſt manner, tho not yet fully known to us, for its moſt univerſal Good. Sect. 6.

A FUTURE State, firmly believed, makes the greateſt Difficulties on this Subject to vaniſh. No particular *finite Evils* can be looked upon as intolerable, which lead to Good, infinite in *Duration*. Nor can we complain of the Conditions of Birth, if the preſent Evils of Life have *The Neceſſity of believing a future State.*

* See the Archbiſhop of *Dublin*, *De Origine Mali.*

even

Sect. 6. even a probable hazard of *everlaſting Happineſs* to compenſate them; much more if it be placed in our power certainly to obtain it. Never could the boldeſt Epicurean bring the lighteſt Appearance of Argument againſt the *Poſſibility* of ſuch a State, nor was there ever any thing tolerable advanced againſt its *Probability*. We have no Records of any Nation which did not entertain this Opinion. Men of Reflection in all Ages, have found at leaſt probable Arguments for it; and the Vulgar have been prone to believe it, without any other *Argument* than their natural Notions of *Juſtice* in the *Adminiſtration of the World*. Preſent *Hope* is preſent Good: and this very Hope has enlivened human Life, and given eaſe to generous Minds, under Anxieties about the publick Good.

THIS Opinion was interwoven with all Religions; and as it in many inſtances overballanced the Motives to Vice, ſo it removed Objections againſt *Providence*. The good Influence of this Opinion, however it might not juſtify any *Frauds*, yet probably did more good than what might overballance many Evils flowing from even very *corrupt Religions*. How agreeable then muſt it be to every good Man, that this Opinion, were there even no more to be done, ſhould be confirmed beyond queſtion or doubt, by a well atteſted *divine*

vine *Revelation*, for the perpetual *Security* of the virtuous, and for the conſtant Support of the *kind and compaſſionate*? How gladly muſt every honeſt Heart receive it; and rejoice that even thoſe who have neither *Leiſure* nor *Capacity* for deep *Reflection*, ſhould be thus convinced of it? Sect. 6.

The Conduct of the unkind Affections.

As to the Management of thoſe Paſſions which ſeem *oppoſite* to the *Happineſs* of others, ſuch as *Anger*, *Jealouſy*, *Envy*, *Hatred*; it is very neceſſary to repreſent to our ſelves continually, the moſt *favourable Conceptions* of others, and to force our Minds to examine the *real Springs* of the reſented Actions. We may almoſt univerſally find, that "no Man acts from "*pure Malice*; that the Injurious only "intended ſome *Intereſt of his own*, with-"out any *ultimate Deſire* of our Miſe-"ry; that he is more to be pitied for his "own mean *ſelfiſh Temper*, for the want "of true *Goodneſs*, and its attendant *Hap-"pineſs*, than to be hated for his Conduct, "which is really more pernicious to him-"ſelf than to others*. Our *Lenity*, *For-"giveneſs*, and *Indulgence* to the Weak-"neſs of others, will be conſtant Matter "of *delightful Conſciouſneſs*, and *Self-*

* See this Point handled with great Judgment, in *Plato's Gorgias*.

"*Ap-*

Sect. 6. " *Approbation*; and will be as probably " effectual in moſt caſes, to obtain *Repa-* " *ration* of Wrongs, from an hearty *Re-* " *morſe*, and thorow *Amendment of the* " *Temper* of the Injurious, as any Me- " thods of Violence." Could we raiſe our Goodneſs even to an higher Pitch, and conſider " the Injurious as our *Fellow-* " *Members* in this great intellectual Body, " whoſe Intereſt and Happineſs it becomes " us to promote, as much as we can con- " ſiſtently with that of others, and not " to *deſpiſe*, *ſcorn*, or *cut them off*, be- " cauſe of every *Weakneſs*, *Deformity*, " or *lighter Diſorder*;" we might bring our ſelves to that divine Conduct, of even *returning good for evil.*

In like manner, our *Emulation*, *Jealouſy*, or *Envy*, might be reſtrained in a great meaſure, by a conſtant *Reſolution* of bearing always in our Minds the * *lovely Side* of every Character: † " The " compleatly Evil are as rare as the per- " fectly Virtuous: There is ſomething " amiable almoſt in every one." Could we enure our ſelves conſtantly to dwell on theſe things, we might often bear patiently the *Succeſs of a Rival*, nay, ſometimes even rejoice in it, be more happy our

* Epictet. Enchir. *Cap.* 65. † Plato Phædon.

ſelves,

ſelves, and turn him into a real *Friend*. We ſhould often find thoſe *Phantoms* of Vice and Corruption which torment the *Jealous*, vaniſhing before the bright Warmth of a thorow *good Temper*, reſolved to ſearch for every thing *lovely and good*, and averſe to think any *evil*. Sect. 6.

Conduct of the moral Senſe, and Senſe of Honour.

V. In governing our *moral Senſe*, and *Deſires of Virtue*, nothing is more neceſſary than to ſtudy the *Nature* and *Tendency* of human Actions; and to extend our views to the *whole Species*, or to all *ſenſitive Natures*, as far as they can be affected by our Conduct. Our moral Senſe thus regulated, and conſtantly followed in our Actions, may be the moſt conſtant Source of the moſt *ſtable Pleaſure*. The ſame Conduct is always the moſt probable Means of obtaining the *Pleaſures of Honour*. If there be a Diſtinction between *Truth* and *Falſhood*, Truth muſt be ſtronger than Falſhood: It muſt be more probable that *Truth* will generally prevail; that the real *good Tendency* of our Actions, and the Wiſdom of our *Intentions* will be known; and *Miſrepreſentations* or *partial Views* will vaniſh. Our Deſire of *Honour* is not confined to our preſent State. The Proſpect of *future Glory* is a ſtrong Motive of Action. And thus the *Time*, in which our Character may have the hazard of obtaining Juſtice, has no other Limits than

Sect. 6. than thoſe of the *Exiſtence of rational Natures*. Whereas, *partial Notions* of Virtue, and *partial Conduct*, have no other Foundation for *Self-Approbation*, than our *Ignorance*, *Error*, or *Inadvertence*; nor for *Honour*, than the like *Ignorance*, *Error*, or *Inadvertence* of others.

THAT we may not be engaged into any thing contrary to the publick Good, or to the true Schemes of Virtue, by the Deſire of *falſe Honour*, or *Fear of falſe Shame*, it is of great uſe to examine the *real Dignity* of thoſe we converſe with, and to confine our *Intimacies* to the truly virtuous and wiſe. From ſuch we can expect no Honour, but according to our ſincere Purſuit of the *publick Good*; nor need we ever fear any *Shame* in ſuch a Courſe. But above all, did we frequently, and in the moſt lively manner, preſent to our ſelves that great, and wiſe, and good MIND, which preſides over the Univerſe, ſees every *Action*, and knows the true *Character* and *Diſpoſition* of every Heart, approving nothing but ſincere Goodneſs and Integrity; did we conſider that the time will come, when we ſhall be as conſcious of his *Preſence*, as we are of our own *Exiſtence*; as ſenſible of his *Approbation* or *Condemnation*, as we are of the Teſtimony of our own Hearts; when we ſhall be engaged in a *Society of Spirits*, ſtripped of theſe *Prejudices*

judices and *falſe Notions* which ſo often attend us in Fleſh and Blood, how ſhould we deſpiſe that Honour which is from Men, when oppoſite to the trueſt Honour from GOD himſelf? Sect. 6.

VI. CONCERNING the Deſires of *Wealth* and *Power*, beſides what was ſuggeſted above to allay their Violence, from conſidering the ſmall Addition commonly made to the *Happineſs* of the Poſſeſſor, by the greateſt Degrees of them, and the *Uncertainty* of their Continuance; if we have obtained any ſhare of them, let us examine their *true Uſe*, and what is the beſt Enjoyment of them. *The Deſires of Wealth and Power.*

——— *Quid aſper*
Utile Nummus habet? Patriæ cariſque propinquis
Quantum elargiri decet? ——— Perſius.

WHAT *moral Pleaſures*, what Delights of *Humanity*, what *Gratitude* from Perſons obliged, what *Honour*, may a wiſe Man of a generous Temper purchaſe with them? How fooliſh is the Conduct of heaping up Wealth for *Poſterity*, when ſmaller Degrees might make them equally happy! when great *Proſpects* of this kind are the ſtrongeſt *Temptations* to them, to indulge *Sloth*, *Luxury*, *Debauchery*, *Inſolence*, *Pride*, and *Contempt* of their Fellow-Creatures;

Sect. 6. and to baniſh ſome noble Diſpoſitions, *Humility*, *Compaſſion*, *Induſtry*, *Hardineſs of Temper and Courage*, the Offspring of the ſober rigid Dame *Poverty*. How often does the *Example*, and almoſt direct *Inſtruction* of Parents, lead Poſterity into the baſeſt Views of Life!

——— *Qui nulla exempla beati*
Pauperis eſſe putat ———
Cum dicis Juveni ſtultum qui donat amico,
Qui paupertatem levat attollitque propinqui,
Et ſpoliare doces & circumſcribere ———
Ergo Ignem, cujus ſcintillas ipſe dediſti,
Flagrantem late, & rapientem cuncta videbis.

Juv. Sat. 14.

How powerfully might the Example of a wiſely generous Father, at once teach his Offspring the true *Value* of Wealth or Power, and prevent their *Neglect* of them, or fooliſh *throwing* them away, and yet inſpire them with a *generous Temper*, capable of the juſt *Uſe* of them!

Support againſt Death.

Death is one Object of our *Averſion*, which yet we cannot avoid. It can ſcarcely be ſaid, that "the *Deſire of Life* is as "ſtrong as the Sum of all *ſelfiſh Deſires*." It may be ſo with thoſe who enure themſelves to no Pleaſures but thoſe of the *external Senſes*. But how often do we ſee Death

Death endured, not only from Love of *Virtue*, or *publick Affections*, in Heroes and Martyrs, but even from Love of *Honour* in lower Characters! Many Averſions are ſtronger than that to Death. *Fear of bodily Pain*, *fear of Diſhonour*, which are ſelfiſh Averſions, do often ſurpaſs our Averſion to Death, as well as *publick Affections* to Countries or Friends. It is of the greateſt Conſequence to the *Enjoyment* of Life, to know its true *Value*; to ſtrip Death of its borrowed Ideas of Terror; to conſider it barely as the *Ceſſation of both the Pains and Pleaſures we now feel*, coming frequently upon us with no more Pain than that of *Swooning*, with a noble Hazard, or rather a certain *Proſpect* of ſuperior Happineſs to every *good Mind*. Death in this view muſt appear an inconſiderable Evil, in compariſon of *Vice*, *Self-Abhorrence*, real *Diſhonour*, the *Slavery of one's Country*, the *Miſery of a Friend*. Sect. 6.

THE tender Regards to a *Family* and *Offspring*, are often the ſtrongeſt Bands to reſtrain a generous Mind from ſubmitting to Death. What ſhall be the Fate of a *Wife*, a *Child*, a *Friend*, or a *Brother*, when we are gone, are the frequent Subjects of grievous Anxiety. The Fortunes of ſuch Perſons often depend much upon us; and when they do not, yet we are more anxious

Sect. 6. about their State when we ſhall be abſent.

Ut aſſidens implumibus pullis avis,
Serpentium allapſus timet
Magis relictis, non ut adſit Auxilî
Latura plus præſentibus. Hor.

Next to the Belief of a good PROVIDENCE, nothing can ſupport Men more under ſuch *Anxieties*, than conſidering how often the *Orphan* acquires a *Vigor* of Mind, *Sagacity* and *Induſtry*, ſuperior to thoſe who are enfeebled by the conſtant *Care* and *Services* of others. A wiſe Man would deſire to be provided with Friends againſt ſuch an Exigency; Perſons of ſuch Goodneſs, as would joyfully accept the *Legacy* of a *Child*, or indigent *Friend* committed to their Protection.

IF Death were an *entire End* of the Perſon, ſo that no Thought or Senſe ſhould remain, all *Good* muſt ceaſe at Death, but no *Evil* commence. The *Loſs of Good* is Evil to us now, but will be no Evil to a Being which has loſt all *Senſe of Evil.* Were this the Caſe, the Conſolation againſt Death would only be this, frequently to look upon *Life* and all its Enjoyments as granted to us only for a *ſhort Term*; to employ this uncertain Time as much as we can in the Enjoyment of the *nobleſt Pleaſures*;

ſures; and to prevent Surprize at our Re- Sect. 6.
moval, by *laying our Account* for it.

BUT if we exiſt, and think after Death, and retain our *Senſes* of Good and Evil, no Conſolation againſt Death can be ſuggeſted to a *wicked Man*; but for the *virtuous*, there are the beſt Grounds of *Hope* and *Joy*. If the *Adminiſtration* of the whole be good, we may be ſure "that *Order* "and *Happineſs* will in the whole prevail: "Nor will *Miſery* be inflicted any farther "than is neceſſary for ſome prepollent "Good." Now there is no Preſumption, that the *abſolute Miſery* of any *virtuous* Perſon can be neceſſary to any good End: Such Perſons therefore are the moſt likely to enjoy a State of perfect Happineſs.

VII. TO conclude: Let us conſider that common Character, which when aſcribed to any *State*, *Quality*, *Diſpoſition*, or *Action*, engages our *Favour* and *Approbation* of it, *viz.* its being *natural*. We have many Suſpicions about Tempers or Diſpoſitions formed by *Art*, but are ſome way prepoſſeſſed in favour of what is *natural*: We imagine it muſt be advantageous and delightful to be in a natural State, and to live according to Nature. "This very "Preſumption in favour of what is natural, "is a plain Indication that the Order of "Nature is good, and that Men are ſome

What is the natural State of Men.

Sect. 6. " way convinced of it. Let us enquire
" then what is meant by it."

IF by natural we mean " that which we " enjoy or do, when we firſt begin to ex- " iſt, or to think," it is impoſſible to know what *State*, *Temper*, or *Actions*, are *natural*. Our *natural State* in this Senſe differs little from that of a *Plant*, except in ſome accidental *Senſations of Hunger*, or of *Eaſe*, when we are well nouriſhed.

SOME elaborate Treatiſes of great Philoſophers about *innate Ideas*, or Principles practical or ſpeculative, amount to no more than this, " That in the Beginning of our " Exiſtence we have no *Ideas* or *Judg-* " *ments* ;" they might have added too, on *Sight*, *Taſte*, *Smell*, *Hearing*, *Deſire*, *Volition*. Such Diſſertations are juſt as uſeful for underſtanding *human Nature*, as it would be in explaining the *animal Oeconomy*, to prove that the *Fœtus* is animated before it has *Teeth*, *Nails*, *Hair*, or before it can *eat*, *drink*, *digeſt*, or *breathe* : Or in a *natural Hiſtory of Vegetables*, to prove that *Trees* begin to grow before they have *Branches*, *Leaves*, *Flower*, *Fruit*, or *Seed:* And conſequently that all theſe things were adventitious, or the Effect of Art.

BUT if we call " that *State*, thoſe " *Diſpoſitions* and *Actions*, *natural*, to " which

" which we are inclined by ſome part of our Conſtitution, antecedently to any *Volition of our own*; or which flow " from ſome *Principles* in our Nature, not " brought upon us by our own *Art*, or " that of others;" then it may appear, from what was ſaid above, that " a State " of *Good-will*, *Humanity*, *Compaſſion*, " *mutual Aid*, *propagating and ſupporting Offſpring*, *Love of a Community or Country*, *Devotion*, *or Love and Gratitude to ſome governing Mind*, is our " natural State," to which we are naturally inclined, and do actually arrive, as univerſally, and with as much uniformity, as we do to a certain *Stature* and *Shape*. Sect. 6.

IF by natural we underſtand " the " *higheſt Perfection of the Kind*, to which " any Nature may be improved by cultivating its natural Diſpoſitions or Pow- " ers;" as few arrive at this in the Growth of their *Bodies*, ſo few obtain it in their *Minds*. But we may ſee what this Perfection is, to which our *natural Diſpoſitions* tend, when we improve them to the utmoſt, as far as they are conſiſtent with each other, making the *weaker* or *meaner* yield to the *more excellent* and *ſtronger*. Our ſeveral *Senſes* and *Affections*, *publick* and *private*, with our Powers of *Reaſon* and *Reflection*, ſhew this to be the *Perfection* of our *Kind*, *viz.* " to know,

Sect. 6. " love, and reverence the great AUTHOR
" of all things; to form the moſt *exten-*
" *ſive Ideas* of our own true Intereſts, and
" thoſe of all other *Natures*, *rational* or
" *ſenſitive*; to abſtain from all *Injury*;
" to purſue regularly and impartially the
" *moſt univerſal abſolute Good*, as far
" as we can; to enjoy conſtant *Self-Ap-*
" *probation*, and *Honour* from wiſe Men;
" with *Truſt in divine* PROVIDENCE,
" *Hope of everlaſting Happineſs*, and a
" full *Satisfaction* and *Aſſurance* of Mind,
" that the whole Series of *Events* is di-
" rected by an unerring *Wiſdom*, for the
" greateſt univerſal *Happineſs* of the
" whole."

To aſſert that " Men have generally
" arrived to the *Perfection of their Kind*
" in this Life," is contrary to Experience. But on the other hand, to ſuppoſe " no Or-
" der at all in the *Conſtitution* of our Na-
" ture, or no *prevalent Evidences* of good
" Order," is yet more contrary to Experience, and would lead to a Denial of PROVIDENCE in the moſt important Affair which can occur to our Obſervation. We actually ſee ſuch Degrees of *good Order*, of *ſocial Affection*, of *Virtue* and *Honour*, as make the Generality of Mankind continue in a tolerable, nay, an *agreeable* State. However, in ſome Tempers we ſee the *ſelfiſh Paſſions* by Habits grown too ſtrong;

in

in others we may obſerve *Humanity*, *Compaſſion*, and *Good-nature* ſometimes raiſed by Habits, as we ſay, to an Exceſs. Sect. 6.

WERE we to ſtrike a *Medium* of the ſeveral Paſſions and Affections, as they appear in the whole Species of Mankind, to conclude thence what has been the natural Ballance previouſly to any Change made by Cuſtom or Habit, which we ſee caſts the Ballance to either ſide, we ſhould perhaps find the *Medium* of the publick Affections not very far from a ſufficient *Counter-ballance* to the *Medium* of the Selfiſh; and conſequently the *Overballance* on either ſide in particular Characters, is not to be looked upon as the *original Conſtitution*, but as the *accidental Effect* of Cuſtom, Habit, or Aſſociations of Ideas, or other preternatural Cauſes: So that an univerſal *increaſing* of the Strength of *either*, might in the whole be of little advantage. The raiſing univerſally the *publick Affections*, the Deſires of *Virtue* and *Honour*, would make the *Hero of Cervantes*, pining with *Hunger* and *Poverty*, no rare Character. The univerſal increaſing of *Selfiſhneſs*, unleſs we had more accurate Underſtandings to diſcern our *neceſt Intereſts*, would fill the World with univerſal *Rapine* and *War*. The Conſequences of either univerſally *abating*, or *increaſing* the Deſires between the *Sexes*, the *Love of Offspring*, or the ſeveral *Taſtes*

Sect. 6. *Taſtes* and *Fancies* in other Pleaſures, would perhaps be found more pernicious to the whole, than the preſent Conſtitution. What ſeems moſt truly wanting in our Nature, is greater *Knowledge*, *Attention* and *Conſideration:* had we a greater Perfection this way, and were evil *Habits*, and fooliſh *Aſſociations of Ideas* prevented, our *Paſſions* would appear in better order.

BUT while we feel in our ſelves ſo much *publick Affection* in the various Relations of Life, and obſerve the like in others; while we find every one deſiring indeed his *own Happineſs*, but capable of diſcerning, by a little Attention, that not only his external *Conveniency*, or *worldly Intereſt*, but even the moſt immediate and lively *Senſations of Delight*, of which his Nature is ſuſceptible, immediately flow from a *Publick Spirit*, a *generous*, *human*, *compaſſionate Temper*, and a ſuitable *Deportment*; while we obſerve ſo many Thouſands enjoying a tolerable State of *Eaſe* and *Safety*, for each one whoſe Condition is made *intolerable*, even during our preſent *Corruption:* How can any one look upon this World as under the Direction of an *evil Nature*, or even queſtion a perfectly *good* PROVIDENCE? How clearly does the *Order of our Nature* point out to us our true *Happineſs* and *Perfection*, and lead us to it as naturally as the ſeveral *Powers* of

the *Earth*, the *Sun*, and *Air*, bring *Plants* to their Growth, and the Perfection of their Kinds? We indeed are directed to it by our *Underſtanding* and *Affections*, as it becomes *rational* and *active Natures*; and *they* by *mechanick Laws*. We may ſee, that "*Attention* to the moſt *univer-* "*ſal Intereſt* of all ſenſitive Natures, is "the Perfection of each individual of Man- "kind:" That they ſhould thus be like well-tuned *Inſtruments*, affected with every *Stroke* or *Touch* upon any one. Nay, how much of this do we actually ſee in the World? What *generous Sympathy*, *Compaſſion*, and *Congratulation* with each other? Does not even the flouriſhing State of the *inanimate Parts of Nature*, fill us with joy? Is not thus *our Nature* admoniſhed, exhorted and commanded to cultivate *univerſal Goodneſs* and *Love*, by a *Voice heard thro' all the Earth, and Words ſounding to the Ends of the World*? Sect. 6.

TREATISE II.

ILLUSTRATIONS *upon the* MORAL SENSE.

THE Differences of Actions from which ſome are conſtituted *morally Good*, and others *morally Evil*, have always been accounted a very important Subject of Inquiry: And therefore, every Attempt to free this Subject from the uſual Cauſes of Error and Diſpute, the *Confuſion of ambiguous Words*, muſt be excuſable.

IN the following Diſcourſe, *Happineſs* denotes pleaſant *Senſation* of any kind, or a continued State of ſuch *Senſations*; and *Miſery* denotes the contrary *Senſations*. *Definitions.*

SUCH Actions as tend to procure Happineſs to the Agent, are called *privately uſeful*: and ſuch Actions as procure Miſery to the Agent, *privately hurtful*.

ACTIONS

ACTIONS procuring Happineſs to others may be called *publickly uſeful*, and the contrary Actions *publickly hurtful*. Some Actions may be both *publickly and privately uſeful*, and others both *publickly and privately hurtful*.

THESE different *natural Tendencies* of Actions are univerſally acknowledged; and in proportion to our *Reflection* upon human Affairs, we ſhall enlarge our Knowledge of theſe Differences.

Two Queſtions about Morality.

WHEN theſe *natural Differences* are known, it remains to be inquired into: 1ſt, "What *Quality* in any Action determines our *Election* of it rather than the "contrary?" Or, if the Mind determines itſelf, "What *Motives* or *Deſires* excite "to an Action, rather than the contrary, "or rather than to the *Omiſſion?*" 2dly, "What *Quality* determines our *Approba*"*tion* of one Action, rather than of the "contrary Action?"

THE Words *Election* and *Approbation* ſeem to denote ſimple Ideas known by *Conſciouſneſs*; which can only be explained by *ſynonymous Words*, or by concomitant or conſequent Circumſtances. *Election* is purpoſing to do an Action rather than its contrary, or than being inactive. *Approbation*

vation of our own Action denotes, or is attended with a Pleaſure in the *Contemplation* of it, and in *Reflection* upon the *Affections* which inclined us to it. *Approbation* of the Action of another is pleaſant, and is attended with *Love* toward the Agent.

THE *Qualities* moving to *Election*, or *exciting to Action*, are different from thoſe moving to *Approbation*: We often do Actions which we do not *approve*, and *approve* Actions which we *omit*: We often *deſire* that an Agent had omitted an Action which we *approve*; and *wiſh* he would do an Action which we *condemn*. *Approbation* is employed about the Actions of *others*, where there is no room for our Election.

NOW in our Search into the *Qualities* exciting either our *Election* or *Approbation*, let us conſider the ſeveral *Notions* advanced of moral Good and Evil in both theſe Reſpects; and what *Senſes*, *Inſtincts*, or *Affections*, muſt be neceſſarily ſuppoſed to account for our *Approbation* or Election.

THERE are two Opinions on this Subject entirely oppoſite: The one that of the old *Epicureans*, as it is beautifully explained in the firſt Book of *Cicero*, *De finibus*; *The Epicurean Opinion.*

finibus; which is revived by Mr. *Hobbes* and followed by many better Writers "That all the Deſires of the *human* "*Mind*, nay of all *thinking Natures*, "are reducible to *Self-Love*, or *Deſire of* "*private Happineſs*: That from this "Deſire all Actions of any Agent do flow." Our *Chriſtian Moraliſts* introduce other ſorts of Happineſs to be deſired, but ſtill "'tis the *Proſpect of private Happineſs*, "which, with ſome of them, is the ſole "*Motive of Election*. And that, in like "manner, what determines any Agent to "*approve* his own Action, is its *Tendency* "*to his private Happineſs* in the whole, "tho it may bring *preſent Pain* along "with it: That the *Approbation* of the "Action of another, is from an Opinion "of its Tendency to the Happineſs of the "*Approver*, either *immediately* or more "*remotely*: That each Agent may diſco- "ver it to be the ſureſt way to promote "his private Happineſs, to do *publickly* "*uſeful Actions*, and to abſtain from thoſe "which are *publickly hurtful*: That the "neglecting to obſerve this, and doing "*publickly hurtful Actions*, does miſchief "to the whole of Mankind, by hurting "any one part; that every one has ſome "little *damage* by this Action: Such an "*inadvertent Perſon* might poſſibly be "*pernicious* to any one, were he in his "Neighbourhood; and the very *Exam-*

"*ple*

"*ple* of ſuch Actions may extend over the "whole World, and produce ſome perni- "cious Effects upon any Obſerver. That therefore every one may look upon ſuch Actions as *hurtful to himſelf*, and in "this view does diſapprove them, and hates "the Agent. In the like manner, a *pub-* "*lickly uſeful Action* may diffuſe ſome "ſmall *Advantage* to every Obſerver, "whence he may *approve* it, and *love* "the Agent."

THIS Scheme can never account for the principal Actions of human Life †: Such as the *Offices of Friendſhip, Gratitude, natural Affection, Generoſity, publick Spirit, Compaſſion.* Men are conſcious of no ſuch Intentions or *acute Reflections* in theſe Actions. Ingenious ſpeculative Men, in their ſtraining to ſupport an *Hypotheſis*, may contrive a thouſand *ſubtle ſelfiſh Motives*, which a kind generous Heart never dreamed of. In like manner, this Scheme can never account for the ſudden *Approbation*, and violent *Senſe* of ſomething amiable in Actions done in diſtant Ages and Nations, while the Approver has perhaps never thought of theſe diſtant *Tendencies* to his Happineſs. Nor will it better account for our *want of Approbation*

Does not anſwer the Appearances.

† See *Treat.* 3. *Sect.* 1.

toward

toward *publickly uſeful Actions* done *caſually*, or only with Intention of *private Happineſs* to the Agent. And then, in theſe Actions reputed *generous*, if the Agent's Motive was only a view to his *own Pleaſure*, how come we to approve them more than his *enriching himſelf*, or his *gratifying his own Taſte* with good Food? The whole *Species* may receive a like Advantage from both, and the Obſerver an equal Share.

WERE our *Approbation* of Actions done in *diſtant Ages* and *Nations*, occaſioned by this Thought, that ſuch an Action done toward our ſelves would be uſeful to us, why don't we approve and love in like manner any Man who *finds a Treaſure*, or *indulges* himſelf in any exquiſite *Senſation*, ſince theſe Advantages or Pleaſures might be conferred on *our ſelves*; and tend more to *our Happineſs* than any Actions in diſtant Ages?

THE *Sanctions of Laws* may make any Agent chuſe the Action required, under the Conception of *uſeful* to himſelf, and lead him into an Opinion of *private Advantage* in it, and of detriment in the contrary Actions; but what ſhould determine any Perſon to approve the *Actions of others*, becauſe of a Conformity to a Law,

Law, if Approbation in any Perſon were only an Opinion of private Advantage?

THE other Opinion is this, "That we have not only *Self-Love*, but *benevolent Affections* alſo toward others, in various Degrees, making us deſire their Happineſs as an *ultimate End*, without any view to private Happineſs: That we have a *moral Senſe* or Determination of our Mind, to *approve* every *kind Affection* either in our ſelves or others, and all publickly uſeful Actions which we imagined do flow from ſuch Affection, without our having a view to our *private Happineſs*, in our Approbation of theſe Actions." *The oppoſite Opinion does plainly.*

THESE two Opinions ſeem both intelligible, each conſiſtent with itſelf. The former ſeems not to repreſent human Nature as it is; the other ſeems to do it.

THERE have been many *ways of ſpeaking* introduced, which ſeem to ſignify ſomething different from both the former Opinions. Such as theſe, that "Morality of Actions conſiſts in *Conformity to Reaſon, or Difformity from it*:" That "*Virtue* is acting according to the *abſolute Fitneſs and Unfitneſs of Things*, or agreeably to the "*Na-* *Schemes ſeemingly different from both.*

" *Natures* or *Relations* of Things," and many others in different Authors. To examine theſe is the Deſign of the following Sections; and to explain more fully how the *Moral Senſe* alledged to be in Mankind, muſt be preſuppoſed even in theſe Schemes.

SECT.

SECT. I.

Concerning the Character of Virtue, agreeable to Truth or Reaſon.

SINCE Reaſon is underſtood to denote our *Power of finding out true Propoſitions*, Reaſonableneſs muſt denote the ſame thing, with *Conformity to true Propoſitions, or to Truth.*

REASONABLENESS in an Action is a very common Expreſſion, but yet upon inquiry, it will appear very confuſed, whether we ſuppoſe it the Motive to *Election*, or the Quality determining *Approbation.*

THERE is one ſort of *Conformity to Truth* which neither determines to the one or the other; *viz.* that *Conformity which is between every true Propoſition and its Object.* This ſort of Conformity can never make us *chuſe* or *approve* one Action more than its contrary, for it is found in all Actions alike: Whatever *attribute* can be aſcribed to a *generous kind Action*, the *contrary Attribute* may as *truly* be aſcribed to a *ſelfiſh cruel Action:* Both Propoſitions are equally *true*, and the two contrary Actions, the Objects of the two *Conformity to Truth examined.*

Sect. 1. *Truths* are equally *conformable* to the ſeveral Truths, with that ſort of *Conformity* which is between a Truth and its Object. This *Conformity* then cannot make a Difference among Actions, or recommend one more than another either to *Election* or *Approbation*, ſince any Man may make as many Truths about Villany, as about Heroiſm, by aſcribing to it *contrary Attributes*.

For Inſtance, theſe are *Truths* concerning the *Preſervation* of *Property*. "It tends to the Happineſs of human So-"ciety: It incourages Induſtry: It ſhall "be rewarded by God." Theſe are alſo *Truths* concerning *Robbery*. "It diſturbs "Society: It diſcourages Induſtry: It ſhall "be puniſhed by God." The former *three Truths* have the *Preſervation of Property* for their *Object*; the *latter three* have *Robbery*. And each Claſs of Truths hath that ſort of *Conformity* to its Object, which is common to all Truths with their Objects. The *moral Difference* cannot therefore depend upon this *Conformity*, which is common to both.

The *Number* of Truths in both caſes may be plainly the ſame; ſo that a good Action cannot be ſuppoſed to agree to *more Truths* than an evil one, nor can an evil Action be diſagreeable to any *Truth* or *Com-*

Compages of Truths made about it; for whatever Propoſitions do not agree with their Objects are not Truths. Sect. 1.

IF *Reaſonableneſs*, the Character of Virtue, denote ſome other ſort of *Conformity* to Truth, it were to be wiſhed that theſe Gentlemen, who make it the original Idea of moral Good, antecedent to any *Senſe* or *Affections*, would explain it, and ſhew how it determines us antecedently to a Senſe, either to *Election* or *Approbation*.

THEY tell us, "we muſt have ſome "*Standard* antecedently to all *Senſe* or "*Affections*, ſince we judge even of our "Senſes and Affections themſelves, and "approve or diſapprove them: This "Standard muſt be our *Reaſon*, Conformi- "ty to which muſt be the original Idea of "moral Good."

BUT what is this *Conformity of Actions to Reaſon?* When we ask the Reaſon of an Action we ſometimes mean, "*What Truth* "*ſhews a Quality in the Action, exciting* "*the Agent to do it?*" Thus, why does a *Luxurious* Man purſue *Wealth?* The Reaſon is given by this Truth, "Wealth is "uſeful to purchaſe Pleaſures." Sometimes for a Reaſon of Actions we ſhew the *Truth expreſſing a Quality, engaging our Approbation.* Thus the *Reaſon* of hazard- *Reaſons either juſtifying or exciting.*

Sect. 1. ing Life in juſt War, is, that " it tends " to preſerve our honeſt Countrymen, or " evidences publick Spirit:" The *Reaſons* for *Temperance*, and againſt *Luxury* is given thus, " Luxury evidences a ſelfiſh " baſe Temper." The former ſort of Reaſons we will call *exciting*, and the latter *juſtifying*.* Now we ſhall find that all *exciting Reaſons* preſuppoſe *Inſtincts* and *Affections*; and the *juſtifying* preſuppoſe a *Moral Senſe*.

Exciting Reaſons ſuppoſe Affections.

As to *exciting Reaſons*, in every calm rational Action ſome *end* is deſired or intended; no end can be intended or deſired previouſly to ſome one of theſe Claſſes of Affections, *Self-Love*, *Self-Hatred*, or deſire of private Miſery, (if this be poſſible) *Benevolence* toward others, or *Malice*: All Affections are included under theſe; no *end* can be previous to them all; there can therefore be no *exciting Reaſon* previous to *Affection*.

We have indeed many confuſed Harangues on this Subject, telling us, " We " have two Principles of Action, *Reaſon*, " and *Affection*, or *Paſſion* (*i. e.* ſtrong " Affection): the *former* in common with

* Thus *Grotius* diſtinguiſhes the Reaſons of War, into the *Juſtificæ*, and *Suaſoriæ*.

Angels,

" Angels, the *latter* with Brutes: No Action is wiſe, or good, or reaſonable, to which we are not excited by *Reaſon*, as diſtinct from all *Affections*; or, if any ſuch Actions as flow from *Affections* be good, 'tis only by *chance*, or *materially* and not *formally*." As if indeed *Reaſon*, or the Knowledge of the Relations of things, could excite to Action when we propoſed no *End*, or as if *Ends* could be intended without *Deſire* or *Affection*. Sect. 1.

No exciting Reaſons for ultimate Ends.

BUT are there not alſo exciting Reaſons, even previous to any end, moving us to propoſe one end rather than another? To this *Ariſtotle* long ago anſwered, " that there are *ultimate Ends* deſired without a view to any thing elſe, and *ſubordinate Ends* or Objects deſired with a view to ſomething elſe." To *ſubordinate Ends* thoſe *Reaſons* or *Truths* excite, which ſhew them to be conducive to the *ultimate End*, and ſhew *one Object* to be more effectual than another: thus *ſubordinate Ends* may be called *reaſonable*. But as to the *ultimate Ends*, to ſuppoſe *exciting Reaſons* for them, would infer, that there is no *ultimate End*, but that we deſire one thing for another in an infinite Series.

THUS ask a Being who deſires *private Happineſs*, or has *Self-Love*? " what

Sect. 1. " Reaſon excites him to deſire Wealth." He will give this Reaſon, that " Wealth " tends to procure Pleaſure and Eaſe." Ask his Reaſon for deſiring Pleaſure or Happineſs: One cannot imagine what Propoſition he could aſſign as his *exciting Reaſon*. This Propoſition is indeed true, " There is an *Inſtinct* or *Deſire* fixed " in his Nature, determining him to " purſue his Happineſs;" but it is not this *Reflection* on his own Nature, or this *Propoſition* which excites or determines him, but the *Inſtinct itſelf*. This is a Truth, " *Rhubarb* ſtrengthens the Sto- " mach:" But 'tis not a *Propoſition* which ſtrengthens the Stomach, but the *Quality* in that Medicine. The Effect is not produced by *Propoſitions* ſhewing the *Cauſe*, but by the *Cauſe* itſelf.

In like manner, what *Reaſon* can a benevolent Being give, as exciting him to hazard his Life in juſt War? This perhaps, " ſuch Conduct tends to the Happineſs of " his Country." Ask him, " why he " ſerves his Country?" he will ſay, " His " Country is a very valuable Part of Man- " kind." Why does he ſtudy the Happineſs of Mankind? If his Affections be really *diſintereſted*, he can give no *exciting Reaſons* for it: The Happineſs of Mankind in general, or of any valuable Part of it, is an *ultimate End* to that Series of Deſires.

We

Sect. 1.

Men have many ultimate Ends.

WE may tranſiently obſerve one Miſtake which many fall into, who in their Philoſophical Inquiries have learned to form very *abſtract general Ideas*: They ſuppoſe, becauſe they have formed ſome Conception of an *infinite Good*, or *greateſt poſſible Aggregate*, or *Sum of Happineſs*, under which all *particular Pleaſures* may be included; that there is alſo ſome *one great ultimate End*, with a view to which every *particular Object* is deſired; whereas, in truth, each *particular Pleaſure* is deſired without farther view, as an ultimate End in the *ſelfiſh Deſires*. 'Tis true, the *Proſpect* of a greater inconſiſtent Pleaſure may ſurmount or ſtop this Deſire; ſo may the *Fear* of a prepollent Evil. But this does not prove, that "all Men have formed "Ideas of *infinite Good*, or *greateſt poſ-* "*ſible Aggregate*, or that they have any "*Inſtinct* or *Deſire*, without an Idea of "its Object." Juſt ſo in the *benevolent* Affections, the Happineſs of any one Perſon is an *ultimate End*, deſired with no farther view: And yet the obſerving its *Inconſiſtency* with the Happineſs of another more beloved, or with the Happineſs of *many*, tho each one of them were but equally beloved, may overcome the former Deſire. Yet this will not prove, that in each *kind Action* Men do form the abſtract Conception of *all Mankind*, or the *Syſtem of Rationals*.

The

Sect. 1. The forming ſuch large Conceptions is indeed uſeful, that ſo we may gratify either our *Self-Love* or *kind Affections* in the fulleſt manner, as far as our Power extends; and may not content our ſelves with ſmaller Degrees either of *private* or *publick Good*; while greater are in our power: But when we have formed theſe *Conceptions*, we do not ſerve the *Individual* only from Love to the *Species*, no more than we deſire *Grapes* with an Intention of the *greateſt Aggregate* of Happineſs, or from an Apprehenſion that they make a Part of the *General ſum* of our Happineſs. Theſe Conceptions only ſerve to ſuggeſt *greater Ends* than would occur to us without Reflection; and by the *Prepollency* of one Deſire toward the *greater Good*, either private or publick, to ſtop the Deſire toward the *ſmaller Good*, when it appears inconſiſtent with the greater.

The common Reaſons examined.

LET US examine the Truths aſſigned as *exciting* to the Purſuit of publick Good, even by thoſe, who, tho they allow *diſintereſted Affections*, and a *moral Senſe*, yet ſuppoſe ſomething *reaſonable* in it antecedently. They aſſign ſuch as theſe "publick Good "is the End propoſed by the DEITY." Then what *Reaſon* excites Men to concur with the DEITY? Is it this, "Concurring "with the DEITY will make the Agent "*happy*?" This is an *exciting Reaſon* indeed,

deed, but plainly ſuppoſes *Self-Love*: And let any one aſſign the *exciting Reaſon* to the Deſire of Happineſs. Is the Reaſon exciting to concur with the DEITY this, "The DEITY is our *Benefactor*?" Then what *Reaſon excites* to concur with Benefactors? Here we muſt recur to an *Inſtinct*. Is it this Truth, "The divine Ends are "*reaſonable Ends*?" Then what means the Word [*reaſonable*?] Does it mean, that "the Deity has *Reaſons* exciting "him to promote the publick Good?" What are theſe *Reaſons*? Why, perhaps "we "do not know them particularly, but in "general are ſure that the DEITY has "Reaſons for them." Then the Queſtion recurs, What Reaſon excites us to *implicit Concurrence* with the Ends of the DEITY? The Reaſons which excite *one Nature* may not excite another: The Tendency of an Action to the *Happineſs of one Agent* may excite him, but will not excite another *Agent* to concur, unleſs there appears a like Tendency to the Happineſs of that *other*. They may ſay, "they are ſure "the *divine Ends* are good." What means *Goodneſs*? Is it *moral* or *natural*? If the divine Ends be *natural Good*, i. e. *pleaſant*, or the *Cauſe of Pleaſure*, to whom is this *Pleaſure*? If to the DEITY, then why do we ſtudy the Happineſs or the pleaſing of the DEITY? What *Reaſon* excites us? All the poſſible Reaſons muſt Sect. 1.

either

Sect. 1. either preſuppoſe ſome *Affection*, if they are exciting; or ſome *moral Senſe*, if they are juſtifying. —— Is the divine End naturally good to us? This is an exciting Reaſon, but ſuppoſes *Self-Love*. If we ſay the divine Ends are *morally Good*, we are juſt where we began. What is *moral Goodneſs*? *Conformity to Reaſon*. What are the *Reaſons exciting* or *juſtifying*?

If any alledg as the Reaſon *exciting* us to purſue publick Good, this Truth, that "the Happineſs of a *Syſtem*, a *Thouſand*, "or a *Million*, is a greater Quantity of "Happineſs than that of *one Perſon*: "and conſequently, if Men deſire Happineſs, they muſt have ſtronger Deſires "toward the *greater Sum*, than toward "the *leſs*." This Reaſon ſtill ſuppoſes an *Inſtinct toward Happineſs* as previous to it: And again, To *whom* is the Happineſs of a Syſtem a greater Happineſs? To one *Individual*, or to the *Syſtem*? If to the Individual, then his Reaſon exciting his Deſire of a *happy Syſtem* ſuppoſes *Self-Love*: If to the *Syſtem*, then what *Reaſon* can excite to deſire the greater *Happineſs of a Syſtem*, or any *Happineſs* to be in the Poſſeſſion of *others*? None ſurely which does not preſuppoſe *publick Affections*. Without ſuch *Affections* this Truth, "that an hundred Felicities is a "greater Sum than one Felicity," will no more

more excite to ſtudy the Happineſs of the *Hundred*, than this Truth, "an hundred Stones are greater than one," will excite a Man, who has no *deſire of Heaps*, to call them together. Sect. 1.

THE ſame may be obſerved concerning that *Propoſition*, aſſigned by ſome as the *ultimate Reaſon* both *exciting* to, and *juſtifying* the Purſuit of publick Good, *viz.* "*It is beſt that all ſhould be happy.*" *Beſt* is moſt good: Good to whom? To the *Whole*, or to each *Individual?* If to the *former*, when this Truth excites to Action, it muſt preſuppoſe *kind Affections*; if it is good to each *Individual*, it muſt ſuppoſe *Self-Love.*

LET us once ſuppoſe *Affections*, *Inſtincts* or *Deſires* previouſly implanted in our Nature: and we ſhall eaſily underſtand the *exciting Reaſons* for Actions, *viz.* "Theſe "Truths which ſhew them to be conducive toward ſome *ultimate End*, or toward the *greateſt End* of that kind in our Power." He acts *reaſonably*, who conſiders the various Actions in his Power, and forms *true Opinions* of their *Tendencies*; and then chuſes to do that which will obtain the higheſt Degree of *that*, to which the *Inſtincts* of his Nature incline him, with the ſmalleſt Degree of thoſe things to which *The true Meaning of Reaſons exciting to Actions, and reaſonable Actions.*

Sect. 1. which the *Affections* in this Nature make him averſe.

MORE particularly, the *exciting Reaſons* to a Nature which had only *ſelfiſh Affections*, are thoſe Truths which ſhewed "what Object or Event would occaſion "to it the greateſt Quantity of *Pleaſure*:" theſe would excite to the Proſecution of it. The *exciting Truths* about *Means*, would be only thoſe which pointed out ſome Means as more certainly effectual than any other, or with leſs *Pain* or *Trouble* to the *Agent*. *Publick Uſefulneſs* of *Ends* or *Means*, or *publick Hurtfulneſs* would neither excite nor diſſuade, farther than the *publick State* might affect *that* of the Agent.

IF there is any Nature with *publick Affections*: The Truths exciting to any *End* in this Order, are ſuch as ſhew, "that "any Event would promote the Happi-"neſs of others." That *End* is called moſt *reaſonable*, which our Reaſon diſcovers to contain a greater Quantity of *publick Good*, than any other in our power.

WHEN any Event may affect both the *Agent* and *others*, if the Agent have both *Self-Love* and *publick Affections*, he acts according to that Affection which is *ſtrongeſt*, when there is any *Oppoſition* of Intereſts; if

if there be no Oppoſition, he follows both. Sect. 1.
If he diſcovers this Truth, that "his conſtant purſuit of *publick Good* is the moſt "probable way of promoting his *own* "*Happineſs*," then his Purſuit is truly reaſonable and conſtant; thus both Affections are at once gratify'd, and he is conſiſtent with himſelf. Without knowledge of that Truth he does not act *reaſonably* for his own Happineſs, but follows it by *Means* not tending effectually to this *End*: and muſt frequently, from the Power of *Self-Love*, neglect or counteract his other *End*, the *publick Good*. If there be alſo a *moral Senſe* in ſuch an Agent; while yet he is inadvertent to the *Connexion* of *private Happineſs* with the *Study of the publick*; he muſt be perpetually yet more uneaſy, either thro' the apprehended *Neglect of private Intereſt* when he ſerves the Publick; or when he purſues only *private Intereſt*, he will have perpetual *Remorſe* and *Diſſatisfaction* with his own Temper, thro' his *moral Senſe*. So that the Knowledge of this *Connexion* of private Intereſt, with the Study of publick Good, ſeems abſolutely neceſſary to preſerve a conſtant *Satisfaction* of Mind, and to prevent an *alternate Prevalence* of ſeemingly contrary Deſires.

SHOULD any one aſk even concerning theſe two *ultimate Ends*, *private Good* and

Sect. 1. and *publick*, is not the latter more *reaſonable* than the former? What means the Word *reaſonable* in this Queſtion? If we are allowed to preſuppoſe *Inſtincts* and *Affections*, then the Truth juſt now ſuppoſed to be diſcoverable concerning our State, is an *exciting Reaſon* to *ſerve the publick Intereſt*, ſince this Conduct is the moſt *effectual Means* to obtain both ends. But I doubt if any Truth can be aſſigned which *excites* in us either the Deſire of *private Happineſs* or *publick*. For the *former* none ever alledged any *exciting Reaſon:* and a *benevolent Temper* finds as little *Reaſon exciting* him to the latter; which he deſires without any view to *private Good*. If the meaning of the Queſtion be this, "does not every *Spectator ap-* "*prove* the Purſuit of publick Good more "than private?". The Anſwer is obvious that he does: but not for any *Reaſon* or *Truth*, but from a *moral Senſe*.

THIS leads to conſider *Approbation* of Actions, whether it be for *Conformity to any Truth*, or *Reaſonableneſs*, that Actions are ultimately approved independently of any *moral Senſe*? Or if all *juſtifying Reaſons* do not preſuppoſe it?

Juſtifying Reaſons ſuppoſe a moral Senſe.

IF *Conformity to Truth*, or *Reaſonable*, denote nothing elſe but that "an Action "is the *Object of a true Propoſition*," 'tis

plain, that all Actions ſhould be approved equally, ſince as many Truths may be made about the worſt, as can be made about the beſt. See what was ſaid above about exciting Reaſons. Sect. 1.

But let the *Truths* commonly aſſigned as *juſtifying* be examined. Here 'tis plain, "*A Truth ſhewing an Action to be fit to* "*attain an End*," does not juſtify it; nor do we approve a *ſubordinate End* for any Truth, which only ſhews it to be fit to promote the *ultimate End*; for the worſt Actions may be conducive to their *Ends*, and *reaſonable* in that Senſe. The *juſtifying Reaſons* then muſt be about the *Ends* themſelves, eſpecially the *ultimate Ends*. The Queſtion then is, "Does a *Confor-* "*mity to any Truth* make us *approve* an "*ultimate End*, previouſly to any *moral* "*Senſe*?" For example, we approve *purſuing the publick Good*. For what *Reaſon*? or what is the *Truth* for Conformity to which we call it a *reaſonable End*? I fanſy we can find none in theſe Caſes, more than we could give for our liking any *pleaſant Fruit*.

The Reaſons aſſigned are ſuch as theſe; "*'Tis the End propoſed by the* Deity." But why do we *approve* concurring with the divine Ends? This Reaſon is given, "*He is our Benefactor:*" But then, for

Sect. I. what *Reaſon* do we approve *Concurrence with a Benefactor*? Here we muſt recur to a *Senſe*: Is this the Reaſon moving to *Approbation*, "*Study of publick Good tends* "*to the Advantage of the Approver*?" Then the Quality moving us to *approve* an Action, is its being *advantageous to us*, and not *Conformity to a Truth*. This Scheme is intelligible, but not true in fact. Men *approve* without Perception of *private Advantage*; and often do not *condemn or diſapprove* what is plainly pernicious; as in the Execution of a *juſt Sentence*, which even the Criminal may *approve*.

IF any allege, that this is the *juſtifying Reaſon* of the *Purſuit of publick Good*, "*that it is beſt all be happy*," then we approve Actions for their *Tendency to that State which is beſt*, and not for *Conformity to Reaſon*. But here again, what means *beſt*? *morally beſt*, or *naturally beſt*? If the *former*, they explain the ſame Word by itſelf in a Circle: If they mean the *latter*, that "it is the moſt happy State "where all are happy," then, *moſt happy*, for whom? the *Syſtem*, or the *Individual*? If for the *former*, what Reaſon makes us *approve the Happineſs of a Syſtem*? Here we muſt recur to a *Senſe* or *kind Affections*. Is it moſt happy for the *Individual*? Then the Quality moving *Approbation* is

again *Tendency to private Happineſs*, not *Reaſonableneſs*. Sect. 1.

THERE are ſome other *Reaſons* aſſigned in Words differing from the former, but more confuſed, ſuch as theſe: "*'Tis our Duty to ſtudy publick Good. We are obliged to do it. We owe Obedience to the Deity. The whole is to be preferred to a Part.*" But let theſe Words *Duty*, *Obligation*, *Owing*, and the meaning of that Gerund, *is to be preferred*, be explained; and we ſhall find our ſelves ſtill at a Loſs for *exciting Reaſons* previouſly to *Affections*, or *juſtifying Reaſons* without recourſe to a *moral Senſe*. *Obligation ſuppoſes either Affections or a moral Senſe.*

WHEN we ſay one is obliged to an Action, we either mean, 1. *That the Action is neceſſary to obtain Happineſs to the Agent, or to avoid Miſery*: Or, 2. *That every Spectator, or he himſelf upon Reflection, muſt approve his Action, and diſapprove his omitting it, if he conſiders fully all its Circumſtances.* The former Meaning of the Word *Obligation* preſuppoſes *ſelfiſh Affections*, and the *Senſes of private Happineſs*: The latter Meaning includes the *moral Senſe*. Mr. *Barbeyrac*, in his Annotations upon *Grotius* *: *The meaning of Obligation.*

* *Lib.* 1. *Chap.* 1. *Sect.* 10.

Sect. 1. makes *Obligation* denote an *indiſpenſable Neceſſity to act in a certain manner.* Whoever obſerves his Explication of this *Neceſſity*, (which is not *natural*, otherwiſe no Man could act againſt his Obligation) will find that it denotes only "ſuch "a Conſtitution of a powerful Superior, "as will make it impoſſible for any Being "to obtain *Happineſs*, or avoid *Miſery*, "but by ſuch a Courſe of Action." This agrees with the former Meaning, tho ſometimes he alſo includes the latter.

MANY other confuſed Definitions have been given of Obligation, by no obſcure Names in the learned World. But let any one give a diſtinct Meaning, different from the two above-mentioned. To purſue them all would be endleſs; only let the *Definitions* be ſubſtituted in place of the Word OBLIGATION, in other parts of each Writer, and let it be obſerved whether it makes good Senſe or not.

Arguments for ſome Standard of Morals prior to a Senſe conſidered.

BEFORE we quit this Character *Reaſonableneſs*, let us conſider the Arguments brought to prove that there muſt be ſome Standard of moral Good antecedent to any Senſe. Say they, "*Perceptions of* "*Senſe* are deceitful, we muſt have ſome "Perception or Idea of *Virtue* more ſtable "and certain; this muſt be *Conformity to* "*Reaſon*; *Truth* diſcovered by our *Rea-*

"*ſon*

" *ſon* is certain and invariable: *That* Sect. 1.
" then alone is the Original Idea of Virtue,
" *Agreement with Reaſon.*" But in like manner our *Sight* and *Senſe of Beauty* is deceitful, and does not always repreſent the true *Forms* of Objects. We muſt not call that *beautiful* or *regular*, which pleaſes the *Sight*, or an *internal Senſe*; but Beauty in external Forms too, conſiſts in *Conformity* to *Reaſon*. So our *Taſte* may be vitiated: we muſt not ſay that *Savour* is perceived by *Taſte*, but muſt place the original Idea of *grateful Savours* in *Conformity to Reaſon*, and of *ungrateful* in *Contrariety to Reaſon*. We may miſtake the real *Extent* of Bodies, or their *Proportions*, by making a Concluſion upon the firſt ſenſible Appearance: Therefore *Ideas of Extenſion* are not originally acquired by a *Senſe*, but conſiſt in *Conformity to Reaſon*.

IF what is intended in this Conformity to Reaſon be this, " That we ſhould call " no Action *virtuous*, unleſs we have " ſome *Reaſon* to conclude it to be virtu- " ous, or ſome *Truth* ſhewing it to be ſo." This is very true; but then in like manner we ſhould count no Action *vicious*, unleſs we have ſome *Reaſon* for counting it ſo, or when 'tis *Truth* " that it is vicious." If this be intended by *Conformity to Truth*, then at the ſame rate we may make *Conformity to Truth* the original Idea of *Vice*

Sect. 1. as well as *Virtue*; nay, of every Attribute whatſoever. That *Taſte* alone is *ſweet*, which there is *Reaſon* to count *ſweet*; that Taſte alone is *bitter* concerning which 'tis *true* that it is *bitter*; that Form alone is *beautiful*, concerning which 'tis true that it is *beautiful*; and that alone *deformed*, which is truly *deformed*. Thus *Virtue*, *Vice*, *Sweet*, *Bitter*, *Beautiful*, *or Deformed*, originally denote *Conformity to Reaſon*, antecedently to Perceptions of any *Senſe*. The *Idea of Virtue* is particularly that concerning which 'tis *Truth*, that it is *Virtue*; or *Virtue* is *Virtue*; a wonderful Diſcovery!

So when ſome tell us, "that Truth is "naturally pleaſant, and more ſo than "any *ſenſible Perception*; this muſt "therefore engage Men more than any "other Motive, if they attend to it." Let them obſerve, that as much *Truth* is known about *Vice* as *Virtue*. We may *demonſtrate* the publick *Miſeries* which would enſue upon *Perjury*, *Murder*, and *Robbery*. Theſe Demonſtrations would be attended with that *Pleaſure* which is peculiar to *Truth*; as well as the Demonſtrations of the publick Happineſs to enſue from *Faith*, *Humanity and Juſtice*. There is equal Truth on both ſides.

We

Sect. 1.

Whence it is that Virtue is called reaſonable and not Vice.

WE may tranſiently obſerve what has occaſioned the Uſe of the Word *reaſonable*, as an Epithet of only *virtuous Actions*. Tho we have *Inſtincts* determining us to deſire *Ends* without ſuppoſing any previous *Reaſoning*; yet 'tis by uſe of our *Reaſon* that we find out the Means of obtaining our *Ends*. When we do not uſe our Reaſon, we often are diſappointed of our End. We therefore call thoſe Actions which are *effectual* to their Ends, *reaſonable* in one Senſe of that Word.

AGAIN, in all Men there is probably a *moral Senſe*, making publickly uſeful Actions and kind Affections *grateful* to the Agent, and to every Obſerver: Moſt Men who have thought of human Actions, agree, that the *publickly uſeful* are in the whole alſo *privately uſeful* to the Agent, either in this Life or the next: We conclude, that all Men have the *ſame Affections and Senſes*: We are convinced by our Reaſon, that 'tis by publickly uſeful Actions alone that we can promote *all our Ends*. Whoever then acts in a contrary manner, we preſume is *miſtaken, ignorant of*, or *inadvertent* to, theſe Truths which he might know; and ſay he acts *unreaſonably*. Hence ſome have been led to imagine, ſome *Reaſons* either exciting or juſti-

Sect. 1. justifying previously to all *Affections* or a *moral Sense.*

Objections from our judging even of our Affections and Senses themselves.

TWO Arguments are brought in defense of this Epithet, as antecedent to any Sense, *viz.* "That we judge even of "our *Affections* and *Senses* themselves, "whether they are *morally Good* or *Evil.*"

THE second Argument is, that "if "all *moral Ideas* depend upon the *Consti-* "*tution* of our *Sense*, then all *Constitu-* "*tions* would have been alike reasonable "and good to the DEITY, which is ab- "surd."

1. That we judge our Senses themselves.

AS to the first Argument, 'tis plain we judge of our own *Affections*, or those of others by our *moral Sense*, by which we approve kind Affections, and disapprove the contrary. Bnt none can apply *moral Attributes* to the very *Faculty* of perceiving *moral Qualities*; or call his *moral Sense morally Good* or *Evil*, any more than he calls the *Power of Tasting*, *sweet*, or *bitter*; or of *Seeing*, *strait* or *crooked*, *white* or *black.*

Answered.

EVERY one judges the *Affections* of others by his own *Sense*; so that it seems not impossible that in these *Senses* Men might differ as they do in *Taste*. A *Sense approving Benevolence* would disapprove

that

that Temper, which a *Senſe approving* Sect. 1.
Malice would delight in. The *former* would judge of the *latter* by his *own Senſe*, ſo would the *latter* of the *former*. Each one would at firſt view think the *Senſe* of the other perverted. But then, is there no difference? Are both Senſes equally *good*? No certainly, any *Man* who obſerved them would think the *Senſe* of the *former* more deſirable than of the *latter*; but this is, becauſe the *moral Senſe* of every *Man* is conſtituted in the former manner. But were there any Nature with no *moral Senſe* at all obſerving theſe two Perſons, would he not think the State of the *former* preferable to that of the *latter*? Yes, he might: but not from any Perception of *moral Goodneſs* in the one *Senſe* more than in the other. Any rational Nature obſerving two Men thus conſtituted, with *oppoſite Senſes*, might by reaſoning ſee, not *moral Goodneſs* in one *Senſe* more than in the contrary, but a *Tendency to the Happineſs of the Perſon himſelf*, who had the former *Senſe* in the one Conſtitution, and a *contrary Tendency* in the oppoſite *Conſtitution*: nay, the Perſons themſelves might obſerve this; ſince the *former Senſe* would make theſe Actions grateful to the Agent which were uſeful to others; who, if they had a like Senſe, would *love* him, and return *good Offices*; whereas the *latter Senſe* would make all ſuch Actions as are *uſeful*

to

Sect. 1. *to others*, and apt to engage their *good Offices*, ungrateful to the Agent; and would lead him into *publickly hurtful Actions*, which would not only procure the Hatred of others, if they had a *contrary Senſe*, but engage them out of their *Self-Love* to ſtudy his *Deſtruction*, tho their *Senſes* agreed. Thus any *Obſerver*, or the *Agent* himſelf with this *latter Senſe*, might perceive that the *Pains* to be feared, as the Conſequence of *malicious Actions*, did over-ballance the *Pleaſures* of this *Senſe*; ſo that it would be to the Agent's *Intereſt* to counteract it. Thus one Conſtitution of the *moral Senſe* might appear to be more *advantageous* to thoſe who had it, than the contrary; as we may call that Senſe of Taſting *healthful*, which made wholeſom Meat pleaſant; and we would call a contrary *Taſte pernicious*. And yet we ſhould no more call the moral Senſe *morally good* or *evil*, than we call the *Senſe of Taſting ſavoury* or *unſavoury*, *ſweet* or *bitter*.

But muſt we not own, that we judge of all our *Senſes* by our *Reaſon*, and often correct their *Reports* of the *Magnitude*, *Figure*, *Colour*, *Taſte* of Objects, and pronounce them *right* or *wrong*, as they agree or diſagree with *Reaſon*? This is true. But does it then follow, that *Extenſion*, *Figure*, *Colour*, *Taſte* are not *ſen-*

ſenſible Ideas, but only denote *Reaſonableneſs*, or *Agreement with Reaſon*? Or that theſe Qualities are perceivable antecedently to any *Senſe*, by our *Power of finding out Truth*? Juſt ſo a *compaſſionate Temper* may raſhly imagine the *Correction of a Child*, or the *Execution of a Criminal*, to be cruel and inhuman: but by *reaſoning* may diſcover the *ſuperior Good* ariſing from them in the whole; and then the ſame *moral Senſe* may determine the Obſerver to approve them. But we muſt not hence conclude, that it is any *reaſoning* antecedent to a *moral Senſe*, which determines us to *approve* the Study of publick Good, any more than we can in the former Caſe conclude, that we perceive *Extenſion*, *Figure*, *Colour*, *Taſte*, antecedently to a Senſe. All theſe Senſations are often corrected by *Reaſoning*, as well as our *Approbations* of Actions as *Good* or *Evil**: and yet no body ever placed the *Original Idea* of *Extenſion*, *Figure*, *Colour*, or *Taſte*, in *Conformity to Reaſon*. Sect. 1.

THUS tho no Man can immediately either *approve* or *diſapprove* as *morally good or evil* his own *moral Senſe*, by which he approves only *Affections* and *Actions* conſequent upon them; yet he

* See Sect. 4. of this Treatiſe.

may

Sect. 1. may ſee whether it be *advantageous* to him in other reſpects, to have it conſtituted *one way* rather than another. *One Conſtitution* may make theſe Actions grateful to this Senſe which tend to procure *other Pleaſures* alſo. A *contrary Conſtitution* may be known to the very Perſon himſelf to be *diſadvantageous*, as making theſe Actions *immediately grateful*, which ſhall occaſion all *other ſorts* of Miſery. His *Self-Love* may excite him, tho with inward *Diſſatisfaction*, to counteract this Senſe, in order to avoid a greater *Evil*. Mr. *Hobbes* ſeems to have had no better Notions of the *natural State* of Mankind. An Obſerver, who was *benevolent*, would deſire that all had the former ſort of *Senſe*; a *malicious Obſerver*, if he feared no *Evil to himſelf*, from the Actions of the Perſons obſerved, would deſire the *latter Conſtitution*. If this Obſerver had a *moral Senſe*, he would think that *Conſtitution* which was contrary to *his own*, *ſtrange* and *ſurprizing*, or *unnatural*. If the Obſerver had no *Affections* toward others, and were disjoined from Mankind, ſo as to have neither *Hopes* nor *Fears* from their Actions, he would be indifferent about their *Conſtitutions*, and have no *Deſire* or *Preference* of one above another; tho he might ſee which were *advantageous* to them, and which pernicious.

As

Sect. 1.

As to the ſecond Argument, What means [*alike reaſonable or good to the* DEITY?] Does it mean, "that the "DEITY could have had no *Reaſons* "*exciting* him to make one Conſtitution "rather than another?" 'Tis plain, if the DEITY had nothing *eſſential to his Nature*, correſponding to our *ſweeteſt* and *moſt kind Affections*, we can ſcarce ſuppoſe he could have any *Reaſon exciting* him to any thing he has done: but grant ſuch a *Diſpoſition* in the DEITY, and then the manifeſt *Tendency of the preſent Conſtitution to the Happineſs of his Creatures* was an exciting Reaſon for chuſing it before the contrary. Each ſort of Conſtitution might have given Men an equal *immediate Pleaſure* in preſent *Self-Approbation* for any ſort of Action; but the Actions approved by the *preſent Senſe*, procure all *Pleaſures* of the *other Senſes*; and the Actions which would have been approved by a *contrary moral Senſe*, would have been productive of all *Torments of the other Senſes*.

The 2d Objection, that all Conſtitutions would have been alike reaſonable, anſwered.

IF it be meant, that "*upon this Sup-* "*poſition, that all our Approbation pre-* "*ſuppoſes in us a moral Senſe, the* DEITY "*could not have approved one Conſtitution* "*more than another:*" where is the Conſequence? Why may not the Deity have ſomething

Sect. I. ſomething of a ſuperior Kind, analogous to our *moral Senſe*, eſſential to him? How does any Conſtitution of the *Senſes of Men* hinder the DEITY to reflect and judge of his own Actions? How does it affect the divine Apprehenſion, which way ſoever *moral Ideas* ariſe with Men?

IF it means "*that we cannot approve* "*of one Conſtitution more than another*, "*or approve the* DEITY *for making the* "preſent Conſtitution:" This Conſequence is alſo falſe. The *preſent Conſtitution* of our *moral Senſe* determines us to approve all *kind Affections*: This Conſtitution the DEITY muſt have foreſeen as *tending* to the *Happineſs* of his Creatures; it does therefore evidence *kind Affection* or *Benevolence* in the DEITY, this therefore we muſt *approve*.

The meaning of antecedent Reaſonableneſs.

WE have got ſome ſtrange Phraſes, "*that ſome things are antecedently reaſo-* "*nable in the Nature of the thing*," which ſome inſiſt upon: "That otherwiſe, "ſay they, if before Man was created, "any Nature *without a moral Senſe* had "exiſted, this Nature would not have ap- "proved as morally good in the Deity, "his conſtituting our Senſe as it is at pre- "ſent." Very true; and what next? If there had been no *moral Senſe* in that Nature, there would have been no *Perception of*

of Morality. But " could not ſuch Na- Sect. 1.
" tures have ſeen ſomething *reaſonable* in
" one Conſtitution more than in another ?"
They might no doubt have *reaſoned* about the various *Conſtitutions*, and foreſeen that the *preſent one* would tend to the *Happineſs* of Mankind, and would evidence *Benevolence* in the DEITY: So alſo they might have *reaſoned* about the *contrary Conſtitution*, that it would make Men miſerable, and evidence *Malice* in the Deity. They would have *reaſoned* about *both*, and found out *Truths*: are both Conſtitutions alike *reaſonable* to theſe Obſervers ? No, ſay they, " the *benevolent* one is *reaſona-*
" *ble*, and the *malicious unreaſonable*:"
And yet theſe Obſervers *reaſoned* and *diſcovered Truths* about both: An Action then is called by us *reaſonable* when 'tis *benevolent*, and *unreaſonable* when *malicious*. This is plainly making the Word *reaſonable* denote whatever is *approved* by our moral Senſe, without Relation to *true Propoſitions*. We often uſe that Word in ſuch a confuſed Manner: But theſe *antecedent Natures*, ſuppoſed without a *moral Senſe*, would not have *approved* one Conſtitution of the DEITY as *morally* better than another.

HAD it been left to the Choice of theſe *antecedent Minds*, what *manner of Senſe*

Sect. 1. they would have deſired for Mankind; would they have ſeen no *difference*? Yes they would, according to their *Affections* which are preſuppoſed in all *Election*. If they were *benevolent*, as we ſuppoſe the DEITY, the *Tendency of the preſent Senſe to the Happineſs of Men* would have excited their Choice. Had they been *malicious*, as we ſuppoſe the Devil, the *contrary Tendency* of the *contrary Senſe* would have excited their *Election* of it. But is there nothing *preferable*, or *eligible* antecedently to all *Affections* too? No certainly, unleſs there can be *Deſire* without *Affections*, or *ſuperior Deſire*, *i. e.* Election antecedently to all *Deſire*.

Reaſons for Election different from thoſe for Approbation.

SOME do farther perplex this Subject, by aſſerting, that "the ſame *Reaſons* determining *Approbation*, ought alſo to excite to *Election*." Here, 1. We often ſee *juſtifying Reaſons* where we can have no *Election*; *viz.* when we obſerve the *Actions of others*, which were even prior to our *Exiſtence*. 2. The Quality moving us to *Election* very often cannot excite *Approbation*; viz. *private uſefulneſs*, not publickly pernicious. This both does and *ought* to move *Election*, and yet I believe few will ſay, "they *approve* as virtuous "the *eating a Bunch of Grapes*, taking a "*Glaſs of Wine*, or *ſitting down* when "one

" one is tired." *Approbation* is not what we can *voluntarily* bring upon our ſelves. When we are contemplating Actions, we do not *chuſe* to approve, becauſe *Approbation* is pleaſant; otherwiſe we would always approve, and never condemn any Action; becauſe this is ſome way uneaſy. *Approbation* is plainly a *Perception* ariſing without previous *Volition*, or Choice of it, becauſe of any *concomitant Pleaſure*. The Occaſion of it is the *Perception of benevolent Affections* in our ſelves, or the diſcovering the like in others, even when we are incapable of any *Action* or *Election*. The *Reaſons* determining *Approbation* are ſuch as ſhew that an Action evidenced *kind Affections*, and that in *others*, as often as in *our ſelves*. Whereas, the *Reaſons* moving to Election are ſuch as ſhew the *Tendency of an Action to gratify ſome Affection* in the Agent. Sect. 1.

THE *Proſpect* of the Pleaſure of *Self-Approbation*, is indeed often a Motive to *chuſe* one Action rather than another; but this ſuppoſes the *moral Senſe*, or Determination to *approve*, prior to the *Election*. Were Approbation *voluntarily* choſen, from the Proſpect of its concomitant Pleaſure, then there could

Sect. 1. be no *Condemnation* of our own Actions, for that is unpleaſant.

As to that confuſed Word [ought] 'tis needleſs to apply to it again all that was ſaid about *Obligation*.

SECT.

SECT. II.

Concerning that Character of Virtue *and* Vice, *The* Fitneſs *or* Unfitneſs of Actions.

WE come next to examine ſome other Explications of Morality, which have been much inſiſted on of late. * We are told, "that there are *eternal and immutable Differences* of Things, abſolutely "and antecedently: that there are alſo "*eternal and unalterable Relations* in "the Natures of the Things themſelves, "from which ariſe *Agreements* and *Diſagreements*, *Congruities* and *Incongruities*, *Fitneſs* and *Unfitneſs* of the *Application of Circumſtances*, to the *Qualifications of Perſons*; that Actions "*agreeable to theſe Relations are morally Good*, and that the *contrary* Actions are "*morally Evil.*" Theſe Expreſſions are ſometimes made of the ſame Import with thoſe more common ones: "*acting agreeably to the eternal Reaſon and Truth*

The Fitneſs and Unfitneſs *in Morals.*

* See Dr. *Samuel Clarke's Boyle's* Lectures; and many late Authors.

Sect. 1. " *of Things.*" 'Tis aſſerted, that " God " who knows all theſe *Relations*, &c. " does guide his Actions by them, ſince " he has no wrong Affection" (the Word [wrong] ſhould have been firſt explained) : " And that in like manner theſe *Relations*, " &c. *ought*" (another unlucky Word in Morals) " to determine the *Choice* of all " Rationals, abſtractly from any *Views* " *of Intereſt.* If they do not, theſe " Creatures are inſolently *counteracting* " *their Creator*, and as far as they can, " *making things to be what they are not*, " which is the greateſt Impiety."

THAT Things are now *different* is certain. That *Ideas*, to which there is no *Object* yet exiſting conformable, are alſo *different*, is certain. That upon comparing two *Ideas* there ariſes a *relative Idea*, generally when the two Ideas compared have in them any *Modes of the ſame ſimple Idea*, is alſo obvious. Thus every *extended Being* may be compared to any other of the ſame *Kinds of Dimenſions*; and *relative Ideas* be formed of *greater*, *leſs*, *equal*, *double*, *triple*, *ſubduple*, &c. with infinite variety. This may let us ſee that Relations are not *real Qualities* inherent in external Natures, but only *Ideas* neceſſarily accompanying our *Perception* of two Objects at once, and comparing them. *Relative Ideas* do continue, when the external

ternal Objects do not exiſt, provided we retain the *two Ideas*. But what the *eternal Relations* in the Natures of Things do mean, is not ſo eaſy perhaps to be conceived. Sect. 2

Three ſorts of Relations conſidered.

To ſhew particularly how far *Morality* can be concerned in *Relations*, we may conſider them under theſe Three Claſſes. 1. The *Relations of inanimate Objects*, as to their *Quantity*, or *active* and *paſſive Powers*, as explained by Mr. *Locke*. 2. The *Relations of inanimate Objects to rational Agents, as to their active or paſſive Powers*. 3. The *Relations of rational Agents among themſelves*, founded on their *Powers* or *Actions* paſt or continued. Now let us examine what *Fitneſſes* or *Unfitneſſes* ariſe from any of theſe *ſorts of Relations*, in which the *Morality* of Actions may conſiſt; and whether we can place *Morality* in them, without preſuppoſing a *moral Senſe*. 'Tis plain, that ingenious Author ſays nothing againſt the Suppoſition of a *moral Senſe*: But many do imagine, that his Account of moral Ideas is independent upon a *moral Senſe*, and therefore are leſs willing to allow that we have ſuch an immediate Perception, or *Senſe* of Virtue and Vice. What follows is not intended to oppoſe his Scheme, but rather to ſuggeſt what ſeems a neceſſary Explication of it; by ſhewing that it is no otherwiſe in-

Sect. 2. telligible, but upon Suppoſition of a *moral Senſe.*

None of them explain Morality *without a* Senſe.

1. RELATIONS *of inanimate Objects* being known, puts it in the Power of a rational Agent often to *diverſify* them, to *change their Forms, Motions*, or *Qualities* of any kind, at his pleaſure: but no body apprehends any *Virtue* or *Vice* in ſuch Actions, where no *Relation* is apprehended to a *rational Agent's Happineſs* or *Miſery*; otherwiſe we ſhould have got into the Claſs of Virtues all the practical *Mathematicks*, and the Operations of *Chymiſtry*.

2. As to the *Relations of inanimate Objects to rational Agents*; the Knowledge of them equally puts it in one's Power to *deſtroy Mankind*, as to preſerve them. Without preſuppoſing *Affections*, this Knowledge will not excite to one Action rather than another; nor without a *moral Senſe* will it make us approve any Action more than its contrary. The Relation of *Corn* to human Bodies being known to a Perſon of *kind Affections*, was perhaps the *exciting Reaſon* of teaching Mankind *Husbandry*: But the Knowledge of the *Relations of Arſenick* would excite a *malicious Nature*, juſt in the ſame manner, to the greateſt Miſchief. A *Sword*, an *Halter*, a *Muſket*, bears the *ſame Relation*

tion to the Body of an *Hero*, which they do to a *Robber*. The killing of either is equally agreeable to theſe *Relations*, but not equally *good* in a *moral Senſe*. The Knowledge of *theſe Relations* neither excites to Actions, nor juſtifies them, without preſuppoſing either *Affections* or a *moral Senſe*. *Kind Affections* with ſuch Knowledge makes *Heroes*; *malicious Affections*, *Villains*. Sect. 2

3. THE laſt *ſort of Relations* is that among *rational Agents*, founded on their *Actions* or *Affections*; whence one is called *Creator*, another *Creature*; one *Benefactor*, the other *Beneficiary* (if that Word may be uſed in this general Senſe;) the one *Parent*, the other *Child*; the one *Governor*, the other *Subject*, &c. Now let us ſee what *Fitneſſes* or *Unfitneſſes* ariſe from theſe Relations.

THERE is certainly, independently of *Fancy* or *Cuſtom*, a *natural Tendency* in ſome Actions to give *Pleaſure*, either to the Agent or to others; and a *contrary Tendency* in other Actions to give *Pain*, either to the Agent or others: This ſort of *Relation* of Actions to the *Agents* or *Objects* is indiſputable. If we call theſe Relations *Fitneſſes*, then the moſt contrary Actions have *equal Fitneſſes* for contrary Ends; and each one is *unfit* for the End of the

Sect. 2. the *other*. Thus *Compaſſion* is *fit* to make *others happy*, and *unfit* to make others *miſerable*. *Violation of Property* is *fit* to make Men *miſerable*, and *unfit* to make them happy. Each of theſe is both *fit* and *unfit*, with reſpect to different Ends. The bare *Fitneſs then to an End*, is not the Idea of moral Goodneſs.

PERHAPS the *virtuous Fitneſs* is that of *Ends*. The Fitneſs of a *ſubordinate End* to the ultimate, cannot conſtitute the Action *good*, unleſs the *ultimate End* be good. To *keep a Conſpiracy ſecret* is not a good *End*, tho it be fit for obtaining a farther *End*, the *Succeſs of the Conſpiracy*. The *moral Fitneſs* muſt be that of the *ultimate End* itſelf: The *publick Good* alone is a *fit End*, therefore the *Means* fit for this *End* alone are good.

WHAT means the *Fitneſs of an ultimate End*? For what is it fit? Why, 'tis an *ultimate End*, not fit for any thing farther, but *abſolutely fit*. What means that Word *fit*? If it notes a *ſimple Idea* it muſt be the *Perception of ſome Senſe*: thus we muſt recur, upon this Scheme too, to a *moral Senſe*.

Agreement *with* Relations *preſuppoſes alſo a* moral Senſe.

IF Fitneſs be not a *ſimple Idea*, let it be defined. Some tell us, that it is "an "*Agreement* of an *Affection*, *Deſire*, "*Action*,

" *Action, or End,* to the *Relations of* Sect. 2.
" *Agents.*" But what means *Agreement?* Which of theſe four Meanings has it? 1. We ſay one *Quantity* agrees with another of equal *Dimenſions* every way. 2. A *Corollary* agrees with a *Theorem*; when our knowing the latter to be Truth, leads us to know that the former is alſo a *true Propoſition.* 3. *Meat* agrees with that *Body* which it tends to *preſerve.* 4. Meat agrees with the *Taſte* of that Being in whom it raiſes a *pleaſant Perception.* If any one of theſe are the Meanings of *Agreement* in the Definition, then one of theſe is the Idea of *Fitneſs.* 1. That an Action or Affection is of the ſame *Bulk* and *Figure* with the *Relation.* Or, 2. When the *Relation* is a *true Propoſition,* ſo is the *Action* or *Affection.* Or, 3. The *Action* or *Affection* tends to *preſerve* the Relation; and *contrary Actions* would deſtroy it: So that, for inſtance, GOD would be no longer related to us as *Creator* and *Benefactor,* when we diſobeyed him. Or, 4. The Action raiſes *pleaſant Perceptions* in the *Relation.* All theſe Expreſſions ſeem abſurd.

THESE Gentlemen probably have ſome other Meanings to theſe Words *Fitneſs* or *Agreement.* I hope what is ſaid will ſhew the need for *Explication* of them, tho they be ſo common. There is one Meaning

Sect. 2. ing perhaps intended, however it be obſcurely expreſſed, That "certain *Affections* or *Actions* of an Agent, ſtanding "in a *certain Relation* to other Agents, "is *approved* by every *Obſerver*, or raiſes "in him a *grateful Perception*, or moves "the Obſerver to *love* the Agent." This Meaning is the ſame with the Notion of pleaſing a *moral Senſe*.

WHOEVER explains *Virtue* or *Vice* by *Juſtice* or *Injuſtice*, *Right* or *Wrong*, uſes only more ambiguous Words, which will equally lead to acknowledge a *moral Senſe*.

SECT.

SECT. III.

Mr. Woolaſton's Significancy of Truth, *as the Idea of* Virtue *conſidered.*

MR. WOOLASTON * has introduced a new Explication of *moral Virtue*, viz. *Significancy of Truth in Actions*, ſuppoſing that in every Action there is ſome *Significancy*, like to that which *Moraliſts* and *Civilians* ſpeak of in their *Tacit Conventions*, and *Quaſi Contractus!*

THE Word *Signification* is very common, but a little Reflection will ſhew it to be very ambiguous. In *Signification of Words* theſe things are included: 1. An *Aſſociation of an Idea with a Sound*, ſo that when any *Idea* is formed by the Speaker, the *Idea of a Sound* accompanies it. 2. The *Sound perceived* by the Hearer excites the *Idea* to which it is connected. 3. In like manner a *Judgment* in the Speaker's Mind is accompanyed with the *Idea of a Combination of Sounds.* 4. This *Combination of*

Signification *wherein it conſiſts.*

* *In his Religion of Nature delineated.*

Sect. 3. *Sounds* heard raiſes the *Apprehenſion* of that *Judgment* in the Mind of the Hearer. Nothing farther than theſe Circumſtances ſeems to be denoted by *Signification.*

Concluſions drawn from Speech.

HEARING a Propoſition does not of itſelf produce either *Aſſent* or *Diſſent*, or *Opinion* in the Hearer, but only preſents to his Apprehenſion the *Judgment*, or *Thema Complexum.* But the Hearer himſelf often forms *Judgments* or *Opinions* upon this occaſion, either *immediately* without Reaſoning, or by ſome ſhort *Argument.* Theſe *Opinions* are ſome one or more of the following *Propoſitions.* 1. *That a* Sound *is perceived, and a Judgment apprehended.* 2. *Such a Perſon cauſed the Sound heard.* 3. *The Speaker intended to excite in the Hearer the Idea of the* Sound, *and the Apprehenſion of the Judgment, or* Thema Complexum. This Judgment is not always formed by the Hearer, nor is it always true, when Men are heard ſpeaking. 4. *The Speaker intended to produce* Aſſent *in the Hearer:* This Judgment is not always true. 5. *The Speaker* aſſents *to the Propoſition ſpoken:* This Judgment in the Hearer is often falſe, and is formed upon Opinion of the Speaker's *Veracity*, or ſpeaking what expreſſes his *Opinion* uſually. 6. *The Speaker does not aſſent to the Propoſition ſpoken:* This Judgment of the Hearer is often falſe,

when what is ſpoken is every way true. Sect. 3.
7. *The Speaker intended that the Hearer ſhould believe or judge,* " *that the Propo-* " *ſition ſpoken was aſſented to by the* " *Speaker.*" 8. *The Speaker had the contrary Intention, to that ſuppoſed in the laſt Judgment:* Both theſe latter Judgments may be *falſe*, when the Propoſition ſpoken is every way *true*. 9. *The Propoſition ſpoken repreſents the Object as it is, or is logically true.* 10. *The Propoſition ſpoken does not repreſent the Object as it is, or it is logically falſe.*

As to the firſt four *Circumſtances* which make up the proper *Significancy* of Speech, 'tis ſcarce poſſible that any one ſhould place *moral Good* or *Evil* in them. Whether the Propoſition were *logically true* or *falſe*, the having a bare *Apprehenſion* of it as a *Thema Complexum*, or raiſing this in another, without intending to produce *Aſſent* or *Diſſent*, can have no more *moral Good* or *Evil* in it, than the *Reception* of any other *Idea*, or raiſing it in another. This *Significancy of Falſhood* is found in the very *Propoſitions* given in *Schools*, as *Inſtances* of *Falſhood*, *Abſurdity*, *Contradiction to Truth*, or *Blaſphemy*. The *pronouncing* of which, are Actions *ſignifying* more properly than moſt of our other *Actions*; and yet no body condemns them as immoral.

Morality *does not conſiſt in* Significancy.

As

Sect. 3.

Nor in Concluſions formed by Hearers.

As to the *Opinions* formed by the Hearer, they are all his own *Action* as much as any other *Concluſion* or *Judgment* formed from *Appearances* of any ſort whatſoever. They are *true* or *falſe*, according to the Sagacity of the *Obſerver*, or his *Caution*. The Hearer may form perfectly true *Opinions* or *Judgments*, when the *Speaker* is guilty of the baſeſt *Fraud*; and may form *falſe Judgments*, when the Speaker is perfectly *innocent*, and ſpoke nothing *falſe* in any Senſe.

The *Evils* which may follow from the falſe Judgments of the Hearer, are no otherwiſe chargeable on the *Speaker*, than as the evil Conſequences of another's Action of any kind may be chargeable upon any Perſon who *co-operated*; or, by his *Action* or *Omiſſion*, the Conſequence of which he might have *foreſeen*, did either actually *intend* this Evil, or *wanted that Degree of kind Affection*, which would have inclined him to have prevented it.

The Morality of Speech in the Intention.

The *Intention* of the Speaker is what all *Moraliſts* have hitherto imagined the *Virtue* or *Vice* of Words did depend upon, and not the bare *Significancy* of Truth or Falſhood. This *Intention* is either, 1. *To lead the Hearer into a true or falſe Opinion about the Sentiments of the Speaker.* 2. *To*

2. *To make the Hearer aſſent to the Propoſition ſpoken.* Or, 3. *Both to make the Hearer aſſent to the Propoſition, and judge that the Speaker alſo aſſents to it.* Or, 4. *To accompliſh ſome* End, *by means of the Hearer's aſſent to the Propoſition ſpoken.* This End may be known by the Speaker to be either *publickly uſeful,* or *publickly hurtful.* Sect. 3.

SOME Moraliſts * of late have placed all *Virtue in Speech* in the *Intention* of the laſt kind, *viz.* "Accompliſhing ſome pub-"lickly uſeful End, by ſpeaking either *lo-"gical Truth* or *Falſhood:* and that all "*Vice* in ſpeaking, conſiſts in intending to "effect ſomething *publickly hurtful* by "Speech, whether *logically true or falſe,* "and known to be ſuch; or by uſing "Speech in a manner which we may fore-"ſee would be *publickly hurtful,* whether "we actually *intend* this evil Conſequence "or not." Some ſtricter *Moraliſts* aſſert, that "the *publick Evils* which would en-"ſue from deſtroying mutual Confidence, "by allowing to ſpeak *Propoſitions known "to be falſe* on any occaſion, are ſo "great, that no particular *Advantage* to "be expected from ſpeaking *known logi-"cal Falſhoods*, can ever over-ballance

* Barberack's *Notes on* Puffendorf, *Lib.* iv. *c.* 1, 7.

Sect. 3. " them; that all uſe of Speech ſuppoſes a " *tacit Convention of Sincerity*, the *Vio-* " *lation* of which is always evil." Both ſides in this Argument agree, that the *moral Evil* in Speech conſiſts either in ſome *direct malicious Intention*, or a *Tendency to the publick Detriment* of Society; which Tendency the Agent might have *foreſeen*, as connected with his Action, had he not *wanted* that Degree of *good Affections* which makes Men *attentive* to the Effects of their Actions. Never was bare *Significancy of Falſhood* made the Idea of *moral Evil*. Speaking *logical Falſhood* was ſtill looked upon as innocent in many caſes. Speaking *contrary to Sentiment*, or *moral Falſhood*, was always proved evil, from ſome *publickly hurtful Tendency*, and not ſuppoſed as evil *immediately*, or the ſame Idea with *Vice*. The *Intention to deceive* was the Foundation of the Guilt. This Intention the Speaker ſtudies to *conceal*, and does not *ſignify* it: It is an *Act of the Will*, neither *ſignified* by his Words, nor itſelf *ſignifying* any thing elſe.

THIS Point deſerved Conſideration, becauſe if any Action be *ſignificant*, 'tis certainly the *Act of Speaking*: And yet even in this the *Virtue* is not the *Significancy of Truth*, nor the *Vice* the *ſignifying Falſhood*.

THE

Sect. 3.

THE *Signification of ſome Actions* depends upon a like *Aſſociation of Ideas* with them, made either by *Nature*, or *arbitrarily*, and by *Cuſtom*, as with *Sounds*. *Letters* are by *Cuſtom* the *Signs of Sounds*. A *Shriek* or *Groan* is a natural *Sign* of *Fear* or *Pain*: A *Motion of the Hand* or *Head* may ſignify *Aſſent*, *Diſſent*, or *Deſire*. The *cutting down tall Poppies* was an *anſwer*: The *ſending Spurs*, *advice to Flight*: *Kindling many Fires* raiſes the Opinion of an *Encampment*: *Raiſing* a *Smoke* will raiſe Opinion of *Fire*. *The* Significancy *of Actions.*

THE moſt important Diſtinction of *Signs* is this, that * 1. "Some *Appearances* "are the Occaſion upon which an Obſer- "ver, by his *own reaſoning*, forms a "Judgment, without ſuppoſing, or having "reaſon to believe, that the *Agent*, who "cauſed theſe Appearances, did it with "*deſign to communicate his Sentiments* to "others; or when the Actions are ſuch "as are uſually done by the Agents, with- "out *deſigning to raiſe Opinions* in Ob- "ſervers. 2. Some Actions are never "uſed but with *profeſſed Deſign* to con- "vey the *Opinions of the Agent* to the "*Obſerver*; or ſuch as the Obſerver *in-*

* *See* Grotius de Jure Bell. *Lib.* 3. *c.* 1.

Sect. 3. " *fers* nothing from, but upon having " *reaſon* to believe that the *Cauſer* of the " Appearance *intended to convey ſome Sen-* " *timent to the Obſerver.*" 3. Other Signs are uſed, when " the *Signifier* gives " no reaſon to conclude any other *Inten-* " *tion*, but only to raiſe an *Apprehenſion* " *of the Judgment, or the Thema Com-* " *plexum*, without *profeſſing any deſign to* " *communicate his Sentiments*, or to pro- " duce any *Aſſent* in the Obſerver."

To do Actions from which the Obſerver will form *falſe Opinions*, without having reaſon to imagine an *Intention* in the Agent, is never of itſelf imagined *evil*, let the Signs be *natural* or *inſtituted*; provided there be no *malicious Intention*, or *neglect of publick Good.* 'Tis never called a Crime in a *Teacher*, to pronounce an *abſurd Sentence* for an inſtance; in a *Nobleman*, to travel without *Coronets*; or a *Clergyman* in *Lay-Habit*, for private Conveniency, or to avoid troubleſome Ceremony; to *leave Lights in a Lodge*, to make People conclude there is a *Watch kept.* This *Significancy* may be in any Action which is obſerved; but as *true Concluſions* argue no *Virtue* in the Agent, ſo *falſe ones* argue no *Vice.*

RAISING *falſe Opinions* deſignedly by the *ſecond Sort* of Signs, which reaſonably lead

lead the Obſerver to conclude *Intention in the Agent to communicate his Sentiments*, whether the Signs be *cuſtomary*, *inſtituted*, or *natural*, is generally *evil*, when the Agent knows the Falſhood; ſince it tends to diminiſh *mutual Confidence*. To *ſend Spurs* to a Friend, whom the *Sender* imagines to be in no danger, to deceive by *Hieroglyphicks* or *Painting*, is as criminal as a *falſe Letter*. This *Significancy* occurs in very few human Actions: Some of the moſt important *Virtues* profeſs no *deſign of communicating Sentiments*, or *raiſing Opinions* either true or falſe: Nor is there any more *Intention* in ſome of the moſt *vicious Actions*. Again, who can imagine any *Virtue* in all Actions, where there is this *Significancy of Truth* with *Intention*? Is it Virtue to ſay at *Chriſtmaſs*, that "the Mornings are ſharp?" to *beckon with the Hand*, in ſign of *Aſſent* to ſuch an Aſſertion? And in *falſe Propoſitions* thus ſignified by *Actions* or *Words*, there is no *Evil* apprehended where the *Falſhood* is only *logical*. When the Falſhood is known by the Agent, the *Evil* is not imagined in the *Significancy*, but in doing what one may foreſee tends to breed *Diſtruſt in Society*. And did all *moral Evil* conſiſt in *moral Falſhood*, there could be no *Sins of Ignorance*. If Mr. *Woolaſton* alledges, that "Ignorance of ſome things "ſignifies this Falſhood, *viz. We are not*

Sect. 3.

Sect. 3. "*obliged to know the Truth*:" This Falſhood is not ſignified with *Intention*; nor is it *moral Falſhood*, but only *logical*: ſince no Man in an Error knows that "*he* "*is obliged to know the contrary Truth.*" Mr. *Woolaſton*'s uſe of the Words [ought] or [obliged] without a diſtinct Meaning, is not peculiar to this Place.

THE third ſort of *Significancy of Falſehood* is never apprehended as *morally Evil*, if it were, then every *Dramatick Writer* drawing *evil Characters*, every *Hiſtory Painter*, every *Writer of Allegories*, or *Epicks*, every *Philoſopher* teaching the Nature of *contradictory Propoſitions*, would be thonght criminal.

Significancy *different from the* Morality.

BUT ſince only the *firſt ſort of Significancy* can be in all Actions, and that too ſuppoſing that every Action whatſoever is *obſerved* by ſome Being or other: Let us ſee if this will account for *Morality*. Perhaps either, 1ſt, "Every Action is *good* "which leads the Obſerver into *true Opi-* "*nions* concerning the *Sentiments of the* "*Agent*, whether the *Agent's Opinions* "be *true* or *falſe*." Or, 2dly, "That Ac- "tion is good which leads the Obſerver "into *true Opinions concerning the Ob-* "*ject*, *the Tendency of the Action*, *and* "*the Relation between the Agent and* "*the Object*."

DID

Sect. 3.

DID *Virtue* conſiſt in this *firſt ſort of Significancy* of Truth, it would depend not upon the *Agent* but the *Sagacity of the Obſerver:* The acute Penetration of one would conſtitute an *Action virtuous*, and the Raſhneſs or Stupidity of another would make it *vicious:* And the moſt *barbarous Actions* would raiſe no *falſe Opinion of the Sentiments of the Agent*, in a judicious Obſerver.

THE ſecond *ſort* of Significancy would alſo make *Virtue* conſiſt in the *Power of Obſervers*. An exact Reaſoner would receive no *falſe Opinion* from the worſt Action concerning the *Object* or *Relation* of the Agent to it: And a *falſe Opinion* might be formed by a weak Obſerver of a *perfectly good Action.*—— An Obſerver who knew an Agent to have the *baſeſt Temper*, would not from his worſt Action conclude any thing *falſe* concerning the *Object:* And all ſuch *falſe Opinions* would ariſe only upon Suppoſition that *the Agent was virtuous.*

BUT may it not be ſaid, that "whether "Men reaſon well about Actions or not, "there are ſome *Concluſions really deduci-* "*ble from every Action*? It is a *Datum* "from which ſomething may be inferred "by *juſt Conſequence*, whether any one ac-

Sect. 3. " tually infers it or not. Then may not this " *Quality* in Actions, whether we call it " *Significancy* or not, *that only true* " *Propoſitions can be inferred from them* " *by juſt Reaſoning, be moral Goodneſs?* " And may it not be the *very Idea* of *mo-* " *ral Evil* in Actions, that *ſome falſe* " *Concluſions can by juſt Conſequence be* " *deduced from them?*" Or if we will not allow theſe to be the *very Ideas* of moral Good and Evil, " are they not *univerſal* " *juſt Characters* to diſtinguiſh the one " from the other?"

ONE may here obſerve in general, that ſince the Exiſtence of the Action is ſuppoſed to be a true *Premiſe* or *Datum*, no *falſe* Concluſion can poſſibly be inferred from it by *juſt Reaſoning*. We could perhaps often juſtly infer, that the Agent had *falſe Opinions*; but then this Concluſion of the Obſerver, *viz.* " that the Agent " has falſe Opinions," is really true.

True Concluſions *deducible from Actions, no juſt Character of* Virtue.

BUT again, it will not make an *univerſal Character* of good Actions, that a juſt Reaſoner would infer from them, that " *the Opinions of the Agent are true.*" For it is thus Men muſt reaſon from Actions; *viz. Given the Conſtitution of Nature, the Affections of Agents, and the Action, to conclude concerning the Opinions:* Or more generally *given any three*

of

of theſe to conclude the fourth. Thus ſuppoſe the "*Conſtitution of Nature ſuch, "that the private Intereſt of each Individual is connected with the publick "Good:*" Suppoſe an Agent's Affections *ſelfiſh* only, then from a *publickly uſeful Action* we infer, that "*the Agent's Opinions are true:*" And from a *publickly hurtful Action* conclude his *Opinions* to be falſe. Sect. 3.

THE ſame *Conſtitution* ſuppoſed with *publick Affections* as well as *ſelfiſh*. The obſerving a *kind or publickly uſeful Action*, will not immediately infer, that the Agent's *Opinions* are either *true* or *falſe:* With falſe Opinions he might do *publickly uſeful Actions* out of his *publick Affections*, in thoſe caſes wherein they are not apparently oppoſite to his Intereſt. *A publick Action* oppoſite to ſome preſent *private Intereſt*, would generally evidence *true Opinions*; or if the *Opinions were falſe*, that his *publick Affections* were in this Caſe much ſtronger than his *Self-Love*. A cruel Action would indeed evidence *falſe Opinions*.

SUPPOSE the *ſame Conſtitution* in all other reſpects, with *malicious Affections* in an Agent. *A cruel or ungrateful Action* would not always prove the *Opinions of the Agent to be falſe*; but only that his

Malice

Sect. 3. *Malice* in this inſtance, was more violent than regard to his *Intereſt*. A *beneficent Action* would prove only one of theſe two, either that his *Opinions of the Conſtitution* were true; or, that if he was miſtaken about the *Conſtitution*, he had alſo a *falſe Opinion* of the natural Tendency of the Action. Thus *falſe Opinions* may be evidenced by contrary Actions.

SUPPOSE "*a Conſtitution wherein a* "*private Intereſt could be advanced in* "*Oppoſition to the publick*" (this we may call an *evil Conſtitution:*) Suppoſe only *Self-Love* in the Agent, then a *publickly uſeful Action*, any way *toilſome* or *expenſive* to the Agent, would evidence *falſe Opinions:* And the moſt *cruel ſelfiſh Actions* would evidence *true Opinions*.

IN an *evil Conſtitution*, ſuppoſe *kind Affections* in the Agent; *a publickly uſeful Action* would not certainly argue either *true or falſe Opinions*. If his *Opinions* were true, but *kind Affections* ſtronger than *Self-Love*, he might act in the ſame manner, as if his *Opinions* were falſe, and *Self-Love* the *reigning Affection*.

IN an *evil Conſtitution*, ſuppoſe *malicious Affections* in an Agent, all *publickly uſeful Actions* would argue *falſe Opini-*

ons;

pns; and *publickly hurtful Actions* would argue *true ones*. Sect. 3.

THIS may ſhew us that Mens Actions are generally *publickly uſeful*, when they have *true Opinions*, only on this account; that we neither have *malicious Affections* naturally, nor is there any probability, in our preſent *Conſtitution*, of promoting a *private Intereſt* ſeparately from, or in Oppoſition to the *Publick*. Were there contrary *Affections* and a contrary *Conſtitution*, the moſt cruel Actions might flow from *true Opinions*; and conſequently *publickly uſeful Actions* might flow from falſe ones.

How far it is a Character of Virtue, that it flows from true Opinions.

IN our *preſent Conſtitution*, 'tis probable no Perſon would ever do any thing publickly hurtful, but upon ſome falſe Opinion. The *flowing from true Opinions* is indeed a tolerable Character or Property of *Virtue*, and *flowing from ſome falſe Opinion* a tolerable Character of *Vice*; tho neither be ſtrictly univerſal. But, 1. This is not *proper Signification*. A judicious Obſerver never imagines any *Intention to communicate Opinions* in ſome of the moſt important Actions, either *good* or *evil*. 2. Did an Action *ſignify Falſhood*, 'tis generally only *logical*. 3. The *falſe Opinion* in the Agent is not the *Quality* for which the evil Action is *condemned*; nor is the

true

Sect. 3. *true Opinion* that for which the good Action is *approved*. True Opinions in Agents often *aggravate* Crimes, as they ſhew higher Degrees of *evil Affection*, or total *Abſence* of *good*. And *falſe Opinions* generally *extenuate* Crimes, unleſs when the very Ignorance or Error has flowed from *evil Affection*, or total *Abſence of good*.

'Tis ſurprizing, for inſtance, how any ſhould place the *Evil* of *Ingratitude* in *denying* the Perſon injured, to have been a *Benefactor*. The Obſerver of ſuch an Action, if he ſuppoſed the Agent had really that *falſe Opinion*, would think the Crime the leſs for it: But if he were convinced that the Agent had a *true Opinion*, he would think his *Ingratitude* the *more odious*. Where we moſt abhor Actions, we ſuppoſe often *true Opinions*: And ſometimes admire Actions flowing even from *falſe Opinions*, when they have evidenced no *want* of good Affection.

To write a Cenſure upon a Book ſo well deſigned as Mr. *Woollaſton*'s, and ſo full of very good Reaſoning upon the moſt uſeful Subjects, would not evidence much *good Nature*. But allowing him his *juſt Praiſe*, to remark any *Ambiguities* or *Inadvertencies* which may lead Men into Confuſion in their Reaſoning, I am confident would

have

have been acceptable to a Man of ſo much Goodneſs, when he was living. Sect. 3.

ONE may ſee that he has had ſome other Idea of *moral Good*, previous to this *Significancy of Truth*, by his introducing, in the very Explication of it, Words preſuppoſing the *Ideas of Morality* previouſly known: Such as [*Right*,] [*Obligation*,] [*Lye*,] [*his*] denoting [Property.]

MR. *Woolaſton* acknowledges that there may be very little *evil* in ſome Actions ſignifying Falſhood; ſuch as *throwing away that which is of but little Uſe or Value.* It is objected to him, that there is equal *Contrariety to Truth* in ſuch Actions, as in the greateſt *Villany*: He, in anſwer to it, really unawares gives up his whole Cauſe. He muſt own, that there may be the *ſtricteſt Truth* and *Certainty* about Trifles; ſo there may be the moſt *obvious Falſhood* ſignified by *trifling Actions*. If then *Significancy of Falſhood* be the very ſame with *moral Evil*, all Crimes muſt be equal. He anſwers, that *Crimes* increaſe according to the *Importance* of the Truth denied; and ſo the *Virtue* increaſes, as the *Importance* of the Truths affirmed. Then

Signifying of Truth *equal in* unequal Virtue.

Virtue

Sect. 3.

Virtue and *Vice* increaſe, as the *Importance* of Propoſitions affirmed or denied;
But *Signification of Truth and Falſhood* does not ſo increaſe:
Therefore *Virtue* and *Vice* are not the ſame with *Signification of Truth or Falſhood.*

But what is this *Importance of Truth*? Nothing elſe but the *Moment* or *Quantity* of good or evil, either *private* or *publick*, which ſhould be produced by Actions, concerning which theſe *true Judgments* are made. But 'tis plain, the *Signification* of Truth or Falſhood is not varied by this *Importance*; therefore *Virtue* or *Vice* denote ſomething different from this *Signification.*

But farther, The *Importance* of Actions toward publick Good or Evil, is not the *Idea of Virtue* or *Vice:* Nor does the one prove *Virtue* in an Action, any farther than it evidences *kind Affections*; or the other *Vice*, farther than it evidences either *Malice* or *Want* of kind Affections: Otherwiſe a *caſual Invention*, an Action wholly from *views of private Intereſt*, might be as virtuous as the moſt *kind* and *generous Offices:* And *Chance-Medley*, or *kindly intended*, but *unſucceſsful Attempts* would

would be as *vicious* as *Murder* or *Treaſon.* Sect. 3.

ONE of Mr. *Woolaſton*'s Illuſtrations that *Significancy of Falſhood* is the Idea of moral Evil, ends in this, "*'Tis acting* "*a Lye.*" What then? Should he not firſt have ſhewn what was *moral Evil*, and that every Lye was ſuch? *Some Ambiguities in Mr. Woolaſton.*

ANOTHER Illuſtration or Proof is that, "*it is acting contrary to that Rea-*"*ſon which* GOD *has given us as the* "*Guide of our Actions.*" Does not this place the original Idea of *moral Evil* in *counteracting the* DEITY, and not in *ſignifying Falſhood*? But, he may ſay, "Counteracting the DEITY denies him "to be our *Benefactor*, and ſignifies "Falſhood." Then why is *ſignifying Falſhood* evil? Why, 'tis *counteracting the* DEITY, who gave us Reaſon for our Guide. Why is this evil again? It denies the Truth, that "*he is our Benefactor.*"

ANOTHER Illuſtration is this, "That "*ſignifying Falſhood is altering the Na-*"*tures of Things, and making them be* "*what they are not*, or *deſiring at leaſt* "*to make them be what they are not.*" If by *altering the Natures* be meant *deſtroying Beings*, then moral Evil conſiſts in *deſiring the Deſtruction of other Natures*,

Sect. 3. or in *Evil Affections*. If what is meant be *altering the Laws of Nature*, or *deſiring that they were ſtopped*; this is ſeldom deſired by any but *Madmen*, nor is this *Deſire* evidenced by ſome of the worſt Actions, nor is *ſuch Deſire* always criminal; otherwiſe it were as great a Crime as any, to wiſh, when a *Dam* was broken down, that the Water would not overflow the Country.

IF *making Things be what they are not*, means "attempting or deſiring that any "Subject ſhould have two *oppoſite Quali-* "*ties at once*, or a *Quality* and its *Pri-* "*vation*;" 'tis certain then, that according to the *Stoicks*, all *vicious Men are thorowly mad*. But 'tis to be doubted, that ſuch Madneſs never hapned to even the *worſt of Mankind*. When a Man *murders*, he does not deſire his *Fellow-Creature* to be both *dead* and *living*. When he *robs*, he does not deſire that both *he* and the *Proprietor* ſhould at the *ſame time* poſſeſs. If any ſays, that he deſires to have a *Right* to that, to which another has a *Right*; 'tis probably falſe Robbers neither think of *Rights* at all, nor are ſolicitous about acquiring them: Or, if they retain ſome *wild Notions of Rights*, they think their *Indigence*, *Conqueſt* or *Courage* gives them a *Right*, and makes the other's Right to *ceaſe*. If *attempting to make*

old

old Qualities or Rights give place to new, Sect. 3.
be the Idea of *moral Evil*, then every *Artificer*, *Purchaſer*, or *Magiſtrate inveſted with an Office* is criminal.

MANY of Mr. *Woolaſton*'s Propoſitions contradicted by Actions, are about *Rights*, *Duties*, *Obligation*, *Juſtice*, *Reaſonableneſs*. Theſe are *long Words*, *principal Names*, or *Attributes* in Sentences. The little Word [his,] or the Particles [*as*, *according*] are much better: they may eſcape Obſervation, and yet may include all the Ambiguities of *Right*, *Property*, *Agreement*, *Reaſonableneſs*: "*Treating* "*Things* as *they are*, *and not* as *they are* "*not*:" Or, *According to what they are*, "*or are not*," are Expreſſions he probably had learned from another truly great Name, who has not explained them ſufficiently.

IT may perhaps not ſeem improper on this occaſion to obſerve, that in the *Quaſi Contractus*, the *Civilians* do not imagine any Act of the Mind of the *Perſon obliged* to be really ſignified, but by a ſort of *Fictio juris* ſuppoſing it, order him to act as if he had contracted, even when they know that he had *contrary Intentions*. *In Quaſi Contracts, or Tacit, no Signification of Truth.*

IN the *Tacit Conventions*, 'tis not a *Judgment* which is ſignified, but an *Act of the Will tranſferring Right*, in which there

Sect. 3. there is no Relation to *Truth* or *Falſhood* of itſelf. The *Non-performance of Covenants* is made *penal*, not becauſe of their *ſignifying Falſhoods*, as if this were the Crime in them: But it is neceſſary, in order to preſerve *Commerce* in any Society, to *make effectual* all *Declarations of Conſent to transfer Rights* by any uſual *Signs*, otherwiſe there could be no *Certainty* in Mens Tranſactions.

SECT.

SECT. IV.

Shewing the Uſe of Reaſon *concerning* Virtue *and* Vice, *upon Suppoſition that we receive theſe Ideas by a* Moral Senſe.

HAD thoſe who inſiſt ſo much upon the *antecedent Reaſonableneſs of Virtue*, told us diſtinctly what is *reaſonable* or *provable* concerning it, many of our Debates had been prevented. Let us conſider what *Truths* concerning Actions Men could deſire to know, or prove by *Reaſon*. I fancy they may be reduced to theſe Heads. 1. "To know whether there are "not *ſome Actions* or *Affections* which "obtain the *Approbation* of any Spectator or Obſerver, and others move his "*Diſlike* and *Condemnation?*" This Queſtion, as every Man can anſwer for himſelf, ſo *univerſal Experience* and *Hiſtory* ſhew, that in all Nations it is ſo; and conſequently the *moral Senſe* is *univerſal*. 2. "Whether there be any particular "*Quality*, which, wherever it is apprehended, gains *Approbation*, and the contrary raiſes *Diſapprobation?*" We ſhall find

Truths about Morals, four ſorts.

Sect. 4. find this *Quality* to be *kind Affection*, or Study of the Good of others; and thus the *moral Senſes* of Men are generally *uniform*. About theſe two Queſtions there is little reaſoning; we know how to anſwer them from reflecting on our own *Sentiments*, or by conſulting others. 3. "What "Actions do really *evidence kind Affec-* "*tions*, or do really *tend to the greateſt* "*publick Good*?" About this Queſtion is all the ſpecial *Reaſoning* of thoſe who treat of the particular *Laws of Nature*, or even of *Civil Laws*: This is the largeſt Field, and the moſt uſeful Subject of *Reaſoning*, which remains upon every *Scheme of Morals*. 4. "What are the Motives "which, even from Self-Love, would ex- "cite each Individual to do thoſe Actions "which are publickly uſeful?" 'Tis probable indeed, no Man would *approve* as virtuous an Action *publickly uſeful*, to which the Agent was excited only by *Self-Love*, without any *kind Affection*: 'Tis alſo probable that no view of *Intereſt* can raiſe that *kind Affection*, which we *approve* as virtuous; nor can any *Reaſoning* do it, except that which ſhews ſome *moral Goodneſs*, or *kind Affections* in the Object; for this never fails, where it is obſerved or ſuppoſed in any Perſon to raiſe the *Love* of the Obſerver; ſo that *Virtue* is not properly *taught*.

YET

Sect. 4.

YET ſince all Men have naturally *Self-Love* as well as *kind Affections*, the former may often counteract the latter, or the latter the former; in each caſe the Agent is *uneaſy*, and in ſome degree *unhappy*. The firſt *raſh Views* of human Affairs often repreſent *private Intereſt* as oppoſite to the *Publick*: When this is apprehended, *Self-Love* may often engage Men in *publickly hurtful Actions*, which their *moral Senſe* will condemn; and this is the ordinary Cauſe of Vice. To repreſent theſe Motives of *Self-Intereſt*, to engage Men to publickly uſeful Actions, is certainly the moſt neceſſary Point in Morals. This has been ſo well done by the *antient Moraliſts*, by Dr. *Cumberland*, *Puffendorf*, *Grotius*, *Shaftesbury*; 'tis made ſo certain from the *divine Government* of the World, the *State of Mankind*, who cannot ſubſiſt without Society, from univerſal *Experience* and *Conſent*, from *inward Conſciouſneſs* of the Pleaſure of kind Affections, and *Self-Approbation*, and of the *Torments* of *Malice*, or *Hatred*, or *Envy*, or *Anger*; that no Man who conſiders theſe things, can ever imagine he can have any poſſible *Intereſt* in oppoſing the publick Good; or in checking or reſtraining his kind Affections; nay, if he had no *kind Affections*, his very *Self-Love* and Regard to his private Good might excite

Sect. 4. him to publickly uſeful Actions, and diſſuade from the contrary.

WHAT farther ſhould be provable concerning Virtue, whence it ſhould be called *reaſonable antecedently to all Affection*, or *Intereſt*, or *Senſe*, or what it ſhould be *fit* for, one cannot eaſily imagine.

PERHAPS what has brought the Epithet *Reaſonable*, or *flowing from Reaſon*, in oppoſition to what flows from *Inſtinct*, *Affection*, or *Paſſion*, ſo much into uſe, is this, "That it is often obſerved, that "the very beſt of our particular *Affections* "or *Deſires*, when they are grown vio- "lent and *paſſionate*, thro' the *confuſed* "*Senſations* and *Propenſities* which at- "tend them, do make us incapable of "conſidering calmly the whole *Tendency* "of our Actions, and lead us often into "what is *abſolutely pernicious*, under "ſome Appearance of *relative* or *parti-* "*cular Good*." This indeed may give ſome ground for diſtinguiſhing between *paſſionate Actions*, and *thoſe* from *calm Deſire* or *Affection* which employs our *Reaſon* freely: But can never ſet *rational Actions* in Oppoſition to thoſe from *Inſtinct*, *Deſire* or *Affection*. And it muſt be owned, that the moſt perfect Virtue conſiſts in the *calm*, *unpaſſionate Benevolence*,

Vence, rather than in particular Affections. Sect. 4.

IF one asks "how do we know that "*our Affections are right when thay are* "*kind?*" What does the Word [right] mean? Does it mean *what we approve*? This we know by *Conſciouſneſs* of our *Senſe*. Again, how do we know that our *Senſe* is right, or that we *approve our Approbation?* This can only be anſwered by another Queſtion, *viz.* "How do "we know we are pleaſed when we are "pleaſed?" —— Or does it mean, "how "do we know that we ſhall *always* ap- "prove what we *now* approve?" To anſwer this, we muſt firſt know that the *ſame Conſtitution* of our *Senſe* ſhall always remain: And again, that we have applyed our ſelves carefully to conſider the *natural Tendency* of our Actions. Of the *Continuance* of the ſame Conſtitution of our *Senſe*, we are as ſure as of the Continuance of *Gravitation*, or any other *Law of Nature:* The *Tendency* of our own Actions we cannot always know; but we may know certainly that we *heartily* and *ſincerely* ſtudied to act according to what, by all the Evidence now in our Power to obtain, appeared as moſt *probably tending to publick Good.* When we are conſcious of this *ſincere Endeavour*, the *evil Conſequences* which we could not have fore-

How we judge of our Moral Senſe.

Sect. 4. ſeen, never will make us *condemn* our Conduct. But without this *ſincere Endeavour*, we may often approve at *preſent* what we ſhall *afterwards* condemn.

How our Moral Senſe is corrected by Reaſon.

IF the Queſtion means, "How are "we ſure that what *we* approve, *all o-* "*thers* ſhall alſo approve?" Of this we can be ſure upon *no Scheme*; but 'tis highly probable that the *Senſes* of all Men are pretty *uniform*: That the DEITY alſo approves *kind Affections*, otherwiſe he would not have implanted them in us, nor determined us by a *moral Senſe* to approve them. Now ſince the *Probability that Men ſhall judge truly*, abſtracting from any preſuppoſed *Prejudice*, is greater than that *they ſhall judge falſly*; 'tis more probable, when our Actions are really *kind* and *publicly uſeful*, that *all Obſervers* ſhall judge *truly* of our *Intentions*, and of the *Tendency* of our Actions, and conſequently approve what *we* approve our ſelves, than that they ſhall judge *falſly* and condemn them.

IF the Meaning of the Queſtion be, "Will the doing what our *moral Senſe* "approves tend to *our Happineſs*, and to "the avoiding Miſery?" 'Tis thus we call a *Taſte wrong*, when it makes that *Food* at preſent *grateful*, which ſhall occaſion *future Pains*, or *Death*. This Queſtion

tion concerning our *Self-Intereſt* muſt be Sect. 4.
anſwered by ſuch *Reaſoning* as was mentioned above, to be well managed by our *Moraliſts* both antient and modern.

THUS there ſeems no part of that *Reaſoning* which was ever uſed by *Moraliſts*, to be ſuperſeded by ſuppoſing a *moral Senſe*. And yet without a *moral Senſe* there is no Explication can be given of our *Ideas of Morality*; nor of that *Reaſonableneſs* ſuppoſed *antecedent* to all *Inſtincts*, *Affections*, or *Senſe*.

"BUT may there not be a *right* or "*wrong State* of our *moral Senſe*, as "there is in our other *Senſes*, according "as they repreſent their Objects to be "*as they really are*, or repreſent them o-"therwiſe?" So may not our *moral Senſe* approve that which is *vicious*, and *diſapprove Virtue*, as a *ſickly Palate* may diſlike *grateful Food*, or a *vitiated Sight* miſrepreſent *Colours* or *Dimenſions*? Muſt we not know therefore *antecedently* what is *morally Good* or *Evil* by our *Reaſon*, before we can know that our *moral Senſe* is *right*?

TO anſwer this, we muſt remember that of the *ſenſible Ideas*, ſome are allowed to be only *Perceptions* in our Minds, and not Images of any like *external Quality*, as *Colours*,

Sect. 4. *Colours*, *Sounds*, *Taſtes*, *Smells*, *Pleaſure*, *Pain*. Other Ideas are *Images* of ſomething *external*, as *Duration*, *Number*, *Extenſion*, *Motion*, *Reſt*: Theſe *latter*, for diſtinction, we may call *concomitant Ideas of Senſation*, and the former *purely ſenſible*. As to the *purely ſenſible Ideas*, we know they are *alter'd* by any Diſorder in our *Organs*, and made *different* from what ariſe in us from the ſame Objects at other times. We do not denominate Objects from our *Perceptions during the Diſorder*, but according to our *ordinary Perceptions*, or thoſe of others in *good Health*: Yet no body imagines that therefore *Colours*, *Sounds*, *Taſtes*, are not *ſenſible Ideas*. In like manner many *Circumſtances* diverſify the *concomitant Ideas*: But we denominate Objects from the Appearances they make to us in an *uniform Medium*, *when our Organs are in no diſorder*, *and the Object not very diſtant from them*. But none therefore imagines that it is *Reaſon* and not *Senſe* which diſcovers theſe *concomitant Ideas*, or *primary Qualities*.

Just ſo in our *Ideas of Actions*. Theſe three Things are to be diſtinguiſhed, 1. The Idea of the *external Motion*, known firſt by *Senſe*, and its *Tendency to the Happineſs or Miſery* of ſome *ſenſitive Nature*, often inferr'd by *Argument* or *Reaſon*. 2. *Apprehenſion* or *Opinion* of the *Affections*

tions in the Agent, concluded by our *Reaſon*: So far the Idea of an *Action* repreſents ſomething *external* to the Obſerver. Sect. 4.

3. The *Perception of Approbation or Diſapprobation* ariſing in the Obſerver, according as the *Affections of the Agent* are apprehended *kind* in their *juſt Degree*, or *deficient*, or *malicious*. This *Approbation* cannot be ſuppoſed an *Image of any thing external*, more than the *Pleaſure of Harmony*, *of Taſte*, *of Smell*. But let none imagine, that calling the *Ideas of Virtue* and *Vice* Perceptions of a *Senſe*, upon apprehending the *Actions* and *Affections* of another does diminiſh their *Reality*, more than the like *Aſſertions* concerning all *Pleaſure* and *Pain*, *Happineſs* or *Miſery*. Our *Reaſon* does often correct the *Report of our Senſes*, about the *natural Tendency* of the external Action, and corrects *raſh Concluſions* about the *Affections* of the Agent. But whether our *moral Senſe* be ſubject to ſuch a Diſorder, as to have *different Perceptions*, from the ſame apprehended *Affections* in an Agent, at *different times*, as the *Eye* may have of the Colours of an unaltered Object, 'tis not eaſy to determine: Perhaps it will be hard to find any Inſtances of ſuch a *Change*. What *Reaſon* could correct, if it fell into ſuch a *Diſorder*, I know not; except ſuggeſting to its *Remembrance* its *former Approbations*, and repreſenting the *general Senſe* of Mankind.

Sect. 4. kind. But this does not prove Ideas of *Virtue* and *Vice* to be previous to a *Senſe*, more than a like *Correction* of the Ideas of *Colour* in a Perſon under the *Jaundice*, proves that *Colours* are perceived by *Reaſon*, previouſly to *Senſe*.

IF any ſay, "this *moral Senſe* is not "a *Rule*:" What means that Word? It is not a *ſtrait rigid Body*: It is not a *general Propoſition, ſhewing what Means are fit to obtain an end*: It is not a *Propoſition, aſſerting, that a Superior will make thoſe happy who act one way, and miſerable who act the contrary way*. If theſe be the Meanings of *Rule*, it is no *Rule*; yet by reflecting upon it our Underſtanding may find out a *Rule*. But what *Rule* of Actions can be formed, without Relation to ſome *End* propoſed? Or what *End* can be propoſed, without preſuppoſing *Inſtincts, Deſires, Affections*, or a *moral Senſe*, it will not be eaſy to explain.

SECT.

SECT. V.

Shewing that Virtue *may have whatever is meant by* Merit; *and be* rewardable *upon the Suppoſition, that it is perceived by a* Senſe, *and elected from* Affection *or* Inſtinct.

SOME will not allow any *Merit* in *Actions* flowing from *kind Inſtincts*: "*Merit*, ſay they, attends Actions to "which we are excited by *Reaſon* alone, "or to which we *freely* determine our "ſelves. The Operation of *Inſtincts* or "*Affections* is *neceſſary*, and not *volun-* "*tary*; nor is there more *Merit* in them "than in the *Shining of the Sun*, the "*Fruitfulneſs of a Tree*, or the *Over-* "*flowing of a Stream*, which are all *pub-* "*lickly uſeful.*"

BUT what does *Merit* mean? or *Praiſe-worthineſs*? Do theſe Words denote the "Quality in Actions, which gains *Appro-* "*bation* from the Obſerver? Or, 2*dly*, Are theſe Actions called meritorious, "which, "when any Obſerver does *approve* all o- "ther *Merit, what.*

Sect. 5. " ther *Obſervers* approve him for his *Ap-*
" *probation* of it; and would condemn
" any *Obſerver* who did not *approve* theſe
" Actions?" Theſe are the only Meanings of *meritorious*, which I can conceive as diſtinct from *rewardable*, which is conſidered hereafter ſeparately.

Now we endeavoured already to ſhew, that " no *Reaſon* can excite to Action " previouſly to ſome *End*, and that no " *End* can be propoſed without ſome *In-* " *ſtinct* or Affection." What then can be meant by being *excited by Reaſon*, as diſtinct from all Motion of *Inſtincts* or *Affections?*

THEN *determining our ſelves freely*, does it mean *acting without any Motive or exciting Reaſon?* If it did not mean this, it cannot be oppoſed to *acting from Inſtinct or Affections*, ſince all *Motives* or *Reaſons* preſuppoſe them. If it do mean this, that " Merit is found only in Actions " done without *Motive* or *Affection*, by " *mere Election*, without prepollent *De-* " *ſire* of one *Action* or *End* rather than " its oppoſite, or without *Deſire of that* " *Pleaſure* which * ſome do ſuppoſe fol- " lows

* This is the Notion of *Liberty* given by the Archbiſhop of *Dublin*, in his moſt ingenious Book, *De Origine Mali.*

This

'lows upon any *Election*, by a *natural* Sect. 5.
"*Connexion*:" Then let any Man conſider
whether he ever acts in this manner by *mere Election*, without any previous *Deſire*? And again, let him conſult his own Breaſt, whether ſuch kind of Action gains his *Approbation*? Upon ſeeing a Perſon not more diſpoſed by *Affection, Compaſſion, or Love or Deſire*, to make his Country happy than miſerable, yet chooſing the one rather than the other, from no *Deſire of publick Happineſs*, nor *Averſion to the Torments of others*, but by ſuch an *unaffectionate Determination*, as that by which one moves his *firſt Finger* rather than the *ſecond*, in giving an Inſtance of a *trifling Action*; let any one ask if this Action ſhould be *meritorious*: and yet that there ſhould be no *Merit* in a *tender compaſſionate Heart*, which ſhrinks at every *Pain* of its *Fellow-Creatures*, and triumphs in their *Happineſs*; with *kind Affections* and *ſtrong Deſire* labouring for the publick Good. If this be the Nature of *meritorious Actions*; I fancy every honeſt

---

This Opinion does not repreſent *Freedom* of Election, as oppoſite to all *Inſtinct* or *Deſire*; but rather as ariſing from the *Deſire* of that *Pleaſure ſuppoſed to be connected with every Election*. Upon his Scheme there is a *Motive* and *End* propoſed in every Election, and a natural Inſtinct toward Happineſs preſuppoſed: Tho 'tis ſuch a *Motive* and *End* as leaves us in perfect *Liberty*. Since it is a Pleaſure or Happineſs, not connected with one thing more than another, but following upon the *Determination* itſelf.

Sect. 5. Heart would diſclaim all *Merit in Morals*, as violently as the old *Proteſtants* rejected it in *Juſtification*.

But let us ſee which of the two Senſes of *Merit* or *Praiſe-worthineſs* is founded on this (I won't call it *unreaſonable* or *caſual*) but *unaffectionate Choice*. If Merit denotes the *Quality moving the Spectator to approve*, then there may be *unaffectionate Election* of the greateſt Villany, as well as of the moſt uſeful Actions; but who will ſay that they are *equally approved*? —But perhaps 'tis not the *mere Freedom of Choice* which is approved, but the *free Choice of publick Good*, without any *Affection*. Then Actions are approved for *publick Uſefulneſs*, and not for *Freedom*. Upon this Suppoſition the *Heat of the Sun*, the *Fruitfulneſs of a Tree*, would be *meritorious*: or if one ſays, "theſe are "not *Actions*;" they are at leaſt *meritorious Qualities*, *Motions*, *Attractions*, &c. And a *caſual Invention* may be *meritorious*. —— Perhaps *Free Election* is a *Conditio ſine qua non*, and *publick Uſefulneſs* the immediate *Cauſe* of Approbation; neither ſeparately, but both jointly are *meritorious*: *Free Election alone* is not *Merit*; *Publick Uſefulneſs alone* is not *Merit*; but both concurring. Then ſhould any Perſon by *mere Election*, without any *Deſire* to ſerve the publick, ſet about *Mines*,

Mines, or any *uſeful Manufacture*; or ſhould a Perſon by *mere Election* ſtab a Man, without knowing him to be a *publick Robber*; here both *free Election* and *publick Uſefulneſs* may concur: Yet will any one ſay there is *Merit* or *Virtue* in ſuch Actions? Where then ſhall we find Merit, unleſs in *kind Affections*, or *Deſire* and *Intention* of the publick Good? This moves our *Approbation* wherever we obſerve it: and the want of this is the true *Reaſon* why a *Searcher for Mines*, a *free Killer* of an unknown Robber, the *warming Sun*, or the *fruitful Tree*, are not counted *meritorius*. Sect. 5.

BUT it may be ſaid, that to make an Action *meritorious*, it is neceſſary not only that the Action be *publickly uſeful*, but that it be *known* or *imagined* to be *ſuch*, before the Agent freely chuſes it. But what does this add to the former Scheme? Only a *Judgment* or *Opinion* in the *Underſtanding*, concerning the *natural Tendency* of an Action to the publick Good: Few, it may be preſumed, will place *Virtue* in *Aſſent* or *Diſſent*, or *Perceptions*. And yet this is all that is ſuperadded to the former Caſe. The Agent muſt not *deſire* the publick Good, or have any *kind Affections*. This would ſpoil the *Freedom of Choice*, according to their Scheme, who inſiſt on a *Freedom oppoſite to Affections*,

Sect. 5. *or Inſtincts:* But he muſt *barely know* the Tendency to publick Good, and without any *Propenſity* to, or *Deſire* of, the Happineſs of others, by an *arbitrary Election*, acquire his Merit. Let every Man judge for himſelf, whether theſe are the Qualities which he *approves*.

WHAT has probably engaged many into this way of ſpeaking, "that Virtue is "the Effect of *rational Choice*, and not "of *Inſtincts or Affections*," is this; they find, that "ſome Actions flowing from "particular kind Affections, are ſometimes "condemned as *evil*," becauſe of their *bad Influence* upon the State of larger Societies; and that the *Hurry* and *confuſed Senſations* of any of our Paſſions, may divert the Mind from conſidering the *whole Effect* of its Actions: They require therefore to *Virtue* a *calm and undiſturbed Temper*.

THERE is indeed ſome ground to recommend this *Temper* as very neceſſary in many Caſes; and yet ſome of the moſt *paſſionate Actions* may be perfectly *good*. But in the *calmeſt Temper* there muſt remain *Affection* or *Deſire*, ſome implanted *Inſtinct* for which we can give no *reaſon*; otherwiſe there could be no Action of any kind. As it was ſhewn above in the firſt Section.

IF

Sect. 5.

IF *meritorious Actions* are theſe which whoſoever does not *approve*, is himſelf *condemned* by others; the Quality by which they are conſtituted *meritorious* in this Senſe, is the ſame which moves our *Approbation*. We *condemn* any Perſon who does not *approve* that which we our ſelves *approve*: We preſume the *Senſe* of others to be conſtituted like our own; and that any other Perſon, would he attend to the Actions which we *approve*, would alſo *approve* them, and love the Agent; when we find that another does not *approve* what we approve, we are apt to conclude, that he has not had *kind Affections* toward the Agent, or that ſome *evil Affection* makes him overlook his Virtues, and on this account condemn him.

PERHAPS by meritorious is meant the ſame thing with another Word uſed in like manner, *viz. rewardable*. Then indeed the *Quality* in which *Merit* or Rewardableneſs is founded, is different from that which is denoted by Merit in the former Meanings.

REWARDABLE, or *deſerving Reward*, denotes either that *Quality which would incline a ſuperior Nature to make an Agent happy*: Or, 2dly, That *Quality of Actions which would make a Spectator ap-*

Sect. 5. *prove a ſuperior Nature, when he conferred Happineſs on the Agent, and diſapprove that Superior, who inflicted Miſery on the Agent, or puniſhed him.* Let any one try to give a Meaning to the Word *rewardable* diſtinct from theſe, and not ſatisfy himſelf with the Words *worthy of*, or *deſerving*, which are of very complex and ambiguous Signification.

Now the *Qualities* of an Action determining a powerful Nature to reward it, muſt be various, according to the *Conſtitution* and *Affections* of that Superior. If he has a *moral Senſe*, or *ſomething analagous* of a more excellent ſort, by which he is determined to *love* thoſe who evidence *kind Affections*, and to deſire their Happineſs, then *kind Affection* is a Quality moving to Reward.

But farther, if this Superior be *benevolent*, and obſerves that inferior Natures can by their mutual Actions promote their mutual Happineſs; then he muſt incline to excite them to *publickly uſeful Actions*, by Proſpects of *private Intereſt* to the Agent, if it be needful: Therefore he will engage them to publickly uſeful Actions by *Proſpects of Rewards*, whatever be the internal Principle of their Actions, or whatever their *Affections* be. Theſe *two Qualities* in Actions, *viz. flowing from kind Af-*

Affections, and *publick Uſefulneſs* concur- Sect. 5.
ring, undoubtedly incline the *benevolent Superior* to confer Happineſs: The *former alone*, where, thro' want of *Power*, the Agent is diſappointed of his kind Intentions, will incline a benevolent Superior to reward; and the *want of Power* in the Agent will never incline him to puniſh. But the *want of kind Affections*, altho there be *publickly uſeful Actions*, may be ſo offenſive to the *moral Senſe* of the *ſuperior Nature*, as to prevent *Reward*, or excite to *puniſh*; unleſs this Conduct would occaſion *greater publick Evil*, by withdrawing from many Agents a *neceſſary Motive* to publick Uſefulneſs, *viz.* the *Hope of Reward*.

BUT if the Superior were *malicious* with a *moral Senſe contrary to ours*, the contrary *Affections* and *Tendency of Actions* would excite to reward, if any ſuch thing could be expected from ſuch a *Temper*.

IF Actions be called *rewardable*, when "a *Spectator* would approve the *ſuperior* "*Mind* for conferring Rewards on ſuch "Actions:" Then various Actions muſt be rewardable, according to the *moral Senſe* of the Spectator. *Men* approve rewarding all *kind Affections*: And if it will promote publick Good to promiſe

Sect. 5. Rewards to *publickly uſeful Actions* from whatſoever *Affections* they proceed, it will evidence Benevolence in the Superior to do ſo. And this is the Caſe with *human Governors*, who cannot dive into the Affections of Men.

Whether Motives or Inclinations to Evil be neceſſary to make an Agent rewardable?

SOME ſtrongly aſſert (which is often the only Proof) that "to make an Action "*rewardable*, the Agent ſhould have had "Inclinations to evil as well as to good." What does this mean, That a good governing MIND is only inclined to make an Agent happy, or to confer a *Reward* on him when he has ſome *evil Affections*, which yet are ſurmounted by the *benevolent Affections*? But would not a *benevolent Superior* incline to make any *benevolent Agent* happy, whether he had any weaker evil Inclinations or not? Evil Inclinations in an Agent would certainly rather have ſome Tendency to *diminiſh* the Love of the ſuperior Mind. Cannot a good Mind *love* an Agent, and *deſire* his Happineſs, unleſs he obſerves ſome Qualities, which, were they alone, would excite *Hatred* or *Averſion*? Muſt there be a Mixture of *Hatred* to make *Love* ſtrong and effectual, as there muſt be a Mixture of Shade to ſet off the Lights in a Picture, where there are no *Shades*? Is there any Love, where there is no *Inclination to*

make

make happy? Or is ſtrong Love made up of *Love* and *Hatred*? Sect. 5.

'TIS true indeed, that *Men* judge of the *Strength* of kind Affections generally by the contrary Motives of *Self-Love*, which they ſurmount: But muſt the DEITY do ſo too? Is any Nature the leſs lovely, for its having no Motive to make itſelf *odious*? If a Being which has no Motive to evil can be *beloved* by a Superior, ſhall he not *deſire the Happineſs* of that Agent whom he loves? 'Tis true, ſuch a Nature will do good Actions without Proſpect of any *Self-Intereſt*; but would any benevolent Superior ſtudy the leſs to make it happy on that account? —— But if they apply the Word *rewardable* to thoſe Actions alone, *which an Agent would not do without Proſpect of Reward*: then indeed to make an Action in this Senſe *rewardable*, 'tis neceſſary that the Agent ſhould either have *no kind Affections*, or that he ſhould live in ſuch Circumſtances, wherein Self-Love ſhould lead to Actions *contrary* to the publick Good, and over-power any kind Affections; or that he ſhould have *evil Affections*, which even in a good Conſtitution of the World, his *Self-Love* could not over-ballance without *Reward*.

Sect. 5.

THIS poor Idea of *Rewardableneſs* is taken from the *Poverty* and *Impotence* of *human Governors:* Their Funds are ſoon exhauſted; they cannot make happy all thoſe whoſe Happineſs they deſire: Their *little Stores* muſt be frugally managed; none muſt be rewarded for what good they will do without Reward, or for abſtaining from Evils to which they are not inclined. Rewards muſt be kept for the *inſolent Miniſter*, who without reward would fly in the Face of his Prince; for the *turbulent Demagogue*, who will raiſe Factions if he is not bribed; for the *covetous*, *mean-ſpirited*, but *artful Citizen*, who will ſerve his Country no farther than it is for his private Intereſt. But let any kind honeſt Heart declare what *ſort of Characters* it *loves? Whoſe* Happineſs it moſt deſires? *Whom* it would reward if it could? Or what theſe *Diſpoſitions* are, which if it ſaw rewarded by a ſuperior Nature, it would be moſt pleaſed, and moſt *approve* the Conduct of the Superior? When theſe Queſtions are anſwer'd, we ſhall know what makes Actions *rewardable*.

IF we call all Actions *rewardable*, the rewarding of which we *approve*; then indeed we ſhall approve the rewarding of all *Actions which we approve*, whether the Agent

Agent has had any *Inclinations* or *Motives* to Evil or not: We ſhall alſo approve the *promiſing of Rewards* to all *publickly uſeful Actions*, whatever were the Affections of the Agents. If by this *Proſpect of Reward* either *malicious* Natures are reſtrained from Miſchief, or *ſelfiſh* Natures induced to ſerve the Publick, or *benevolent* Natures not able without reward to ſurmount real or apparent *ſelfiſh Motives*: In all theſe Caſes, the *propoſing Rewards* does really advance the Happineſs of the *Whole*, or diminiſh its *Miſery*; and evidences *Benevolence* in the ſuperior Mind, and is conſequently *approved* by our *moral Senſe*. Sect. 5.

IN this laſt Meaning of the Word *rewardable*, theſe Diſpoſitions are rewardable. 1. *Pure unmixed Benevolence.* 2. *Prepollent good Affections.* 3. *Such weak Benevolence, as will not without Reward overcome apparently contrary Motives of Self-Love.* 4. *Unmixed Self-Love, which by Proſpect of Reward may ſerve the publick.* 5. *Self-Love, which by Aſſiſtance of Rewards, may overballance ſome malicious Affections.* If in theſe Caſes *propoſing Rewards* will increaſe the Happineſs of the Syſtem, or diminiſh its Miſery, it evidences *Goodneſs* in the Governor, when he cannot ſo well otherwiſe accompliſh ſo much good for the whole.

Sect. 5.

IF we ſuppoſe a Neceſſity of making all virtuous Agents *equally happy*, then indeed a *Mixture of evil Diſpoſitions*, tho ſurmounted by the good, or of *ſtrong contrary Motives* overballanced by *Motives to Good*, would be a Circumſtance of ſome Importance in the Diſtribution of Rewards: Since ſuch a Nature, during the *Struggle of contrary Affections* or Motives, muſt have had leſs *Pleaſure* than that virtuous Nature which met with no Oppoſition: But as this very Oppoſition did give this Nature *full Evidence* of the Strength of its Virtue, this *Conſciouſneſs* may be a peculiar *Recompence* to which the unmixed Tempers are Strangers: And there ſeems no ſuch neceſſity of an *equal Happineſs of all Natures*. It is no way inconſiſtent with perfect Goodneſs, to make different *Orders of Beings*; and, provided all the Virtuous be at laſt *fully content*, and as happy as they deſire, there is nothing abſurd in ſuppoſing *different Capacities* and *different Degrees*; and during the Time of *Probation*, there is no neceſſity, not the leaſt ſhew of it, that all be equal.

THOSE who think "*no Perſon puniſhable for any Quality or Action, if* "*he had it not in his Power to have had* "*the oppoſite Quality, or to have ab-*

"*ſtained*

" *ſtained from the Action if he had wil-* Sect. 5.
" *led it*;" perhaps are not miſtaken: but then let them not aſſert on the *other Hand*, that it is unjuſt to reward or make happy thoſe, who neither had any *Diſpoſitions to Evil*, nor could poſſibly *deſire* any ſuch Diſpoſitions. Now if Mens Affections are naturally good, and if there be in their Fellows no *Quality* which would neceſſarily raiſe *Malice* in the Obſerver; but, on the contrary, *all Qualities* requiſite to excite at leaſt *Benevolence* or *Compaſſion*: It may be juſtly ſaid to be in the *Power* of every one, by due Attention, to prevent any *malicious Affections*, and to excite in himſelf *kind Affections* toward all. So that the intricate Debates about human *Liberty* do not affect what is here alledged, concerning our *moral Senſe* of Affections and Actions, any more than any other Schemes.

SOME alledge, that MERIT ſuppoſes, beſide *kind Affection*, that the Agent has a *moral Senſe*, *reflects* upon his own Virtue, *delights* in it, and *chuſes* to adhere to it for the *Pleaſure* which attends it*. We need not debate the Uſe of this Word *Merit*: 'tis plain, we *approve* a generous kind Action, tho the Agent had not made this *Re-*

* See Lord *Shaftesbury*'s Inquiry concerning Virtue. *Part* 1.

Sect. 5. *flection.* This Reflection ſhews to him a Motive of Self-Love, the joint View to which does not increaſe our *Approbation:* But then it muſt again be owned, that we cannot form a juſt Concluſion of a *Character* from one or two kind, generous Actions, eſpecially where there has been no very ſtrong *Motives to the contrary.* Some apparent Motives of *Intereſt* may afterwards overballance the *kind Affections*, and lead the Agent into vicious Actions. But the *Reflection* on Virtue, the being once *charmed* with the lovely Form, will diſcover an *Intereſt* on its ſide, which, if well attended to, no other Motive will overballance. This Reflection is a great *Security* to the *Character*; this muſt be ſuppoſed in ſuch Creatures as *Men* are, before we can well depend upon a *Conſtancy in Virtue.* The ſame may be ſaid of many other Motives to Virtue from *Intereſt*; which, tho they do not *immediately* influence the *kind Affections* of the Agent, yet do remove theſe *Obſtacles* to them, from *falſe Appearances of Intereſt.* Such are theſe from the Sanctions of *divine Laws* by future Rewards and Puniſhments, and even the manifeſt *Advantages of Virtue in this Life:* without *Reflection* on which, a ſteddy *Courſe of Virtue* is ſcarce to be expected amidſt the preſent Confuſion of human Affairs.

SECT.

SECT. VI.

How far a Regard to the Deity is neceſſary to make an Action virtuous.

I. SOME do imagine, that "to make "an Action virtuous, it is neceſſa- "ry that the Agent ſhould have previouſly "known his Action to be *acceptable to* "*the* DEITY, and have undertaken it "chiefly with deſign to pleaſe or obey "him. We have not, ſay they, reaſon "to imagine a *malicious Intention* in many "of the worſt Actions: the very *want* "*of good Affections in their juſt Degree,* "muſt conſtitute *moral Evil.* If ſo, then "the *moral Evil* in the *want of Love or* "*Gratitude,* muſt increaſe in proportion "to the *Cauſes of Love or Gratitude* in "the Object: by the Cauſes of Love, "they mean *thoſe Qualities in the Object* "upon Obſervation of which Love or "Gratitude do ariſe in every good Tem- "per. Now the *Cauſes of Love* toward "the DEITY are infinite; therefore the "want of the higheſt poſſible Degree of "Love to him, muſt be infinitely evil. "—To be excited more by *ſmaller* "*Motives*

Sect. 6. " *Motives* or *Cauſes* than by greater; to " love thoſe who are leſs *lovely*, while " we neglect him in whom are *infinite* " *Cauſes of Love*, muſt argue great *Per-* " *verſeneſs* of Affections. But the *Cauſes* " *of Love* in the DEITY, his infinite " *Goodneſs* toward all, and even toward " our ſelves, from whence ſprings all the " Happineſs of our Lives, are infinitely " above any *Cauſes of Love* to be found " in *Creatures*: Therefore to act from " Love to them without *Intention* to pleaſe " GOD, muſt be infinitely evil."

IF this Reaſoning be juſt, the beſt of Men are infinitely evil. The Diſtinction between *habitual* and *actual Intention* will not remove the Difficulty, ſince theſe Arguments require *actual Intention*. An *habitual Intention* is not a preſent act of Love to the DEITY, influencing our Actions more than actual Love to *Creatures*, which this Argument requires; but a prior general *Reſolution* not at preſent repeated.

TO find what is juſt on this Subject, we may premiſe ſome Propoſitions of which Men muſt convince themſelves by *Reflection*.

How we compute the Goodneſs of Temper.

II. THERE is in Mankind ſuch a *Diſpoſition* naturally, that they deſire the Happineſs of any known *ſenſitive Nature*, when

when it is not inconſiſtent with ſomething more ſtrongly deſired; ſo that were there no *Oppoſitions of Intereſt* eirher private or publick, and *ſufficient Power*, we would confer upon every Being the higheſt Happineſs which it could receive. Sect. 6.

BUT our *Underſtanding* and *Power* are limited, ſo that we cannot know many other Natures, nor is our utmoſt *Power* capable of promoting the Happineſs of many: our Actions are therefore influenced by ſome *ſtronger Affections* than this general *Benevolence*. There are certain *Qualities* found in ſome Beings more than in others, which excite ſtronger *Degrees* of *Good-will*, and determine our *Attention* to their Intereſts, while that of others is neglected. The Ties of *Blood*, *Benefits conferred* upon us, and the Obſervation of *Virtue* in others, raiſe much more vigorous *Affections*, than that general *Benevolence* which we may have toward all. Theſe *Qualities* or *Relations* we may call the *Cauſes of Love*.

HOWEVER theſe *Affections* are very different from the *general Benevolence* toward all, yet it is very probable, that there is a *Regularity* or *Proportion* obſerved in the Conſtitution of our Nature; ſo that, abſtracting from ſome acquired *Habits*, or

Aſſo-

Sect. 6. *Aſſociations of Ideas*, and from the more ſudden *Emotions* of ſome particular Paſſions, *that* Temper which has the moſt lively *Gratitude*, or is the moſt ſuſceptive of *Friendſhip* with virtuous Characters, would alſo have the ſtrongeſt *general Benevolence* toward indifferent Perſons: And on the contrary, where there is the weakeſt *general Benevolence*, there we could expect the leaſt *Gratitude*, and the *leaſt Friendſhip*, or *Love toward the Virtuous*. If this *Proportion* be obſerved, then, if we expreſs all theſe Deſires of the good of others by the Name of *Benevolence*, we may denote the ſeveral *Degrees* in which Men poſſeſs theſe ſeveral kind Diſpoſitions by the *Goodneſs of the Temper*: And the Degrees of Deſire toward the Happineſs of any Perſon, we may call the *Quantity of Love* toward him. Then,

THE *Quantity of Love* toward any Perſon is in a compound Proportion of the apprehended *Cauſes of Love* in him, and of the *Goodneſs of Temper* in the Obſerver. Or $L = C \times G$.

WHEN the *Cauſes of Love* in two Objects are apprehended equal, the *Love* toward either in different Perſons is as the *Goodneſs of Temper*; or $L = G \times 1$.

Sect. 6.

WHEN the *Goodneſs of Temper* is the ſame or equal, the *Love* toward any Objects will be as the *Cauſes*; or $L = C \times 1$.

THE *Goodneſs of any Temper* is therefore as the *Quantity of Love*, divided by the apprehended *Cauſes*, or $G = \frac{L}{C}$. And ſince we cannot apprehend any Goodneſs in having the *Degree of Love* above the *Proportion* of its Cauſes, the moſt virtuous Temper is that in which the *Love* equals its *Cauſes*, which may therefore be expreſſed by Unity *.

HENCE it follows, that if there were any Nature incomparably more excellent than any of our *Fellow-Creatures*, from whom alſo we our ſelves, and all others had received the greateſt *Benefits*; there would be leſs Virtue in any ſmall Degree of *Deſire of his Happineſs*, than in a like *Degree of Love* toward our Fellow-Creature. But *not loving* ſuch a Being, or having a *ſmaller Degree of Love*, muſt evidence a much greater *Defect* in Virtue, than a like *want of Love* toward our Fellow-Creatures. For the *Cauſes of Love* being very great, unleſs the *Love* be alſo

* See *Treat.* 2. *Sect.* 3. *Art.* 11. laſt Paragraph.

Sect. 6. very great, the *Quotient* which expreſſes the *Goodneſs of Temper* will be very much below Unity.

The general Rules applied to the Love of God.

III. To apply this to the DEITY is very obvious. Our *Affections* toward him ariſe in the ſame manner as toward our Fellows, in proportion to our *Attention* to the *Cauſes of Love* in him, and the *Goodneſs of our Temper*. The Reflection on his Goodneſs raiſes *Approbation* and *Complacence*, his *Benefits* raiſe *Gratitude*, and both occaſion *Good-will* or *Benevolence*. Some imagine, that "his *Happineſs* is wholly "detached from all Events in this World, "abſolute, and unvaried in himſelf." And yet the ſame *Inclination* of Mind might remain in us, tho we had this Opinion. When the *Happineſs of a Friend* is in *Suſpenſe*, we deſire it; when he has obtained all that which we deſired, the ſame *Inclination of Mind* ſeems to remain toward him, only without that *Uneaſineſs* accompanying Deſire of an *uncertain* Object: Thus *Gravity* may be ſaid to be the ſame when a Body is reſting on a fixed Baſe, as when it cauſed deſcent.

UPON this Scheme of the divine Happineſs, it is not eaſy to account how our Love to him could excite us to promote the *Happineſs of our Fellows*. Our frequent *Contemplation* of ſuch an amiable excellent Nature

Nature, might indeed tend to *reform* or *improve* our Temper. Sect. 6.

IF we imagine that the DEITY has ſuch *Perceptions* of *Approbation* or *Diſlike* toward Actions as we have our ſelves, then indeed our *Love* to him would directly excite us to do whatever he approves, and ſhun what he condemns. We can ſcarce avoid imagining, that the frequent recurring of Events *diſapproved*, muſt be uneaſy to any Nature, and that the obſerving *approved Actions* muſt be delightful.

IF we imagine that the *divine Happineſs*, or any part of it is connected with the Happineſs of his Creatures, ſo that their Happineſs is conſtituted the Occaſion of his; then indeed our *Love to the* DEITY will directly excite us to all manner of *beneficent Actions*. 'Tis true, many good Men deny theſe two laſt Opinions, yet it is probable, when their Minds are diverted from *Speculations*, by Opportunities of Action, there recurs ſome Imagination of *Offence*, *Uneaſineſs*, and *Reſentment* in the DEITY, upon obſerving *evil Actions*; of *Delight* and *Joy* in beholding good Actions; of *Sorrow* upon obſerving the *Miſery* of his Creatures, and *Joy* upon ſeeing them happy: So that by their *Love to the* DEITY they are influenced to beneficent Actions, notwithſtanding their

Sect. 6. *ſpeculative Opinions.* In our Conceptions of the DEITY, we are continually led to imagine a Reſemblance to what we feel in our ſelves.

WHOEVER maintains theſe Opinions of the DEITY to be true, muſt alſo ſuppoſe "a particular *Determination* of all Events "in the Univerſe;" otherwiſe this *part* of the divine Happineſs is made *precarious* and *uncertain*, depending upon the *undetermined Will* of Creatures.

THE Diverſity of Opinions concerning the *divine Happineſs*, may lead Men into different ways of accounting for the *Influence* which the *Love of* GOD may have upon our Actions toward our Fellows: But the Affections toward the DEITY would be much the ſame upon both Schemes. Where there were the ſame juſt *Apprehenſions* of the *divine Goodneſs* in two Perſons, the *Love* to the DEITY in both would be proportioned to the *Goodneſs of Temper*. Tho the higheſt poſſible *Degree* of Love to a perfectly good DEITY, would evidence no more *Virtue of Temper*, than a proportioned *Love to Creatures*; yet the having only *ſmaller Degrees* of Love to the DEITY, would evidence a greater *Defect* of Goodneſs in the Temper, than any want of *Affection* toward Creatures.

HERE

Sect. 6.

HERE it muſt be remembred, that in arguing concerning the *Goodneſs of Temper* from the *Degree* of Love directly, and the *Cauſes* of Love inverſly, *actual Attention* to the *Cauſes of Love* is ſuppoſed in the Perſon. For 'tis plain, that in the beſt Temper no one *Affection or Idea* can always continue preſent, and there can be no *Affection* preſent to the Mind, toward any Object, while the *Idea* of it is not preſent. The bare *Abſence* therefore of Affection, while the Mind is employed upon a different Object, can argue no *evil* in the Temper, farther than want of *Attention* may argue want of *Affection*. In like manner, in the *beſt Temper*, there can be no Love toward an Object *unknown*: The want therefore of Love to an *Object unknown*, can argue no evil in the Temper, farther than *Ignorance* may argue want of *Affection*. It is certain indeed, that he who knows that there is a good DEITY, and actually thinks of him, and of all his Benefits, yet has not the *ſtrongeſt Love and Gratitude* toward him, muſt have a Temper void of all Goodneſs; but it will not follow, that that Mind is void of Goodneſs which is not *always thinking* of the DEITY, or actually *loving* him, or even does not know him. How far the want of *Attention* to the DEITY, and *Ignorance* of him, may argue an *evil Temper*,

Sect 6. muſt be ſhown from different *Topicks*, to be conſidered hereafter.

What Degrees of Affection neceſſary to Innocence.

IV. But previouſly to theſe Inquiries we muſt conſider "what *Degrees* or Kinds of "Affection are neceſſary to obtain the "ſimple *Approbation* of *Innocence*." 'Tis plain, the *bare Abſence* of all *Malice* is not enough. We may have the general *Benevolence* toward a mere *ſenſitive Nature*, which had no other deſire but *Self-Love*; but we can apprehend no *moral Goodneſs* in ſuch a Being: Nay, 'tis not every *ſmall Degree* of kind Affections which we *approve*. There muſt be ſome *proportion* of kind Affections to the *other Faculties* in any Nature, particularly to its *Underſtanding* and *active Powers* to obtain *Approbation*. Some Brutes evidence ſmall Degrees of *Good-will*, which make them be *approved* in *their Kind*; but the ſame Degrees would not be approved in a *Man*. There is an higher Degree expected in Mankind, to which, if they do not come up, we do not account them *innocent*. It is not eaſy to fix preciſely that *Degree* which we approve as *innocent* by our moral Senſe. Every kind Affection, if it be conſidered only with relation to its own Object, is indeed approved; ſuch as *natural Affection*, *Gratitude*, *Pity*, *Friendſhip*: And yet when we take a more *extenſive* View of the Tendency of ſome

ſome Actions proceeding even from theſe *Affections*, we may often condemn theſe Actions when they are apprehended as pernicious to *larger Syſtems* of Mankind. In the ſame manner we often condemn Actions done from Love to a particular Country, when they appear to be *pernicious to Mankind* in general. In like manner, *Self-Preſervation* and purſuing *private Advantage* abſtractly conſidered, is *innocent*: But when it is apprehended as very pernicious in any caſe to the Safety of *others*, it is condemned. Sect. 6.

MANKIND are capable of large extenſive Ideas of *great Societies*. And it is expected of them, that their *general Benevolence* ſhould continually direct and limit, not only their *ſelfiſh Affections*, but even their *nearer Attachments* to others: that their Deſire of *publick* Good, and Averſion to *publick* Miſery, ſhould overcome at leaſt their Deſire of *poſitive private Advantages*, either to themſelves or their particular Favourites; ſo as to make them abſtain from any Action which would be poſitively pernicious or hurtful to *Mankind*, however *beneficial* it might be to *themſelves*, or their *Favourites*. To undergo *poſitive Evil* for the ſake of *poſitive Good* to others, ſeems ſome degree of Virtue above *Innocence*, which we do not univerſally expect: But to reject *poſitive* attainable

Sect. 6. tainable good, either for our ſelves or our particular Favourites, rather than occaſion any conſiderable *Miſery* to others, is requiſite to obtain the Approbation of *Innocence*. The *want* of this Degree we poſitively condemn as evil; and an Agent muſt riſe above it by *poſitive Services* to Mankind, with ſome *Trouble* and *Expence* to himſelf, before we approve him as virtuous. We ſeem indeed univerſally to expect from all Men thoſe good Offices which give the Agent no trouble or expence: Whoever refuſes them is below Innocence. But we do not *poſitively condemn* thoſe as evil, who will not ſacrifice their private Intereſt to the Advancement of the *poſitive Good* of others, unleſs the private Intereſt be *very ſmall*, and the publick Good *very great*.

BUT as the Deſire of *poſitive private Good* is weaker than Averſion to *private Evil*, or Pain; ſo our *Deſire* of the poſitive Good of others, is weaker than our *Averſion* to their Miſery: It ſeems at leaſt requiſite to *Innocence*, that the ſtronger *publick Affection*, *viz.* our Averſion to the Miſery of others, ſhould ſurmount the *weaker private Affection*, the Deſire of poſitive private Good; ſo that no proſpect of Good to our ſelves, ſhould engage us to that which would occaſion *Miſery* to others. It is in like manner requiſite to

In-

Innocence, that our Averſion to the Miſery of *greater* or *equal Syſtems*, ſhould ſurmount our Deſire of the *poſitive Good* of theſe to which we are more particularly attached. Sect. 6.

How far it may be neceſſary to Innocence to ſubmit to ſmaller *private Pains* to prevent the *greater Sufferings* of others, or to promote ſome great *poſitive Advantages*; or how far the Happineſs of *private Syſtems* ſhould be neglected for the Happineſs of the *greater*, in order to obtain the *Approbation of Innocence*, it is perhaps impoſſible preciſely to determine, or to fix any *general Rules*; nor indeed is it neceſſary. Our buſineſs is not to find out "at how *cheap* a Rate we can purchaſe "*Innocence*, but to know what is *moſt* "*noble*, *generous* and *virtuous* in Life." This we know conſiſts in ſacrificing all *poſitive Intereſts*, and bearing all *private Evils* for the publick Good: And in ſubmitting alſo the Intereſts of all *ſmaller Syſtems* to the Intereſts of the whole: Without any other *Exception* or *Reſerve* than this, that every Man may look upon himſelf as a *Part* of this Syſtem, and conſequently not ſacrifice an *important private Intereſt* to a *leſs important Intereſt* of others. We may find the ſame ſort of Difficulty about all our other Senſes, in determining preciſely what Objects are *indifferent*,

Sect. 6. *different*, or where Pleaſure ends, and Diſguſt begins, tho the poſitive Degrees of the *grateful* and *ungrateful* are eaſily diſtinguiſhed.

IT is alſo very difficult to fix any preciſe *Degree* of Affection toward the DEITY, which ſhould be barely requiſite to Innocence. Only in general we muſt diſapprove that Temper, which, upon Apprehenſion of the perfect Goodneſs of the DEITY, and of his innumerable Benefits to Mankind, has not *ſtronger Affections* of *Love* and *Gratitude* toward him, than thoſe toward any other Being. Such Affections would neceſſarily raiſe frequent *Attention* and Conſideration of our Actions; and would engage us, if we apprehended any of them to be offenſive to him, or contrary to that *Scheme of Events* in which we apprehended the DEITY to *delight*, to avoid them with a more firm Reſolution than what we had in any other Affairs. *Poſitive Virtue* toward the DEITY muſt go farther than a *reſolute abſtaining from Offence*, by engaging us with the greateſt Vigor, to do whatever we apprehend as *poſitively pleaſing*, or conducive to thoſe Ends in which we apprehend the DEITY delights. It is ſcarce conceivable that any *good Temper* can want ſuch Affections toward the DEITY, when once he is known, as were above ſuppoſed neceſſary to *Innocence*. Nor

can

can we imagine *positive Degrees* of Good-neſs of Temper above Innocence, where Affections toward the DEITY do not ariſe proportionably. Sect. 6.

WHAT is here ſaid relates only to the *Apprehenſions of our moral Senſe*, and not to thoſe Degrees of Virtue which the DEITY may require by *Revelation*: And every one's Heart may inform him, whether or no he does not *approve*, at leaſt as *innocent*, thoſe who omit many good Offices which they might *poſſibly* have done, provided they do a great deal of good; thoſe who carefully abſtain from every *apprehended Offence* toward the DEITY, tho they might poſſibly be more frequent in Acts of *Devotion*. 'Tis true indeed, the *Omiſſion of what we know to be required* is poſitively evil: ſo that by a *Revelation* we may be obliged to farther Services than were requiſite previouſly to it, which we could not innocently omit, after this *Revelation* is known: But we are here only conſidering our *moral Senſe*.

V. NOW let us inquire how far *ſimple Ignorance* of a DEITY, or *unaffected Atheiſm* does evidence an *evil Diſpoſition*, or *Defect* of good Affections below *Innocence*. *How far Ignorance of* DEITY *is Evil.*

1. AFFECTIONS ariſing upon *apparent Cauſes*, or preſent *Opinions*, tho falſe, if they

Sect. 6. they be ſuch as would ariſe in the *beſt Temper*, were theſe Opinions *true*, cannot argue any preſent *want of Goodneſs* in any Temper, of themſelves: the *Opinions* indeed may often argue a *want of Goodneſs* at the *time* they were formed: But to a benevolent Temper there is no *Cauſe of Malice*, or Deſire of the *Miſery* or *Non-exiſtence* of any Being for itſelf. There may be Cauſes of Diſlike, and Deſire of Miſery or Non-exiſtence, as the Means of greater Good, or of leſſening Evil.

2. No Object which is entirely *unknown*, or of which we have no *Idea*, can raiſe *Affection* in the beſt Temper; conſequently *want of Affection* to an unknown Object evidences no evil. This would be the Caſe of thoſe who never heard even the *Report of a* DEITY, if ever there were any ſuch: Or who never heard of any *Fellow-Creatures*, if one may make a Suppoſition like to that made by *Cicero* *. And this is perhaps the Caſe, as to the DEITY, of any unfortunate Children, who may have ſome little *Uſe of Reaſon*, before they are inſtructed in any *Religion*.

IF there really were an *Innate Idea* of a DEITY ſo imprinted, that no Perſon could

* De Nat. Deor. *Lib.* 2. *cap.* 37. Ex Ariſtotele.

be

be without it; or if we are ſo diſpoſed, as *neceſſarily* to receive this *Idea*, as ſoon as we can be called moral Agents: then no *Ignorance* of a DEITY can be innocent; all *Atheiſm* muſt be affected, or an Opinion formed, either thro' *evil Affection*, or *want* of *good Affection* below Innocence. But if the *Idea of a* DEITY be neither imprinted, nor offer itſelf even previouſly to any *Reflection*, nor be univerſally excited by *Tradition*, the bare *Want* of it, where there has been no *Tradition* or *Reflection*, cannot be called criminal upon any Scheme. Thoſe who make *Virtue* and *Vice* relative to a *Law*, may ſay, "Men are required "to reflect, and thence to know a DEITY." But they muſt allow *Promulgation* neceſſary, before Diſobedience to a Law can be criminal. Now previouſly to *Reflection* it is ſuppoſed impoſſible for the Agent to know the *Legiſlator*, or to know the *Law requiring him to reflect*, therefore this *Law requiring him to reflect*, was not antecedently to his *Reflection* publiſhed to him. Sect. 6.

THE Caſe of *human Laws*, the Ignorance of which does not excuſe, is not parallel to this. No Perſon under any Civil Government can be ſuppoſed ignorant that there are *Laws* made for the whole State: But in the preſent Suppoſition, Men antecedently to *Reflection* may be ignorant of the DEITY, or that there are *Laws of Nature*.

Sect. 6. *ture.* If any Subject could thus be *unapprized*, that he lived under Civil Government, he ſhould not be accounted *Compos Mentis*. The Suppoſition indeed in both Caſes is perhaps wholly *imaginary*; at leaſt as to Perſons above Childhood. One can ſcarce imagine that ever any Perſon was wholly unapprized of a *governing Mind*, and of a *Right* and *Wrong* in Morals. Whether this is to be aſcribed to *innate Ideas*, to *univerſal Tradition*, or to ſome *neceſſary Determination* in our Nature, to imagine a deſigning *Cauſe* of the beautiful Objects which occur to us, with a *moral Senſe*, let the curious inquire.

3. SUPPOSE an Idea formed in a *benevolent Mind*, of other *ſenſitive Natures*, *Deſire* of their Exiſtence and Happineſs would ariſe.

4. A GOOD *Temper* would incline any one to wiſh, that other Natures were *benevolent*, or morally Good, ſince this is the chief *Happineſs*.

5. A GOOD *Temper* would deſire that the Adminiſtration of Nature were by a *benevolent* or *good Mind*.

6. ALL Deſire of any Event or Circumſtance inclines any Mind to ſearch into the *Truth* of that Event or Circumſtance, by

by all the *Evidence* within its power to obtain. Sect. 6.

7. WHERE there is ſuch *Deſire*, and ſufficiently obvious *Evidence* given in proportion to the *Sagacity* of the deſiring Mind, it will come to the Knowledge of the Truth, if its Deſire be ſtrong.

NOW from theſe Propoſitions we may deduce the following Corollaries.

1. SUPPOSING the Idea of a good DEITY once apprehended, or excited either by *Report*, or the ſlighteſt *Reflection*; if there be *objective Evidence* in Nature proportioned to the *Capacicy* of the Inquirer, for the Exiſtence of a good DEITY, *Atheiſm* directly argues want of good Affection below *Innocence*.

2. IF there be only the ſimple *Tradition* or *Preſumption* of a governing Mind once raiſed; and if there be *Evidence* as before for his *Goodneſs*, to conclude the DEITY *evil* or *malicious*; muſt argue want of *good Affection* as before.

3. SUPPOSE the Idea of an *evil* DEITY once excited, and ſome Preſumptions for his *Malice* from *Tradition*, or ſlight *Reflection* upon particular *Evils* in Nature; to reſt in this Opinion without Inquiry, would

Sect. 6. would argue *want of good Affection*; to deſire to *reject* this Opinion, or *confute* it by contrary Evidence, would argue *good Affection:* Suppoſe ſuch contrary *Evidences* obvious enough in Nature to one who inquired as diligently about it as about his own *Intereſt*; to continue in the *falſe Opinion* cannot be innocent.

How Ignorance in human Affairs evidences a bad Temper.

VI. IN like manner concerning our Fellow-Creatures, who are actually known to us.

4. TO imagine Fellow-Creatures *morally Good*, either according to *Evidence* upon Inquiry, or even by a raſh *Opinion*, evidences *good Affection*.

5. IMAGINING them Evil contrary to obvious *Evidence*, argues *want of good Affection* below Innocence.

6. RETAINING and *inculcating* an Opinion either of the *Cauſes of Love* in others, or of the *Cauſes of Averſion*, induces an *Habit*; and makes the Temper prone to the *Affection* often raiſed. Opinion of *Goodneſs* in the DEITY and our Fellows, increaſes *good Affection*, and improves the *Temper: Contrary Opinion* of either, by raiſing frequent *Averſions*, weakens *good Affection*, and impairs the *Temper*.

THIS

Sect. 6.

THIS may ſhew how cautious Men ought to be in paſſing Sentence upon the *Impiety* of their Fellows, or repreſenting them as *wicked* and *profane*, or *hateful* to the DEITY, and juſtly given over to eternal Miſery: We may ſee alſo what a wiſe *Mark* it is to know the *true Church* by, that "it pronounces Damnation on all others." Which is one of the Characters of the *Romiſh* Church, by which it is often recommended as the ſafeſt for Chriſtians to live in.

THE ſame *Propoſitions* may be applied to our Opinions concerning the *natural Tendencies* of Actions. Where the Evidence is obvious as before, good Affection will produce *true Opinions*, and *falſe Opinions* often argue *want of good Affection* below Innocence. Thus, tho in *Aſſent* or *Diſſent* of themſelves, there can neither be *Virtue* nor *Vice*, yet they may be *Evidences* of either in the Agent, as well as his *external Motions*. 'Tis not poſſible indeed for Men to determine preciſely in many caſes the *Quantity of Evidence*, and its *proportion* to the Sagacity of the Obſerver, which will argue *Guilt* in him, who contrary to it, forms a *falſe Opinion*. But Men are no better judges of the *Degrees of Virtue*

Sect. 6. *and Vice* in external Actions. This therefore will not prove that all *falſe Opinions* or *Errors* are innocent, more than *external Actions:* The Searcher of Hearts can judge exactly of both. Human *Puniſhments* are only *Methods of Self-Defenſe*; in which the *Degrees of Guilt* are not the proper Meaſure, but the *Neceſſity of reſtraining Actions for the Safety of the Publick.*

How want of Attention evidences a bad Temper.

VII. It is next to be conſidered, how far *want of Attention* to the Deity can argue *want of good Affections*, in any Agent, to whom he is known.

Every *good Temper* will have ſtrong Affections to a good Deity, and where there is *ſtrong Affection* there will be *frequent Reflection* upon the Object beloved, *Deſire* of pleaſing, and *Caution* of offence. In like manner every Perſon of good Temper, who has had the Knowledge of a *Country*, a *Syſtem*, a *Species*, will conſider how far theſe great Societies may be affected by his Actions, with ſuch Attention as he uſes in his own Affairs; and will abſtain from what is injurious to them.

Attention to a Deity apprehended as good, and governing the Univerſe, will increaſe the *Moment of Beneficence* in any good

good Agent, various ways, ſuch as by Sect. 6.
Proſpects of *Reward*, either preſent or future, by improving his Temper thro' Obſervation of ſo amiable a *Pattern*, or by raiſing Sentiments of *Gratitude* toward the DEITY, a part of whoſe Happineſs the Agent may imagine depends upon the Happineſs of the Univerſe. In like manner, the conſidering a *Species* or *Syſtem* may increaſe our *good Offices*, ſince *their* Intereſts are advanced by good Offices to *Individuals*.

BUT then from a like Reaſoning to that in *Art.* II. 'tis plain, that in *equal Moments* of good produced by two Agents, the *Goodneſs of the Temper* is inverſly as the ſeveral *additional Helps*, or *Motives* to it. So that *more Virtue* is evidenced by any given *Moment* of Beneficence from good Affections only toward our *Fellows*, or particular Perſons, than by the *ſame Moment* produced from the joint Conſiderations of the DEITY, or of a general *Syſtem* or *Species*.

BUT an injurious Action which appeared to the Agent not only *pernicious to his Fellows*, or to particular Perſons, but *offenſive to the* DEITY, and pernicious to a *Syſtem*, is much more vicious than when the Agent did not reflect upon the DEITY, or a *Community*.

Sect. 6.

Nothing in this Scheme ſuperſedes the Duty of Love to the DEITY, *and* general Benevolence.

VIII. We muſt not hence imagine, that in order to produce greater Virtue in our ſelves, we ſhould regard the DEITY no farther, than merely to *abſtain from Offences*. Were it our ſole Intention in beneficent Actions, only to obtain the *private Pleaſure* of *Self-Approbation* for the Degree of our Virtue, this might ſeem the proper Means of having *great Virtue* with the leaſt *Expence*. But if the real Intention, which conſtitutes an Action virtuous, be the *promoting publick Good*; then *voluntarily* to reject the Conſideration of any Motive which would increaſe the *Moment* of publick Good, or would make us more vigorous and ſtedfaſt in Virtue, muſt argue *want of good Affection*. In any *given Moment* of Beneficence, the unaffected *Want* of Regard to the DEITY, or to *private Intereſt*, does really argue greater Virtue. But the *retaining theſe Motives* with a View to increaſe the *Moment* of publick Good in our Actions, if they really do ſo, argues Virtue equal to, or greater than that in the former Caſe: And the *affected Neglect* of theſe Motives, that ſo we may acquit our ſelves virtuouſly with the *leaſt Expence* to our ſelves, or with the leaſt Moment of publick Good, muſt evidence *want of good Affections*, and baſe *Trick* and *Artifice* to impoſe upon Ob-

Obſervers, or our own Hearts. There- Sect. 6.
fore

SINCE Gratitude to the DEITY, and even Conſideration of *private Intereſt*, tend to increaſe the Moment of our Beneficence, and to ſtrengthen good Affections, the voluntary *Retaining* them with this View evidences Virtue, and *affecting* to neglect them evidences Vice*. And yet,

IF the Moment produced by the Conjunction of theſe Motives, be not greater than that produced with unaffected Neglect of theſe Motives, from particular good

* THIS may ſufficiently juſtify the *Writers of Morality* in their proving, that "Virtue is the ſureſt Means of Happineſs to the Agent." 'Tis alſo plain from univerſal *Experience*, that a *Regard to the Deity*, frequent *Reflection* on his Goodneſs, and conſequent *Acts of Love*, are the ſtrongeſt and moſt univerſally prevailing *Means* of obtaining a good Temper. Whatever *Inſtitution* therefore does moſt effectually tend to raiſe Mens *Attention*, to *recal* their Minds from the Hurry of their common Affairs, to *inſtruct* them in the Ways of promoting publick Good farther than the buſy Part of the World without aſſiſtance would probably apprehend, muſt be ſo *wiſe* and *good*, that every honeſt Mind ſhould rejoice in it, even tho it had no other *Authority* than *human* to recommend it. Every one will underſtand that by this is meant a *publick Worſhip* on ſet Days, in which a ſtop is put to Commerce, and the buſy part of Mankind inſtructed in the Duties of *Piety* and *Humanity*.

Sect. 6. Affection, there is leſs Virtue in the former than in the latter.

MEN may uſe Names as they pleaſe, and may chuſe to call nothing *Virtue* but "what is intended chiefly to evi-"dence *Affection* of one kind or other "toward the DEITY." Writers on this Scheme are not well agreed about what this *virtuous Intention* is; whether only to evidence *Submiſſion*, or *Submiſſion* and *Love*, or to *obtain the divine Benevolence*, and *private Happineſs* to the Agent, or to *give Pleaſure to the Deity*. But let them not aſſert, againſt univerſal *Experience*, that we *approve* no Actions which are not thus intended toward the DEITY. 'Tis plain, a *generous compaſſionate Heart*, which, at firſt view of the Diſtreſs of another flies impatiently to his Relief, or ſpares no Expence to accompliſh it, meets with ſtrong *Approbation* from every Obſerver who has not perverted his *Senſe of Life* by *School-Divinity*, or *Philoſophy*. 'Tis to be ſuſpected, that ſome *Vanity* muſt be at the Bottom of theſe Notions, which place Virtue in ſome *Nicety*, which *active Tempers*, have not leiſure to apprehend, and only the *Recluſe Student* can attain to.

Sect. 6.

To be led by a *weaker Motive*, where a *ſtronger* is alike preſent to the Mind, to love a Creature *more* than GOD, or to have *ſtronger Deſires* of doing what is grateful to Creatures than to GOD, when we equally attend to both, would certainly argue ſome *Perverſion of our Affections*; or to ſtudy the *particular Good* of one, more than that of a *Syſtem*, when we reflected on both: But as no *finite Mind* can retain at once a *Multiplicity of Objects*, ſo it cannot *always* retain any one Object. When a Perſon therefore not thinking at preſent of the DEITY, or of a *Community* or *Syſtem*, does a beneficent Action from *particular Love*, he evidences *Goodneſs of Temper*. The bare *Abſence* of the Idea of a DEITY, or of *Affections* to him, can evidence no evil; otherways it would be a Crime to *fall aſleep*, or to think of any thing elſe: If the *bare Abſence* of this Idea be no evil, the Preſence of *kind Affections* to Fellow-Creatures cannot be evil. If indeed our Love to the DEITY excited to any Action, and at the *ſame time* Love to a *Creature* excited to the Omiſſion of it, or to a contrary Action, we muſt be very criminal if the *former* do not prevail; yet this will not argue all Actions to be evil in which *pleaſing the* DEITY,

Sect. 6. is not directly and chiefly intended. Nay, that Temper muſt really be very *defi-cient* in Goodneſs, which needs to excite it to any good Office, to recal the Thoughts of a DEITY, or a *Community*, or a *Syſtem*. The frequent recalling theſe Thoughts, indeed, does ſtrengthen all good Affections, and increaſes the *Moment* of Beneficence to be expected from any Temper; and with this *View* frequently to recal ſuch Thoughts, muſt be one of the beſt *Helps* to Virtue, and evidence high Degrees of it. Nay, one cannot call that Temper *entire* and *complete*, which has not the *ſtrongeſt Affection* toward the greateſt Benefactor, and the moſt worthy Object.

BEINGS of ſuch Degrees of *Knowledge*, and ſuch *Extent* of Thought, as Mankind are not only capable of, but generally obtain, when nothing interrupts their Inquiries, muſt naturally ariſe to the Knowledge of the DEITY, if their Temper be good. They muſt form *general Conceptions* of the whole, and ſee the *Order*, *Wiſdom*, and *Goodneſs* in the *Adminiſtration of Nature* in ſome Degree. The Knowledge and Love of the DEITY, the *univerſal* MIND, is as *natural* a Perfection to ſuch a Being as Man, as any Accompliſhment to which we arrive by culti-

cultivating our natural Diſpoſitions; nor is that Mind come to the *proper State* and *Vigor* of its kind, where *Religion* is not the main *Exerciſe* and *Delight*. Sect. 6.

IX. THERE is one very ſubtle Argument on this Subject. Some alledge, "That "ſince the DEITY is really the *Cauſe* of "all the Good in the Univerſe, even of "all the *Virtue*, or *good Affection* in "Creatures, which are the ſeeming *Cauſes* "*of Love* toward them, it muſt argue "ſtrange *Perverſion* of Temper to love "thoſe in whom there is no *Cauſe of* "*Love*, or who are (as they affect to "ſpeak) *nothing*, or *Emptineſs of all* "*Goodneſs*. The DEITY alone is amiable, "in whom there is infinite *Fulneſs of* "*every amiable Quality*. The DEITY, "ſay they, not without ſome Reaſon, is "the *Cauſe* of every *pleaſant Senſation*, "which he immediately excites according "to a *general Law*, upon the Occaſion "of *Motions* ariſing in our Bodies; that "likewiſe he gave us that general *Incli-* "*nation*, which we modify into all our "different *Affections*; GOD therefore, "ſay they, is alone *lovely*. Other Things "are not to be beloved, but only the "*Goodneſs of God appearing in them*; "nay ſome do make the *loving* of them, "without conſidering GOD as diſplay- "ing *Whether the* DEITY *is the ſole proper* Object of Love.

Sect. 6. " ing his Goodneſs in them, to be infi-
" nitely evil."

IN anſwer to this it muſt be owned, that " GOD's being the Cauſe of all " the Good in the Univerſe, will no " doubt raiſe the higheſt Love to him in a " good Temper, when it reflects upon " it."

BUT 1ſt, had all Men this Apprehenſion that " there was no good in any Crearure," they really would not love them at all. But Men generally imagine with very good ground, that there are *good Beings* diſtinct from God, tho produced by him: And whether this Opinion be true or falſe, it evidences no evil.

2. AS upon this Scheme GOD is the Cauſe of all *pleaſant Senſation*, ſo is he the Cauſe of all Pain: He is, according to them, the Cauſe of that *Inclination* which we modify into *evil Affection*, as well as into *good*. If then we are to love GOD only, for what we call *good Affection* in Creatures, and not the Creatures themſelves, we muſt alſo only love GOD upon obſerving *evil Affections* in Creatures, and have no *Averſion* to the *baſeſt Temper*, ſince God gave the general INCLINATION alike in both Caſes.

3. IF

Sect. 6.

3. IF we may ſuppoſe *real Beings* diſtinct from GOD, that *their* Affections are not GOD's Affections, if GOD is not the only *Lover* and *Hater*, if our *moral Senſe* is determined to approve *kind Affections*, and our *Love* or *Benevolence* muſt ariſe toward what we *approve*; or if we find an *Inſtinct* to deſire the Happineſs of every ſenſitive Nature, we cannot avoid loving Creatures, and we muſt *approve* any *kind Affections* obſerved in others toward their Fellows. 'Tis true, we muſt approve the *higheſt Affections* toward the DEITY, and *condemn*, as a *Deficiency* of juſt Affections toward GOD any Degree which is not ſuperior to our other Affections. But ſtill, *Affections* towards Creatures, if they be *diſtinct Natures* from GOD, muſt be approved.

4. IF to make a Mind virtuous, or even innocent, it be neceſſary that it ſhould have ſuch ſublime Speculations of GOD, as the τὸ πᾶν in the *Intellectual active Syſtem* (if we may call *one Agent* in many *Paſſive Organs* an *active Syſtem*) then God has placed the Bulk of Mankind in an abſolute *Incapacity* of Virtue, and inclined them perpetually to infinite Evil, by their very *Inſtincts* and *natural Affections*. Does the *parental Affection* direct

Sect. 6. rect a Man to love the DEITY, or his *Children*? Is it the DIVINITY, to which our *Pity* or *Compaſſion* is directed? Is GOD the Object of *Humanity*? Is it a *Deſign* to ſupport the DIVINITY, which we call *Generoſity* or *Liberality*? Upon *Receipt of a Benefit*, does our Nature ſuggeſt only *Gratitude toward* GOD? Affections toward the DEITY may indeed often accompany Affections toward Creatures, and do ſo in a virtuous Temper: but theſe are diſtinct Affections. This Notion of making all virtuous Affections to be only directed toward GOD, is not ſuggeſted to Men by any thing in their *Nature*, but ariſes from the long ſubtle *Reaſonings* of Men at leiſure, and unemployed in the natural Affairs of Life.

5. IF there be no Virtue or Cauſe of Love in Creatures, it is vain for them to debate wherein their Virtue conſiſts, whether in regard toward the DEITY, or in any thing elſe, ſince they are ſuppoſed to have none at all.

TO conclude this Subject. It ſeems probable, that however we muſt look upon that Temper as exceedingly *imperfect*, *inconſtant*, and *partial*, in which *Gratitude toward the univerſal Benefactor*, *Admiration* and *Love* of the *ſupreme*

preme original Beauty, Perfection and Goodneſs, are not the *ſtrongeſt* and moſt *prevalent* Affections; yet *particular Actions* may be innocent, nay virtuous, where there is no actual *Intention* of pleaſing the DEITY, influencing the Agent. Sect. 6.

FINIS.

Juſt publiſh'd, by the ſame Author,

AN Inquiry into the Original of our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue; in two Treatiſes. I. *Concerning Beauty, Order, Harmony, and Deſign.* II. *Concerning Moral Good and Evil. The ſecond Edition, corrected and enlarg'd.*

PROPOSALS

For printing by Subſcription,

AN hiſtorical, critical, geographical, chronological, and etymological Dictionary of the *Holy Bible*; wherein are explain'd all the proper Names, mention'd in the *Old* or *New Teſtament*, whether of Men, Cities, Countries, Rivers, Mountains, &c. As alſo the ſignificant and remarkable Appellatives that any where occur therein, and all the natural Productions, as Plants, Animals, Stones, Gems, &c. The whole digeſted into alphabetical Order, and illuſtrated with correct Maps, and a very great Variety of beautiful Copper Plates, repreſenting the Antiquities and other Curioſities of the *Jews*.

To which is prefixed, *Bibliotheca Sacra*, a copious Catalogue of the beſt Editions and Verſions of the *Bible*. Together with an Account of the moſt valuable Commentaries, Expoſitions, and Paraphraſes upon the Whole or any Part thereof. Concluding with a brief Chronology of the Hiſtory of the *Bible*, a *Jewiſh* Calendar, Tables of all the *Jewiſh* Coins, Weights and Meaſures, reduced to our own; and a literal Tranſlation of all the *Hebrew*, *Chaldee*, *Syriac*, and *Greek* Names in the *Bible*. With Prefaces proper to each Part. Written originally in *French* by Father *Auguſtin Calmet*,

Calmet, a *Benedictine* Monk, Abbot of St. *Leopold* in *Nancy*. And now tranſlated into *Engliſh*, with additional Notes, by *Samuel D'Oyley* M. A. late Fellow of *Trinity-College* in *Cambridge*, and Chaplain to the Right Honourable the Earl of *Lincoln*; and *John Colſon* F. R. S. and Vicar of *Chalk* in *Kent*.

This Work upon the neareſt Computation will make about three Hundred and Forty Sheets in *Folio*, beſides one Hundred and Eighteen curious Copper Plates, Forty-nine whereof are whole Sheet-plates, and Sixty-four half Sheets, including ſix large Maps. The Price to Subſcribers will be three Guineas and a half in Sheets: One Guinea and a half to be paid down, and the Remainder on Delivery. A ſmall Number will be printed on a ſuperfine royal Paper, at ſix Guineas, two of which to be paid in Hand.

Subſcriptions are taken in by *John Smith* and *William Bruce* Booksellers in *Dublin*; *John Osborn* and *John Longman* at the Ship in *Pater-noſter-Row*, and by moſt other Bookſellers in *Great Britain* and *Ireland*.

00059703

Digitized with financial assistance from the
Government of Maharashtra
on 15 June, 2016